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When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act'
(ADA or the Act) in 1990, it consciously chose to expand the universe
of actors covered by federal disability discrimination law in accord-
ance with Congress's intent that the ADA function as a "clear and
comprehensive mandate" that all forms of disability discrimination be
eradicated from American society.2 Prior to the ADA's enactment,
only federal agencies and entities receiving federal financial assistance
had been prohibited from discriminating based on disability under
federal law-specifically section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 3-but the ADA cast the net far more broadly, extending it to
private employers, state and local governments, and public accommo-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. BA.
University of Virginia 1984; J.D. Vanderbilt University 1987. This Article benefited
from comments by Anita Silvers and from excellent research assistance by Dylan
Hughes, Sarah Ream, Wendy Roop, and Susan Salmon. My thanks also go to the
Hastings College of the Law Summer Stipend Program for supporting my research.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-33 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13
(1990)).
2 "It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a clear and comprehensive na-
tional mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
3 The law states:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States... shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under
any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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dations. 4 In enacting the ADA, Congress also chose to explain far
more fully and broadly than it had in section 504 the types of action
that it believed constituted discrimination based on disability. Section
504 simply states that a covered actor cannot take the following ac-
tions against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability: ex-
clude him from participation in, deny him the benefits of, or subject
him to discrimination under a covered program or activity. 5 The
ADA, by contrast, addresses in its statutory mandate the failure to pro-
vide reasonable accommodations, 6 the segregation of people with dis-
abilities into separate programs, 7 and the use of criteria that screen
out people with disabilities,8 among other examples of prohibited dis-
criminatory behavior.
When it came to identifying who would be protected from dis-
crimination under the ADA, however, Congress decided to leave well
enough alone. It adopted the definition of handicap that had been
used in the Rehabilitation Act since 1974 and adopted it essentially
verbatim, only substituting the word "disability" for "handicap."9
Moreover, the statute itself directs that the ADA's definition of disabil-
ity be interpreted no more narrowly than the meanings of handicap
that had grown up out of the regulations issued under section 504,10
and the ADA's legislative history evidences Congress's intent that the
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (1994) (prohibiting in Title I discrimination by pri-
vate employers); §§ 12131-50 (prohibiting in Title II discrimination by public services
and public entities); §§ 12181-89 (prohibiting in Title III discrimination by public
accommodations and services operated by private entities).
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (1994) (providing that covered employers
must make "reasonable accommodations" for individuals with disabilities so long as
such accommodation does not constitute an "undue hardship"); cf. § 12131(2) (refer-
ring to reasonable modifications in defining "qualified individual with a disability");
§ 12182(b) (2) (A) (making it discriminatory for public accommodations to fail to
make reasonable modifications in order to extend goods and services or make avail-
able facilities to individuals with disabilities).
7 See § 12182 (b) (1) (A) (iii) (making it discriminatory to provide individuals with
disabilities an accommodation different or separate from that provided to others un-
less necessary to ensure equal opportunity for those with disabilities).
8 See § 12182 (b) (2) (A) (i) (making it discriminatory for public accommodations
to use eligibility criteria that have a disparate impact on individuals with disabilities).
9 For a discussion of the definition employed by the Rehabilitation Act, see infra
text accompanying notes 55-65.
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a) (1994): "Except as othenvise provided in this chapter,
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the stan-
dards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.)
or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."
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term be interpreted in accordance with section 504 case law." Given
that Congress, when it enacted the ADA, sought to maintain the status
quo in terms of who was protected from discrimination, one might
have anticipated that the question of who could bring suit under the
ADA would provoke little litigation. One would have been wrong. It
appears that the ADA turns the adage on its head, for when it comes
to legal definitions of disability, "the more things stay the same, the
more they change."
Who could claim protection from discrimination based on handi-
cap was a question that was rarely litigated under section 504,12 and
the relatively uncontroversial nature of the definition of disability con-
tinued for a number of years following the ADA's enactment. Indeed,
as recently as 1996, one court that decided to address sua sponte the
threshold question of whether the plaintiff had a disability refrained
from chastising the parties for failing to raise the issue because, ac-
cording to the court, "it is the rare case when the matter of whether
an individual has a disability is even disputed.' 3 Over the past several
years, however, the frequency of litigation over plaintiffs' status as in-
dividuals with a disability eligible to bring an action under the ADA
has increased dramatically, so much so that one expert on ADA litiga-
tion estimated in March 1998 that the plaintiff's disabled status was a
contested issue in over half of the ADA cases being litigated at that
time.14
Several factors may contribute to this rash of litigation over who
has a disability. The timing of the increased litigation may reflect the
lag time between when the ADA's employment provisions-which are
the source of the vast majority of ADA claims-became fully effective
and when lawsuits based on those provisions made their way to
court.15 Moreover, rather than simply defending ADA suits on
11 See Pritchard v. Southern Co. Serv., 92 F.3d 1130, 1132 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996)
("Congress intended for courts to rely on Rehabilitation Act cases when interpreting
similar language in the ADA.").
12 When Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984), was de-
cided, the court noted that, more than ten years following the enactment of the Reha-
bilitation Act, only one court had previously found a plaintiff under section 504 not to
be handicapped. See id. at 745.
13 Morrow v. City ofJacksonville, 941 F. Supp, 816, 823 n.3 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
14 See Interview with Ruth Colker, National Public Radio, All Things Considered
(Mar. 30, 1998) (transcript available in Westlaw ATCON database).
15 ADA Title I provisions became effective, first for employers with 25 or more
employees after July 26, 1992, then for employers with fifteen or more employees
after July 25, 1994. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(e) (1) (1998). Employers with fewer than
fifteen employees are exempt from ADA coverage. See id. Claimants under Title I of
the ADA must adhere to the administrative procedures outlined in Title VII. 42
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grounds of employer motive or plaintiff qualifications, employers are
increasingly challenging a plaintiff's very right to the ADA's protec-
tion, prompted in part by what has been characterized as a narrowing
of the courts' perspective on the meaning of disability.16
The amount-though not timing-of litigation is also undoubt-
edly attributable to the imprecision of the statutory definition itself
and to the inherent difficulties of identifying members of the ADA's
"protected class." The ADA prohibits discrimination against an "indi-
vidual with a disability" and defines disability primarily as a "physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the ma-
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994). If the claimant lives in a state that has its own equal em-
ployment legislation, and its own agency to administer that legislation, he must first
file a charge with that state agency. The state then has 60 days of exclusive jurisdic-
tion over that claim. See § 2000e-5 (c). If the state agency does not act on the charge,
or terminates its jurisdiction for any reason, the claimant may then file his charge with
the EEOC. See § 2000e-5(d). The EEOC then has 180 days of exclusive jurisdiction
over the charge. See § 2000e-5(e) (1). Upon the expiration of that 180-day period,
the claimant may request a "notice-of-right-to-sue" from the EEOC. At this point, the
claimant may file his own private suit against the employer. See § 2000e-5(f) (1).
Thus, it may take at least 240 days from the time the claim is made until a lawsuit is
filed.
In September of 1977, the EEOC issued 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a) (2), authorizing
the issuance of right-to-sue letters before the expiration of the statutory 180-day pe-
riod if the EEOC determined that it would be unable to investigate the claim within
that 180-day period. By 1996, citing a huge backlog of charges, the EEOC informally
instituted a policy of issuing an early right-to-sue letter automatically when a charging
party so requests. See King F. Tower, EEOC Changes "Right-to-Sue" Policy Amidst Legal
Challenges, VA. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER, July 1996. Thus, a "charging party may theo-
retically file an EEOC charge one day and successfully demand a right-to-sue letter
the next." Id. However, some courts have held that the issuance of an early right-to-
sue letter may deprive the court of its jurisdiction, and thus render the claim invalid.
See, e.g., Pearce v. Barry Sable Diamonds, 912 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (certifying
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit the question of whether
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (a) (2) authorizing the issuance of early right-to-sue letters is a
valid regulation). Though the practice continues to be challenged in the courts, the
EEOC maintains its unofficial policy of granting early right-to-sue letters upon
request.
16 See Catherine A. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Indi-
vidualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. Rrv. 327, 328
(1997) (stating that as ADA filings increase in numbers, federal courts have grown
hostile to disability discrimination claims); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking
Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68
U. COLO. L. REv. 107, 112-14 (1997) (explaining why and how employers have in-
creasingly challenged the disability status of plaintiffs and the courts' response).
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jor life activities of such individual."' 7 The statute, however, neglects
to define any of this definition's constitutive elements. The result is a
definition that is notoriously, albeit intentionally, vague and thus sub-
ject to varying interpretations.18 In addition, proving that she is an
individual with a disability is part of a plaintiff's prima facie case in a
suit brought under the ADA, 19 and courts have typically held that as-
sessment of disability must be made on a case-by-case basis. 20 Unlike
other antidiscrimination statutes, in many cases it is not self-evident
that a plaintiff even has the discrimination-prompting attribute. 21 As
defined by the ADA, disability is not a static state of being; nor need it
be a fixed trait. Instead, the boundaries of the category called "disa-
bility" are permeable, with persons moving into and, potentially, out
of the category over the course of their lives.22 Thus, an employer or
other entity defending an ADA claim has both an incentive and op-
17 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (1994). As will be discussed in greater depth in Part
II, the ADA also protects persons who have a history of such an impairment or who
are regarded as having such an impairment. See § 12102(2) (B)-(C).
18 See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The stat-
ute does not itself define the terms 'impairment,' 'substantially limits,' or 'major life
activity,' all of which could have more than one meaning.... [E]ven as to the 'ordi-
nary or natural meanings' of the ADA's words, reasonable minds can differ....").
19 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Delta Airlines, 94 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir. 1996);
Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 882 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Principal Fin.
Group, 93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir. 1996); Pritchard v. Southern Co. Serv., 92 F.3d
1130, 1132 (11th Cir. 1996).
20 In other words, a plaintiff who has diabetes cannot simply cite to a prior deci-
sion as establishing precedent that diabetes is a disability. Instead, he must prove that
his diabetes is an impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life
activities. See, e.g., Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir.
1996); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir.
1995).
21 In other words, as Robert Burgdorf points out, statutes prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on race or sex protect all persons, not simply some protected class, from
discrimination on these bases. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Pro-
tection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of
the Definition of Disability, 42 Vni. L. REv. 409, 423-24 (1997). By contrast, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994), does create a pro-
tected class of persons over the age of 40. See § 631(a). Determining whether a plain-
tifffalls within that protected class, however, is quite straightforward. Burgdorf argues
that the ADA's prohibition of discrimination based on disability should be under-
stood, like Title VII's prohibition of race or sex discrimination, as protecting every-
one from discrimination based on the forbidden ground. See Burgdorf, supra, at
568-72. While well taken, Burgdorf's point does not address the fact that, in order to
claim the ADA's protection, a plaintiff must prove that he satisfies at least one prong
of the broad statutory definition of individual with a disability.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 226-28 for a discussion of the dynamic na-
ture of disability.
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portunity to dispute the plaintifffs status as an individual with a
disability.
Whatever the reasons, the courts are currently encountering a
spate of litigation over what constitutes a disability for purposes of the
ADA. Plaintiffs with conditions ranging from a bent pinky,23 to sea-
sonal affective disorder,24 to breast cancer25 have claimed protection
under the ADA. In attempting to resolve the questions that arise-
some novel and some recurring-courts have looked far and wide for
guidance: to the ADA's language and legislative history, to regulations
issued under the ADA and section 504, to cases decided under these
statutes, and to guidelines issued by agencies charged with enforcing
the ADA.26 None of these sources, however, provides a theoretical
framework for putting into a larger perspective the question of
whether disability exists in a particular case. Not surprisingly, per-
haps, the torrent of decisions on defining disability are all over the
board, and even where trends have emerged on a particular issue,
those trends do not appear to fit into any larger understanding of
whom the ADA should protect.
The lack of a theoretical framework underpinning legal decisions
on who is disabled is itself not surprising. Disability is a topic that has
been generally undertheorized.27 Compared to topics like race and
gender, disability has in the past engendered fewer theoretical exami-
nations. For the past few decades, and increasingly in the 1990s, how-
ever, scholars in the burgeoning field known as "disability studies"
have been approaching the question of "what is disability" from philo-
sophical and social science perspectives, gradually piecing together a
framework for understanding disability as a phenomenon. 28 Like
23 See Ivaniuc v. Hauer Knitting Mills, Inc., No. 94 CV 5909(JS), 1998 WL 57077,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1998).
24 See Robinson v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 899 F. Supp. 848 (D.N.H. 1995).
25 See Malewski v. Nationsbank of Florida, 978 F. Supp. 1095 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
26 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (relying on the plain lan-
guage of the ADA, on regulations issued under the Rehabilitation Act, on regulations
and administrative guidelines issued by agencies administering the ADA, and on pre-
cedent interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
27 See LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NoRmALCY. DIsABILIY, DEAFNESS, AND THE
BODY xii (1995); cf. SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DIsABILITY. KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 147
(1998) (asserting that the liberal arts "have barely noticed disability").
28 See Peter Monaghan, Pioneering Field of Disability Studies Challenges Established Ap-
proaches and Attitudes, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 23, 1998, at A15. Simi Linton
describes the field of inquiry known as disability studies as follows:
Disability studies takes for its subject matter not simply the variations that
exist in human behavior, appearance, functioning, sensory acuity, and cogni-
tive processing but, more crucially, the meaning we make of those variations.
[VCOL. 74:3
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scholars in the fields of race and gender years before them, disability
theorists dispute the assumption that "biology is destiny"29 and assert
that the disadvantages suffered by persons with disabilities, like the
disadvantages suffered by women and African-Americans, are the
product of social practices and not the inevitable consequence of
physical difference. Unlike its race and gender counterparts, how-
ever, disability theory by and large has not filtered into the legal litera-
ture on disability.
30
This Article's purpose is to bring these theoretical perspectives
on disability to bear on some of the issues that have arisen with re-
spect to defining disability for purposes of the ADA. Turning the "dis-
ability kaleidoscope" by adopting these perspectives may cause the
picture-the ongoing struggles over who has a disability and can
claim the ADA's protections-to shift and appear quite different.
Looking at the law of defining disability through a disability studies
lens may bring into focus how some legal decisionmakers continue to
act on the assumption that biology is destiny when it comes to disabil-
ity. More positively, infusing disability theory into the legal literature
might enable legal decisionmakers to shift their own perspectives on
the nature of disability and who should be considered disabled. That
is the mission of this Article.
To that end, Part H sets the legal stage by laying out how federal
statutory definitions of disability have evolved since the middle of this
century, thus illustrating how Congress has endeavored to fit those
The field explores the critical divisions our society makes in creating the
normal versus the pathological, the insider versus the outsider, or the com-
petent citizen versus the ward of the state. It is an interdisciplinary field
based on a sociopolitical analysis of disability and informed both by the
knowledge base and methodologies used in the traditional liberal arts, and
by conceptualizations and approaches developed in areas of the new scholar-
ship. Disability studies has emerged as a logical base for examination of the
construction and function of "disability." These scholarly explorations and
the initiatives undertaken by the disability rights movement have resulted in
new paradigms used to understand disability as a social, political, and cul-
tural phenomenon.
LINTON, supra note 27, at 2.
29 Id. at 143; cf. Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination":" Toward the Broader
Harm of Geneticism, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 345, 345 (1995) (challenging the assump-
tion with respect to genetic differences).
30 Several notable exceptions can be found. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Drimmer, Crip-
ples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social
Polity for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341 (1993); Harlan Hahn, Feminist
Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 97 (1994); Paul K. Longmore, Medical Decision Making and People with
Disabilities: A Clash of Cultures, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 82 (1995).
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definitions to their statutory purposes. Part II also describes briefly
some of the recurring issues that have arisen in litigation over the
definition of disability and considers what guidance the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Bragdon v. Abbott31 will offer lower courts
addressing these issues. Part III then sets the theoretical stage by ex-
amining nonlegal approaches to understanding disability. This Part
looks first at widely accepted conceptual frameworks of disability and
then focuses on the understanding of disability that has grown up out
of the work of disability studies scholars over the past two decades.
Part IV is the meat of the Article. It adopts the perspective of disabil-
ity theory and examines how regulatory and judicial interpretations of
disability often reflect traditional understandings of disability, rather
than the civil rights approach to disability that the ADA purports to
espouse. Specifically, Part IV critiques, from a disability studies view-
point, how administrative and judicial lawmakers have given meaning
to the term "impairment," which is one of the building blocks of the
ADA's definition of disability. Focusing on the particular concept of
impairment offers rich insights into lawmakers' understandings of
what bodily characteristics may give rise to disability, and thus which
persons may be entitled to legal protection. Part V concludes by step-
ping back and assessing more broadly what the impairment critique
suggests with respect to the fundamental task of defining who should
be able to claim the protection of disability discrimination laws.
II. THE LEGAL EvoLUTION OF THE TERM "DIsABILITV'
Congress has used the terms "disability" and "handicap" in a
number of legislative schemes during the second half of the twentieth
century, but has taken various approaches to giving legal content to
those terms. While the thrust of this Article is not primarily historical,
reviewing the different legal meanings attached to the term "disabil-
ity" over the past half-century may inform our understanding of the
issues that continue to arise as the courts attempt to give concrete
meaning to that term today in the context of ADA litigation. To that
end, this Part will briefly describe the variety of meanings given to
disability and handicap in major federal legislation since mid-century.
A. The Social Security Disability Insurance Program
During the 1950s, Congress created the first disability component
of the Social Security Act, a disability insurance program that would
extend cash assistance payments to persons who were unemployable
31 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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due to a disabling physical or mental impairment. Participants in the
debate over the feasibility of a disability insurance program recog-
nized that a core problem would lie in defining the term "disability.
'32
Developing this definition challenged lawmakers to balance providing
coverage to those who needed it with preventing abuse and fraudu-
lent claims.3
3
The definition of "disability" under the legislation ultimately en-
acted in 1956 emphasizes a clinical determination of physical or
mental impairment. Throughout the development of the Social Se-
curity Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, the Advisory Council of
the Social Security Board favored this approach, proposing to restrict
compensable disabilities to those "which can be objectively deter-
mined by medical examinations or tests." 3 4 The statute's final formu-
lation of disability requires the applicant to have a "medically
determinable physical or mental impairment '3 5 evidenced by measur-
able outward signs of disability; patient reports of symptoms and pain
will not suffice unless supported by and consistent with objective
evidence.3
6
In terms of substance, the Social Security definition of disability
focuses on the impact that an individual's impairment or combined
impairments have on her ability to work. The claimant must not only
be incapable of performing her previous job, she must be unable to
"engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy."37  In determining an individual's em-
ployability, the statute allows consideration of factors in addition to
32 See H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 7-8 (1939).
33 See S. Doc. No. 80-1621 (1948). For a detailed accounting of the development
of the disability insurance program, see DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE
68-84 (1984).
34 H.R. Doc. No. 76-110, at 6.
35 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (A) (1995).
36 See § 423(d) (5). The 1967 amendments to the statutory definition of disability
attempted to make it even more objective, requiring that the impairment stem from
"anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." § 423(d) (3).
37 § 423(d) (2) (A) (1995). The Commissioner of Social Security issues regula-
tions quantifying "substantially gainful work." § 423(d) (4) (1995). As of 1997, an
individual earning more than $500 per month from employment would not qualify as
"disabled" for the purposes of the SSA. See 20 C.F.1L § 404.1574(b) (2) (vii) (1997).
The statute, however, does provide that the amount of earnings used to calculate
whether an individual is "disabled" shall not include any amount needed to provide
services, devices, and drugs necessary to control the disabling condition, within "rea-
sonable limits." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (4). For an examination of the boundaries of the
disability category under the statute, see Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The
Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361 (1996).
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the medically demonstrable impairment, including "age, education,
and work experience."3 8 The SSDI program understands disability as
total and permanent and does not contemplate the possibility that an
impairment might limit an individual's employment options, or make
work more difficult, without making it altogether impossible. Accord-
ingly, temporary impairments do not qualify as disabilities for SSDI
purposes: the disabling impairment must endure no less than one
year, or must be of the type that normally ends in death.
3 9
In so crafting the definition of "disability" for use in the SSDI
program, Congress sought to erect a clear dividing line between the
"disabled" and the rest of society, so that assistance could be provided
to those persons found unable to work without undermining the obli-
gation to work generally borne by members of society. Accordingly,
the Social Security definition understands disability as a status func-
tionally equivalent to retirement.
40
B. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In contrast to Congress's understanding of disability as a status
that exempts one from the obligation to work-an understanding em-
bodied in the SSDI program's definition of disability-federal legisla-
tion enacted in 1973 viewed disabled individuals as potentially capable
of working. Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in an
attempt to broaden and improve existing vocational rehabilitation
programs41 and to extend services to a broader range of individuals
with disabilities, including those who might not obviously benefit vo-
cationally.42 In particular, the Rehabilitation Act was intended to
reach those individuals with the most severe handicaps, those which
would require numerous vocational services over a prolonged pe-
riod.43 In considering the legislation, the Senate Committee articu-
lated the desire to commit the requisite time and money to ensure
that any individual who could reach vocational goals would be empow-
38 42 U.S.G. § 423(d) (2) (A) (1995). By contrast, the Social Security Administra-
tion cannot consider whether eligible work exists in the region in which the claimant
resides, or whether the claimant might face obstacles to being hired because of em-
ployer assumptions or stereotypes about his impairment.
39 See§ 423(d) (1) (A).
40 See Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEx. L. Ray. 1003, 1015-16
(1998).
41 For a description of federal rehabilitation legislation predating the Rehabilita-
tion Act, see Drimmer, supra note 30, at 1364-71.
42 See S. REP. No. 93-318 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086, 2092.
43 See id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(15) (A) (ii) (1995) (defining severe handicap).
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ered to do so.44 By eliminating the word "vocational" from the name
of the bill, however, Congress simultaneously signaled a commitment
to giving every handicapped individual the benefit of government re-
habilitative services, without requiring eventual employability as a con-
dition to the eligibility for services. 45 Notwithstanding this apparent
magnanimity, Congress justified government funding of these services
in economic terms by focusing on freeing the caregivers of those with
severe disabilities to reenter the workforce.
46
The Rehabilitation Act, however, went beyond simply expanding
existing rehabilitation programs by demonstrating a new intent on the
part of Congress to secure equal lights for individuals with disabilities.
This intent is most amply illustrated by the inclusion of section 504 of
the Act, which prohibited any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance from discriminating against any "otherwise quali-
fied handicapped individual ... solely by reason of his handicap."
47
Thus, Congress provided a limited promise of civil rights to handi-
capped individuals as a complement to its promise of rehabilitation
services.
Despite this inclusion of civil rights goals, the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of persons covered by the statute retained a vocational fo-
cus.48 The Act defined a qualifying "individual with a disability' as a
person whose mental or physical disability "constitutes or results in a
substantial impediment to employment ' 49 and required that the "indi-
vidual with a disability ... benefit in terms of an employment out-
come" from the services provided.50 This definition seems to belie
Congress's stated intent to provide services for all those with disabili-
ties, regardless of the foreseeable vocational outcome. 51 Moreover,
the employment focus of this definition was particularly problematic
as applied to section 504.52 The "vocationally focused" definition left
unprotected from discrimination any individual with a disability who
44 See S. REP. No. 93-318 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086, 2095.
45 See id. at 2092.
46 See id. at 2092-93.
47 Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1994)).
48 See S. REP. No. 93-318 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086, 2092.
49 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (A) (i) (1995).
50 § 706(8) (A) (ii).
51 In fact, the definition reflects a concession to President Nixon, who, in his veto
message for a 1972 version of the bill, resisted shifting the legislation's focus away
from vocational rehabilitation as a dilution of the resources and purpose of the Act
and cautioned against adopting "welfare or medical goals." See S. REP. No. 93-318
(1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2086, 2089.
52 See S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6388.
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did not need, or was unable to benefit from, vocational rehabilita-
tion.53 Thus, children with disabilities, individuals with the most se-
vere disabilities, elderly persons with disabilities, and individuals who
had successfully completed rehabilitation all remained unprotected
from intentional discrimination.5
4
C. The 1974 Rehabilitation Act Amendments
Recognizing that the original definition simply did not work in
the context of prohibiting discrimination, Congress amended the Re-
habilitation Act in 1974 to create a new definition of "handicapped
individual" for purposes of section 504.55 In doing so, not only did
Congress seek to remedy the defects of the earlier definition, it also
wanted the new formulation to cover individuals discriminated against
based on assumptions about physical or mental impairments, regard-
less of whether those individuals actually had an impairment.56 In the
process, Congress eliminated all reference to employment in the defi-
nition of "handicapped individual"57 and sought to craft a definition
that would embody "a broad government policy that programs receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance shall be operated without discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap."58
The product was a three-pronged approach to defining "handi-
capped individuals," which sought to address the variety of ways in
which those individuals may be discriminated against. 59 The first
prong covers individuals who have "a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life ac-
tivities."60 Often called the "actual disability" prong, it requires a
plaintiff seeking coverage under section 504 to prove three basic facts:
that the individual has either a physical or mental impairment, that
the impairment limits a major life activity, and that the limitation is
substantial. The statutory language itself provides no clarification of
the terms "impairment," "major life activity," or "substantially limits."
The definition's second prong protects individuals who have a
record of an impairment that would substantially limit a major life
activity. 61 The purpose here is to cover individuals who have been
53 See id. at 6389.
54 See id. at 6388-89.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 6389-90 (expressing the intent to broaden coverage).
57 See id. at 6389.
58 Id. at 6390.
59 See id. at 6389.
60 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (B) (i) (1995).
61 See § 706(8) (B) (ii).
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classified or labeled as having a disability, whether erroneously or cor-
rectly.62 Additionally, the second prong applies to persons who have
recovered, either totally or partially, from a condition that constituted
an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity.63 These indi-
viduals are included in the definition because Congress recognized
the potential stigma that attaches once an individual is labeled as
handicapped and the detrimental effects of that stigma on an individ-
ual's opportunities for employment and services. Thus, the "record
of' prong acknowledges that stereotypes about disability may be as
much a barrier to individuals with disabilities as the impairments
themselves.6
Similar concerns motivated Congress's inclusion of the third
prong of the definition of handicapped individual, which covers indi-
viduals who are "regarded as" being handicapped. 65 This prong cov-
ers both individuals who are erroneously believed to have an
impairment and those who do have some impairment, but who are
not substantially limited in any major life activity. Again, Congress
broadened the definition in an attempt to protect persons from the
negative effects of society's assumptions and stereotypes about disabili-
ties, not simply from discrimination based on function-limiting
impairments.
The Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare (HEW) is-
sued regulations analyzing and interpreting section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act 66 and clarifying some of the terms in the amended
statutory definition of handicapped individual. Specifically, the regu-
lations defined "physical impairment" as meaning any "physiological
disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" af-
fecting any of the following bodily systems: "neurological; musculo-
skeletal; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine."67 A "mental impairment" under the regulations was
"any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, or-
ganic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learn-
ing disabilities. ' 68  The HEW regulations acknowledged the
prohibitive difficulty of listing all the diseases and conditions encom-
62 See S. REP. No. 93-1297 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389.
63 See id.
64 See H.R. RE'. No. 101-485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 303, 334-35.
65 See § 706(8) (B) (iii); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 53 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335.
66 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3 (1997).
67 § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (A).
68 § 84.3(j) (2) (i) (B).
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passed by the regulatory definition of impairment, but offered an il-
lustrative list.69 The HEW regulations also illuminated the meaning of
"major life activities," giving as examples "functions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speak-
ing, breathing, learning, and working."70 The regulations, however,
neglected to shed any light on the meaning of "substantially limits."
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Almost two decades after first prohibiting discrimination based
on handicap, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 and extended the prohibition of discrimination to the private
sector.71 In the legislative findings included in the statute, Congress
recognized individuals with disabilities as a "discrete and insular mi-
nority" who had been subjected to discrimination and "political
powerlessness" based on their disabilities. 72 In addition, the statute
expressly acknowledges the existence of "stereotypic assumptions"
about disability that are "not truly indicative of the individual ability
of... individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society. '73 The
ADA's stated goals are broader than the Rehabilitation Act's, for the
ADA expressly seeks to "assure equality of opportunity, full participa-
tion, [and] independent living" for persons with disabilities. 74 None-
theless, like the Rehabilitation Act and the Social Security Act before
it, the ADA falls back on economic justifications. Alongside its other
goals, the ADA seeks to assure "economic self-sufficiency" for individu-
als with disabilities, presumably through gainful employment,75 and
Congress's findings cite the desire to diminish the cost to society and
69 See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685-94 (May 4, 1990). This list included orthopedic, visual,
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multi-
ple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
drug addiction, and alcoholism. The legislative history of the 1986 Amendments to
the Rehabilitation Act added autism, bum injury, and head injury to this list. See also
H.R. REP. No. 99-571, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3471, 3487.
70 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (ii) (1997). The legislative history of the 1986 Amend-
ments to the Rehabilitation Act added interpersonal skills to this list. See H.R. REP.
No. 99-571, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3471, 3487.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 24-25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
268. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111-17 (1994). Title II addresses access to public programs and services. See
§§ 12131-65. Title III covers public accommodations. See §§ 12181-89.
72 § 12101 (a) (7).
73 Id.
74 § 12101 (a) (8). For a further discussion of the relationship between the SSA
and ADA definitions of disability, see Diller, supra note 40.
75 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
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the national economy from individuals with disabilities "resulting
from dependency and nonproductivity."
76
To advance its goals, Congress adopted for the ADA virtually the
same three-pronged definition of a handicapped individual used in
the 1974 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, simply substituting
the phrase "individual with a disability" for "handicapped individ-
ual. ' 77 The ADA's drafters made clear Congress's intention that the
ADA's definition of disability should be interpreted consistently with
section 504's language and HEW's implementing regulations.78 Simi-
larly, the ADA Committee Reports recite verbatim from HEW's sec-
tion 504 regulations regarding the definition of "physical or mental
impairment. ''79 Moreover, the ADA's legislative history specifies that
the third "regarded as" prong of the disability definition seeks to pro-
tect individuals who are not actually disabled from adverse treatment
based on "negative reactions," "misinformation," and "negative atti-
tudes toward disability."80
As it did with the Rehabilitation Act, Congress resisted a "laundry
list" of qualifying disabilities under the ADA as prohibitively difficult
and potentially overly restrictive, 8' but the legislative history of the
ADA suggests the parameters of Congress's understanding of disabil-
ity. The ADA Committee Reports reproduced HEW's illustrative list
of covered impairments, with the addition of HIV infection,82 and re-
jected the idea that coverage should be limited to "traditional" disabil-
ities.83 Nonetheless, Congress intended to exclude from the ADA's
coverage "minor, trivial impairments,"84 and Congress further indi-
76 § 12101(a)(9).
77 See § 12102(2). For a further analysis of the breadth and implications of the
ADA's definition, see WilliamJ. McDevitt, Defining the Term "Disability" Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 281 (1998). See also Robert L.
Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991).
78 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989) (defining "individual with a disability" as
consistent with "individual with handicaps" in section 7(8) (B) of the Rehabilitation
Act); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.G.C.A.N. 303,
332 (defining "disability" under ADA as parallel to "individual with handicaps" in Re-
habilitation Act).
79 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22.
80 Id. at 23-24.
81 See id. at 22; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 6, at 51; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at
28.
82 SeeS. REP. No. 101-116, at 22; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 6, at 51; H.R. REP. No.
101485, pt. 4, at 28.
83 See H.R. REP. No. 101485, at 52; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (echoing
almost verbatim the language in the House Report).
84 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22.
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cated that mere physical traits, such as eye or hair color, would not
qualify as "impairments" contemplated by the ADA definition.8 5 The
ADA definition similarly excludes any nonphysical, nonmental impair-
ments, such as "environmental, cultural, and economic
disadvantages.
86
More significant exclusions from the ADA's definition of "disabil-
ity" resulted from debate on the Senate floor. Some senators attacked
the ADA definition as creating an overly broad class of individuals who
would be protected from discrimination. 87 In fact, Senator Armstrong
wanted to exclude all conditions listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of MentalDisorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, a move that would have removed many mental impairments
from protection.88 Only an ardent defense by other senators pre-
vented conditions such as AIDS and HIV infection, manic-depression,
and schizophrenia from being expressly excluded from the definition
of "disability."89 Partly as a concession to appease senators favoring a
restrictive definition of "disability" and partly as a compromise to ob-
tain President Bush's signature, 90 certain conditions were ultimately
excluded from the ADA's coverage, including, among others, current
use of illegal drugs, homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism,
transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, compulsive gam-
bling, kleptomania, and pyromania.91
When it enacted the ADA, Congress also explicitly authorized sev-
eral federal agencies-the Equal Employment Opportunity Agency
(EEOC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of
Transportation (DOT)-to issue regulations implementing those pro-




87 See 135 CONG. REC. 19,878-80 (1989).
88 See 135 CONG. REc. 19,871.
89 See 135 CONG. REc. 19,897-03.
90 See Burgdorf, supra note 77, at 519.
91 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12210-11 (1994). For an insightful discussion of these exclu-
sions, see Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a
Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451 (1994).
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994) (authorizing the EEOC to issue regulations im-
plementing Title I), §§ 12134(a) and 12186(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to
issue regulations implementing the public services provisions of Title II and the pub-
lic accommodations provisions of Title III), and §§ 12149, 12164, and 12186 (author-
izing the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations implementing the
transportation-related provisions of Titles II and III).
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The resulting regulations provide a regulatory gloss on the meaning
of disability.
The EEOC issued regulations and interpretive guidelines under
Title I that reject a restrictive approach to defining "disability."93 Un-
like the Social Security Act, the ADA-according to the interpretive
guidelines-does not require that an individual be totally unable to
work in order to qualify as disabled.94 Instead, an individual will be
"substantially limited" in the "major life activity" of working if the indi-
vidual is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class
ofjobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities."9 5
With respect to major life activities other than working, the regu-
lations define "substantially limited" in relation to the abilities of the
"average person in the general population."9 6 An individual's impair-
ment will be deemed "substantially limiting" either if she is entirely
unable to perform a major life activity that the "average" individual
would be able to perform, if she can only perform it in a markedly
altered manner, or if she can only perform it for a much shorter
time.97 The regulations also designate factors to consider in deter-
mining whether a major life activity is "substantially limited." Those
factors include the nature of the impairment, its severity, how long
the impairment can be expected to last, and what type of permanent
or long-term impact the impairment might be expected to have. 98 In-
93 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1997).
94 See 56 Fed. Reg. 8593 (1991).
95 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3) (i) (1998). Though the regulations do not define
.class ofjobs" or "broad range ofjobs," they do provide a list of factors to consider,
including "the geographic area to which the individual has reasonable access" and the
actual availability of a given type ofjob within that geographic area. The regulations
also focus on the skills, knowledge, and training necessary for the type of jobs for
which an individual's disability disqualifies him. For example, an individual might be
disqualified from a "class of jobs" if his impairment prevents him from performing
jobs which require walking. The regulations suggest that an individual would be pre-
vented from performing a "broad range ofjobs" if his impairment would foreclose a
variety ofjobs, requiring different types of skills. See § 1630.20) (3) (ii) (1997).
96 § 1630.20)(1)(i) (1997).
97 See§ 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
98 See § 1630.2 0) (2). These factors suggest that the more permanent and severe
an impairment is, the more likely it is to qualify as a covered disability. For example, a
broken arm that healed within several weeks would not qualify as a disability. By
contrast, a broken arm that healed improperly, causing permanent damage and mak-
ing it difficult for the individual to write, would probably be a disability for ADA
purposes.
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deed, the ADA Tide I regulations expressly exclude impairments of
short duration as insufficiently limiting.99
The EEOC regulations and interpretive guidelines also illuminate
the third prong of the ADA's "disability" definition, which deals with
perceived disability. The regulations indicate that the "regarded as"
prong covers (1) an individual who has an impairment that does not
substantially limit a major life activity, but who is treated as if the im-
pairment is substantially limiting; (2) an individual who has an impair-
ment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of
others' attitudes toward such impairment; and (3) an individual who
has no impairment, but who is treated as if she does have a substan-
tially limiting impairment.100 Moreover, the guidelines indicate that,
if an employer makes an adverse employment decision against an indi-
vidual because of "myths, fears and stereotypes" about disability, then
its action would fall under the third prong of the "disability" defini-
tion, whether the employer's perception was a universal or an idiosyn-
cratic one.' 0 1 Thus, if an individual is treated differently because of
"common attitudinal barriers" faced by individuals with disabilities-
including assumptions about their productivity, reliability, or safety,
increased costs resulting from accommodation, insurance, liability, or
fears about the possible reactions from coworkers or clients-then
that individual is regarded as having a disability and the discrimina-
tory treatment is prohibited by the ADA.
E. Persistent Issues and Supreme Irresolution
Despite attempts by the agencies charged with enforcing the ADA
to clarify and to provide interpretive guidance on the statute's defini-
tion of "disability," numerous interpretive issues relating to that defi-
nition have arisen in cases filed under the ADA. Some questions
99 See § 1630.20). In analyzing the factors for "substantially limited," the inter-
pretive guidelines provide that "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short dura-
tion, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities."
The guidelines, however, provide no "bright line" test for determining how long an
impairment's disabling impact must last before it becomes substantially limiting. See
id. By contrast, DOJ and DOT regulations do not impose durational requirements on
disability. According to the DOT, any condition that meets the statutory definition is
a qualifying disability under the ADA, regardless of its duration. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.3
(1997). The DOJ regulations, which do not define "substantially limits," call for a
case-by-case analysis of each impairment, which includes evaluating the impairment's
expected duration and the degree to which it actually limits the individual's ability to
conduct a major life activity. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104, app. b (1998).
100 See § 1630.2(1).
101 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l), app (1998).
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touch on points that the agencies simply did not address, or at least
did not attempt to answer precisely. For example, how should courts
determine whether an activity is a "major life activity" if it is omitted
from the agencies' illustrative list? Litigants have posed this question
with respect to activities as diverse as reproduction,10 2 participation in
interscholastic athletics, 03 the elimination of bodily wastes, 10 4 and
commuting to work.10 5 Other contentious issues arising in the gray
areas left by the regulations include how long an impairment must last
in order to avoid being found to be temporary (and therefore not
covered) ;106 how broadly the "regarded as" prong of the definition
should be interpreted; 10 7 and how limited a person's employment op-
tions must be before she will be considered "substantially limited" in
the major life activity of working.,08
Some persistent issues regarding the meaning of disability, by
contrast, reflect the courts' skepticism of how the agencies interpret
the statutory definition. One issue dividing courts is whether to defer
to the EEOC's conclusion that the determination of whether an im-
pairment exists, and whether it substantially limits a major life activity,
should not take into account the availability of so-called "mitigating
102 Compare Kraul v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
(holding that reproduction is not a major life activity), with Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that reproduction is a major life
activity).
103 Compare Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 863 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that participation in interscholastic athletics is a major life
activity), with Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that playing intercollegiate basketball is not a major life activity).
104 See Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1997) (assuming, with-
out deciding, that the ability to control the elimination of waste is a major life
activity).
105 See Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 975 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan.
1997) (suggesting that commuting to work may be a major life activity). But cf. Reeves
v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
"everyday mobility" is not a major life activity); Lally v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,
No. 95-C4220, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19386 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) (holding that
driving is not a major life activity).
106 See Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 469-88 (discussing the temporary disability
issue).
107 SeeArlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As"Prong: Giving Effect
to Congressional Intent, 42 ViLL. L. REV. 587 (1997).
108 See Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 439-69 (discussing the "exclusion-from-only-
one-job problem"); Locke, supra note 16 (arguing that courts have erroneously re-
quired proof that the plaintiff is generally unemployable before finding substantial
limitation).
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measures."10 9 For example, in considering the impact of diabetes on
a person's life, should a court take into account the effectiveness of
insulin therapy in mitigating the effects of the disease?110 Courts have
also questioned the EEOC's conclusion that some impairments are so
inherently and universally limiting that they should be considered per
se disabilities.1 1  Some courts have rejected thisjudgment, finding in-
stead that the ADA requires an individualized assessment of disability
in all cases.
11 2
Because of the wide range of unsettled issues regarding the defi-
nition of "disability" and their frequent recurrence, many disability
law observers were excited and hopeful for clarification when the
Supreme Court agreed to review an ADA case that hinged on the
meaning of disability. Specifically, the appeal from the First Circuit's
decision in Abbott v. Bragdon1 1 3 asked whether asymptomatic HIV in-
fection was a covered disability under the ADA. Sidney Abbott, a wo-
man infected with HIV, sued Randon Bragdon, a dentist, under the
ADA's public accommodations provisions when he refused, based on
her HIV infection, to fill her cavity in his dental office. Bragdon de-
fended in part1 4 on the grounds that Abbott was not protected by the
109 See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(j), app. (1998) ("The existence of an impairment is to be
determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or
prosthetic devices."); § 1630.20) ("The determination of whether an individual is sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity must be made ... without regard to mitigating
measures....").
110 Compare Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding
that diabetes should be evaluated without considering ameliorative effect of insulin),
with Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that mitigating
measures must be taken into account in evaluating diabetes).
111 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1998) (giving HIV infection as an example).
112 See Lanctot, supra note 16.
113 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), affd in part and remanded in part, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998).
114 Bragdon's other defense posed the second question raised on appeal: Whether
courts should defer to a private health care provider's reasonable professional judg-
ment that treating a patient would pose a direct threat to the health care provider.
The Supreme Court remanded this question for further consideration, after finding
that the record from the First Circuit's decision affirming summary judgment for the
plaintiff did not cite sufficient evidence for the Court to determine whether treating
the plaintiff posed a direct threat to the dentist. The Court held that the First Circuit
may have mistakenly given too much weight to the Centers for Disease Control's Den-
tistry Guidelines, which do not assess the actual risks to dentists posed by treating
HJV-positive patients, and to the American Dental Association Policy on HIV, which is
not the work of a public health organization and does not indicate the scientific basis
for its recommendations. In addition, the Court's consideration of this issue was con-
strained as it did not have "briefs and arguments directed to the entire record" before
it. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2200.
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ADA because she was not an individual with a disability. Both the dis-
trict court1 5 and the First Circuit rejected this defense, finding that
Abbott's HIV infection was a disability within the meaning of the ADA
even though it had not progressed beyond the asymptomatic stage of
the disease.
The appeal presented the Supreme Court with several opportuni-
ties to resolve some of the questions persistently plaguing the lower
courts. For example, the Supreme Court could have resolved whether
the EEOC's view that HIV infection is a per se disability" 6 should be
accepted as an authoritative interpretation of congressional intent.
Similarly, because Sidney Abbott argued that her HIV infection lim-
ited her major life activity of reproduction partly as a result of the risk
of transmitting the virus to a child and because the administration of
antiretroviral therapy can lower that risk from approximately twenty-
five percent to only eight percent,117 the Supreme Court could have
discussed whether the extent of the limitation on reproductive activity
should be assessed in light of the therapy's availability as a mitigating
measure. Moreover, the case furnished the Court with an occasion to
provide lower courts with some practical and specific guidance as to
what makes an activity a "major life activity";" 8 it even gave the Court
a chance to reflect on how the statutory definition of "disability" could
be given meaning in a fashion consistent with the ADA's broader
goals.
In affirming the decision that Sidney Abbott's asymptomatic HIV
infection was a disability for purposes of the ADA, however, the
Supreme Court by and large rejected these opportunities to broadly
clarify the meaning of disability in favor of a fairly narrow decision
specific to Sidney Abbott. Because it found that asymptomatic HIV
infection was a disability for the plaintiff, the Court found it unneces-
sary to address whether HIV infection is a per se disability." 9 Like-
wise, because it reasoned that "[i] t cannot be said as a matter of law
that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child
does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction,"' 20 the
Court found it unnecessary to settle the dispute regarding the rele-
vance of mitigating measures.' 2 ' And finally, while the Court ap-
115 Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
116 29 G.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1998).
117 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
118 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. 554 (granting certiorari on the question of whether repro-
duction is a major life activity).
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proved the First Circuit's resort to the dictionary to determine that
describing a life activity as "major" denotes its "comparative impor-
tance" and "significance," and rejected the contention that major life
activities are limited to activities with a public, economic, or daily di-
mension, 122 the opinion offered little further practical guidance to
lower courts that are called on to decide whether abilities limited by
an impairment should be deemed "major life activities."
Despite the relative narrowness1 23 of its holding in the case, the
Court's opinion is worth scrutinizing for whatever light it might shed
for future cases regarding the definition of "disability." A notable fea-
ture of the opinion is the weight that the Court places on administra-
tive interpretations of disability, particularly the regulations issued
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Because Congress in-
cluded in the ADA a directive that the statute not be construed to
apply lesser standards than those applied under section 504 or its reg-
ulations, the Court felt bound "to construe the ADA to grant at least
as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act."124 Thus, the Court looked to section 504's regula-
tions to find a definition of "physical or mental impairment" and then
had little trouble in concluding-after describing the course of the
HIV disease-that HIV infection "must be regarded as a physiological
disorder with a constant and detrimental effect on the infected per-
son's hemic and lymphatic systems from the moment of infection."'
25
Although the Court did not even look to regulations issued under
the ADA until after it had announced its holding, it stated that the
views of the agencies authorized by Congress to issue regulations im-
plementing the ADA-the EEOC, DOJ, and DOT-are entitled to
deference from the courts.126 Moreover, in proceeding to cite exam-
122 See id. at 2205.
123 An example of this narrowness is displayed in the Court's holding regarding
the major life activity constrained. The Court states: "Reproduction falls well within
the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it
are central to the life process itself." Id. Thus, the Court's holding does not require a
lower court to find that a gay man with an asymptomatic HIV infection is an individ-
ual with a disability, for while the infection might limit the man's sexual activity, gay
or lesbian sexual activity (or, for that matter, sexual activity by a man who has had a
vasectomy or by a postmenopausal or sterilized woman) might not be seen as part of
the "sexual dynamics surrounding [reproduction]." The narrowness of the Court's
holding may be contrasted to the broad reading of "major life activity" suggested by
the Court's dicta. See infra text accompanying notes 124-27.
124 Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202.
125 Id. at 2204.
126 See id. at 2207 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
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ples of post-ADA administrative views consistent with its holding, the
Court cited not only to notice-and-comment regulations issued pursu-
ant to the Administrative Procedures Act, but also to the agencies'
technical assistance documents and interpretive guidelines.127 Thus,
the Court sent a strong message to lower courts to treat administrative
interpretations of the definition of disability as authoritative.
In addition, even though it offered little practical guidance to
lower courts trying to decide whether an activity should be deemed a
"major life activity" the Court's conclusion that "[r] eproduction falls
well within the phrase 'major life activity,"'"28 suggests a broad reading
of the phrase, with the key to an activity's inclusion being its impor-
tance or significance. 129 The Court limited its analysis to reproduc-
tion as a major life activity because that was how Sidney Abbott framed
her case. Nonetheless, the opinion signals the Court's willingness to
consider whether HIV infection may substantially limit other major
life activities.'8 0
Thus, while the Court limited its holding to the facts presented by
the appeal and resisted urgings from the parties and amici to resolve
some of the persistent issues that have arisen regarding the ADA's def-
inition of "disability," the opinion's tone and the dicta suggest that the
five-member majorityl3l might take an expansive view of disability in
127 See id. at 2209 (citing DOJ Title III Technical Assistance Manual (1993), EEOC
Interpretive Manual § 902.2 (reissued Mar. 14, 1995), and 29 C.F.R § 1630, app.
(1997), inter alia).
128 Id. at 2204.
129 Of course, to determine whether an activity is "important" or "significant," one
must ask the question: "Important or significant to what purpose?" The Court does
not indicate any unifying objective for assessing importance. One might read the
Court's conclusion that "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are
central to the life process itself' as signifying that courts should look at whether an
activity is important to the "life process." Limiting major life activities to those impor-
tant to the life process, however, is clearly inconsistent with some of the illustrative
major life activities, such as learning and working, included in the Rehabilitation Act
regnlations. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2)(ii) (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1998).
130 The Court stated:
Given the pervasive, and invariably fatal, course of the disease, its effect on
major life activities of many sorts might have been relevant to our inquiry.
Respondent and a number of amici make arguments about HIV's profound
impact on almost every phase of the infected person's life.... We have little
doubt that had different parties brought the suit they would have main-
tained that an HIV infection imposes substantial limitations on other major
life activities.
Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
131 Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, in which he was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
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other cases. This suggestion, however, is devoid of any broader con-
ceptual understanding of who should be considered disabled for pur-
poses of the ADA or of any theoretical framework for addressing that
question. So it is to nonlegal sources that we look next for conceptual
and theoretical insight.
III. NONLEGAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF DisABILIY
Even as the United States Congress and various administrative
agencies sought to craft and refine a legal definition of disability for
use in nondiscrimination laws, efforts were proceeding in nonlegal
contexts to develop frameworks for clarifying the concept of disability
for use in fields including medicine, rehabilitation, social services, and
demographics. Somewhat more recently, scholars in the emerging
field of disability studies have gone beyond these attempts to articu-
late a framework for identifying disability by delving into phenomeno-
logical questions that challenge our society's very understanding of
what disability is. Neither of these fields of inquiry into the meaning
and nature of disability, however, has to date figured significantly in
discussions of the legal meaning of disability. Nonetheless, examining
these theoretical discussions may prove instructive for both our efforts
to diagnose why the existing legal definition is proving so troublesome
and our search for a cure.
A. Conceptual Frameworks
The ADA's legal definition of "disability" does not refer explicitly
to understandings of the term employed in the specialized applied
fields most directly relating to persons with disabilities.13 2 The legal
definition, however, bears a substantial resemblance to frameworks
for identifying disability developed in these nonlegal contexts. Profes-
sionals in the applied fields have developed frameworks in an effort to
enable clarity, precision, and consistency in the application of policies
and programs relating to persons with disabilities, and these
frameworks share with the legal definition a constitutive nature. In
other words, these frameworks convey the meaning of disability by re-
lating it to other concepts such as impairment, functional limitation,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented from the Court's opinion on whether
asymptomatic HIV is a disability.
132 These applied fields include, for example, special education, rehabilitation
psychology, and physical therapy.
[VOL- 74:3
THE DISABILITY KALEIDOSCOPE
and handicap; they do not, however, provide measurable, objective
criteria that indicate the presence of disability.133
Several conceptual structures for identifying disability have
proven influential. In 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO)
put forth an International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities,
and Handicaps (ICIDH), which describes and distinguishes among
the concepts set forth in its title. According to the WHO classifica-
tion, an impairment is any loss or abnormality of psychological, physi-
ological, or anatomical structure or function; a disability is any
restriction or lack, resulting from an impairment, of ability to perform
an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a
human being; and a handicap is a disadvantage for a given individual,
resulting from an impairment or disability, that limits or prevents the
fulfillment of a role that is normal for that individual, depending on
age, sex, and social and cultural factors.'3 4 This framework thus views
disability as a lack of functional ability that flows from some bodily
impairment; it distinguishes the concept of handicap, by contrast, as
reflecting the interaction that persons with disabilities have with their
environment. In this scheme, therefore, handicap describes the social
disadvantage that results when cultural, physical, or social barriers
limit the opportunities that a disabled person has to be a part of the
life of the community. 135 In this view, the progression from impair-
ment to disability to handicap is not inevitable. Not all impairments
will result in disability, and whether a disability produces a handicap
depends at least in part on an individual's social environment.
The WHO's framework for disability has been used extensively in
areas such as rehabilitation, education, statistics, demography, sociol-
ogy, economics, and anthropology. 3 6 Indeed, several European
countries have officially adopted the ICIDH for use in administrative
settings.' 3 7 The framework has also been used, although not always
uncritically, by disability activists.' 38
133 See Saad Z. Nagi, The Concept and Measurement of Disability, in DiSABILIT Pou-
ESAND GoVERNmENT PROGRAMS 5 (Edward D. Berkowitz ed., 1979) (distinguishing
between constitutive and operational definitions).
134 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF IMPAIR-
MENTS, DisABnrms, AND HANDICAPS (1980).
135 See id.
136 See UNITED NATIONS, STANDARD RuLEs ON THE EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PERSONS wrTH DIsABLIrIEs (1994).
137 See DISAILrY IN AMERICA: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR PREVENTION 76
(Alvin M. Pope & Alvin R. Tarlov eds., 1991) [hereinafter DISABILITY IN AMERICA].
138 See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY. FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
ON DisaBnIITY 13 (1996); Anita Silvers, Disability Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED
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In response to the experience gained since the ICIDH's adop-
tion, the WHO is in the process of revising the ICIDH and has issued a
draft, ICIDH-2.13 9 This draft builds on the original ICIDH, but adopts
largely new terminology to describe the "dimensions" of disablement.
The draft retains the foundational concept of impairment, but uses
the terms "activity" and "activity limitation" (rather than "disability")
to describe how the nature and extent of functioning at the level of
the person can be limited. In addition, the draft uses the terms "par-
ticipation" and "participation restriction" (rather than "handicap") to
describe how the nature and extent of a person's involvement in life
situations may be restricted by impairments and activity limitations.
Finally, the draft recognizes the importance of so-called "Contextual
Factors"-which may be either environmental (such as architectural
characteristics or legal structures) or personal (such as gender or edu-
cation)-in interacting with the foregoing dimensions in producing
disablement. This revised approach seeks to provide a synthesis of the
medical and social models of disability in order to provide "a coherent
view of different dimensions of health at both biological and social
levels."140
The second major conceptual framework of disability, developed
by Saad Nagi, uses ideas similar to those in the ICIDH, but different
terminology. Nagi's schema traces the relationship between pathol-
ogy, impairment, functional limitation, and disability. Pathology (a
term for which the ICIDH has no analog) refers to the body's re-
sponse to an interruption in its normal processes, resulting, for exam-
ple, from infections, disease, or trauma. The term "impairment"
indicates some loss or abnormality of mental, physiological, or bio-
chemical function; this loss or abnormality relates to the specific func-
tioning of an organ or organ system, not to the functioning of an
individual as an entire organism. An impairment's impact on the
functioning of a person as a whole, according to Nagi's framework, is
captured in the concept of functional limitation. Finally, Nagi uses
the term "disability" to describe a person's inability to perform or limi-
tation in performing socially expected roles or tasks, if the inability or
ETHICS 781 (1998). For some of the criticisms of the WHO definition, see infra discus-
sion accompanying note 186.
139 As of 1998, the draft ICIDH-2 is undergoing extensive international field trials.
Data gathered from the trials will be analyzed and may lead to further revisions of the
draft in 1999. The Governing Bodies of the WHO are expected to vote on final ap-
proval of the ICIDH-2 in 2000. See WHO, ICIDH Field Trials (visited Nov. 3, 1998)
<http://www.who.int/msa/mnh/ems/icidh/brochure/fieldtrial.htm>.




limitation results from a functional impairment. Thus, disability (like
handicap in the ICIDH framework) is a relational concept that ex-
presses how functional limitations affect a person in relation to the
demands of the social environment.
141
An example may serve to give concrete meaning to Nagi's ab-
stract concepts (and likewise to the WHO's conceptual framework).
Trauma to an individual's arm may cause the ann's muscles to be-
come denervated; this response to the trauma would be deemed a
pathology. As a result of the denervation, the muscle atrophies; this
loss of physiological function at the level of an organ system would be
considered an impairment. This impairment (muscle atrophy) may
cause the individual to be unable to pull with her arm; functional limi-
tation describes this lack of an individual's ability to perform an ac-
tion. Finally, the individual might lose ajob that requires pulling with
her arm or be rendered unable to swim recreationally. These limita-
tions on performing socially defined activities and roles could consti-
tute disabilities.
142
In 1991, a committee of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) adopted
Nagi's terminology in developing its own model of the disabling pro-
cess. 143 One reason the IOM committee gave for preferring Nagi's
approach to that of the WHO was the committee's preference for the
term "disability" over the term "handicap." Although the committee
recognized that American lawmakers have often used the term "hand-
icap" synonymously with "disability," the committee acknowledged
that "handicap," as applied to individuals, is often viewed as denigrat-
ing and has largely receded from accepted usage in describing individ-
uals with disabilities in the United States.' 44
141 See Nagi, supra note 133, at 2-3; DISABILrIY IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at
79-81.
142 This example is taken from DISABLr IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at 79. Cer-
tainly, reasonable persons could argue that an inability to swim recreationally does
not render a person disabled, even under Nagi's framework, unless the ability to swim
recreationally is socially expected and an inability to do so somehow renders an indi-
vidual less able to meet the demands of his environment. Cf Martinez v. City of Roy,
No. 97-4095, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 5906 (10th Cir. March 26, 1998) (concluding that
recreational swimming is not a major life activity).
143 The IOM committee added to Nagi's framework the concepts of risk factors
and quality of life in developing a model of the disabling process. This process-ori-
ented approach was deemed useful in identifying strategic points during the process
for preventive intervention. See DisAmLrrY IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at 78.
144 See id. at 77-78 ("Much as the term 'cripple' has gone out of style, 'handicap'
seems to be approaching obsolescence, at least among people with disabilities in the
United States."). The choice of language to refer to persons who have disabling con-
ditions has generated much attention, and the current accepted usage seems to be to
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In describing its conceptual framework, the IOM committee also
expounded on the interrelationship of the concepts of disease, im-
pairment, and disability:
[D]isability begins with physical or mental health conditions that
limit the performance of individuals in personally, socially, and cul-
turally expected roles. The limitation may be total, rendering an
activity unperformable, or it may be partial, restricting the amount
or kind of an activity a person can perform. Although conceptually
distinct, disability is often confused with disease and impairment.
For example, specific diagnostic conditions and impairments, such
as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, or multiple sclerosis, are erro-
neously referred to as disabilities. But depending on various fac-
tors, these conditions may or may not lead to disability ...
Moreover, the scope and severity of limitation that follows even the
most physiologically damaging disorders... vary among individuals,
including those with the same condition.
145
On a basic level, the WHO's and Nagi's taxonomies may lend us
some insight on how to understand the ADA's legal definition of "dis-
ability," for the legal definition echoes these frameworks' focus on the
relationship between impairment and functional limitation (or im-
pairment and disability, to use the WHO's terminology). Where the
ADA's definition deviates from these conceptual approaches, how-
ever, is in its failure-at least in many cases-to include the last ele-
ment in the conceptual trilogy: the element focusing on the
relationship of a person with functional limitations to her social envi-
ronment. Specifically, the ADA finds that an individual has a disability
if she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activ-
ity.146 Most of the regulatory examples given of major life activities,
however, focus on function at the organismic level (e.g., walking,
breathing, seeing, and hearing), rather than on an individual's func-
tioning in a socially expected role. In other words, in contrast to the
conceptual frameworks discussed above, the ADA's definition of "disa-
bility" does not appear to require a showing that the impaired individ-
use "people first" language, that is, to refer to a person with a spinal cord injury,
rather than to a quadriplegic, or to an individual with a disability, rather than a dis-
abled individual. See Burgdorf, supra note 21, at 411 n.l. In the 1990s, "disabled
people" has been used increasingly within disability studies to refer to the constitu-
ency group. See LINTON, supra note 27, at 13. The choices that individuals living with
disabling impairments make in how to refer to themselves, however, may defy these
conventions. See NANcy MAres, WArsT-HIGH IN THE WORLD: A LIm AMONG THE
NONDISnBLED 12-14 (1996) (explaining why she refers to herself as a "cripple").
145 DisABimrr IN AMERICA, supra note 137, at 83.
146 For a description of the definition of disability contained in the ADA and its
implementing regulations, see supra Part II.D.
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ual suffers any kind of social disadvantage. The exception to this
approach is the regulations' inclusion of "working" as a major life ac-
tivity. An ADA plaintiff who claims to be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working claims quite directly that her impairment
disadvantages her, not solely on an organismic level, but in her ability
to conform to societal expectations that she perform productive
work.
147
B. The Contribution of Disability Theory: Contrasting Models of Disability
The foregoing description of widely accepted conceptual schema
for identifying and understanding disability hints at some of the ques-
tions that have occupied disability theorists over the past two decades.
For these frameworks imply, contrary to the traditional and still com-
mon understanding of disability, that disability does not lie purely in
the body of the person who has some impairment, but that instead
disability is found in that person's interaction with the social environ-
ment. In their writings, scholars in the field of disability studies have
described several models of disability, or characterizations of different
ways that disability can be understood in moral and philosophical
terms. These models not only illuminate how our society does or
might view disability, but they also suggest the moral relevance of disa-
bility to social policy. Although the scholars whom I include in the
group "disability theorists" do not speak with one voice on the phe-
nomenology of disability, their writings have described three primary
models of disability: the medical model, the social model, and the mi-
nority group model.
1. The Medical Model of Disability
The traditional understanding of disability held in our society, an
understanding that has pervaded rehabilitative efforts, social policy,
and federal legislation prior to the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, has been
dubbed the "medical model" of disability.148 The defining character-
istic of the medical model is its view of disability as a personal trait of
the person in whom it inheres. The individual is the locus of the disa-
bility and, thus, the individual is properly understood as needing aid
and assistance in remediating that disability. Under this view, while
the cause of impairments may vary, the disabled individual is viewed as
147 Cf. Locke, supra note 16 (arguing that working should be eliminated from the
regulatory list of major life activities).
148 Although most disability theorists use the phrase "medical model," the British
theorist Michael Oliver uses the phrase "individual model." See MICHAEL OLIVER, UN-
DERSTANDING DisABnrr. FROM THEORY TO PRACnCE 30 (1996).
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
innately, biologically different and inferior. The physical difference
of the individual is often apparent, and the nondisabled see the indi-
vidual's inferiority and resulting social disadvantages as flowing di-
rectly from that physical difference.
Thus, according to the medical model of disability, the disabled
individual's problem lies in her impairment. Consequently, the best
way to help the disabled individual is to use either medicine to cure or
ameliorate the impairment or rehabilitation techniques to enable the
individual to cope with or overcome the impairment's effects. Dis-
abled persons are thus made dependent on health professionals for
assistance in escaping or overcoming their disability, and their cooper-
ation in the pursuit of a cure is socially expected. Persons with disabil-
ities are dependent on physicians not only when they need medical or
surgical treatment, but also when they need adaptive equipment, such
as prosthetics or orthotics, which require a physician's prescription.
In this fashion, individuals with disabilities are consigned to what the
sociologist Talcott Parsons calls the "sick role"-because of their disa-
bility, they are exempted from normal social obligations such as work-
ing, but this exemption is socially legitimate only if they strive to
become cured and, therefore, normal.149 Those persons whose disa-
bilities are not susceptible to cure, however, remain a potent symbol
of the limitations and failures of modem medicine and thus may be
shunned or abandoned by medical providers. 150
The power of health professionals over persons with disabilities
does not lie solely in medicine's (often illusory) promise of a cure. In
addition, under the medical model, society allocates to physicians the
authority to validate the existence of disability and thus to provide an
individual with access to whatever social assistance may be available to
disabled persons. It is up to a physician to diagnose or categorize the
cause of an impairment and to measure and document its functional
impact. The individual's own subjective experience of impairment or
limitation is irrelevant unless it can be professionally validated. 151
Moreover, because they focus on classifying the nature and causes of
impairment, 152 medical professionals may have a tendency both to
falsely universalize the impact of a particular impairment and to fail to
149 See Talcott Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values
and Social Structure, in PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND ILLNESS (E. GartlyJaco ed., 1958).
150 Cf Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability, in FEMINIST PERSPEC-
TIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 63, 72-73 (Helen Bequaert Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds.,
1992).
151 See id.
152 See Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The
Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW 41, 45 (1996).
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recognize that a given impairment may produce varying degrees of
limitation in different people.
15 3
Congress's creation of the SSDI program in the 1950s illustrates
the medical model of disability in action. 54 A key concern of Con-
gress in enacting the program was that persons who were able to work
would abuse the system by feigning disability in order to receive pub-
lic support, but the lawmakers believed that abuse could be prevented
by requiring a medical certification of disability. The rationale was
that medical certification would limit coverage to disabilities that med-
ical examinations could objectively diagnose. 155 Although organized
medicine initially objected to the medical certification requirement,
once the program had been instituted the American Medical Associa-
tion developed "Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Disability" to as-
sist general practitioners in performing disability assessments. 156
Political scientist Deborah Stone describes these guides as "based on a
pervading faith that a phenomenon of functional impairment, totally
independent of context, can be precisely measured."' 57 Finally, con-
sistent with the medical model, the receipt of disability benefits was
conditioned on an applicant's willingness to accept treatment or reha-
bilitation for her disabling condition. 158
In addition to treating disability as a personal, biological attribute
that sets an individual apart from normal persons and granting the
medical profession cognitive authority to identify and treat disabled
persons, the medical model of disability also has significant implica-
tions for social policy regarding disability. According to the medical
model, the disabled individual is the unfortunate victim of some twist
of fate,159 and that misfortune is seen as essentially a personal or fam-
ily matter-not a misfortune that society is obligated to remedy. For if
disability is essentially biological, then the social disadvantages and ex-
clusion that accompany the disability can be explained as natural and
not ascribable to any social cause.160 Because disability is not socially
caused, the disabled individual has no claim of right to social remedia-
153 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 71.
154 For a description of the definition of disability used in this program, see supra
Part I.A.
155 See STONE, supra note 33, at 79.
156 See id. at 80-82, 110-11.
157 Id. at 113.
158 See id. at 125.
159 See OLvER, supra note 148, at 32 (positing the "personal tragedy theory of
disability").
160 See Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, J. Soc. PHIL.,
Spring 1992, at 105, 113; Anita Silvers, (In)equality, (Ab)normality, and the Ameicans with
Disabilities Act, 21 J. MED. & PHIL. 209, 204 (1996).
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tion, and any benefits or assistance that society chooses to bestow on
persons with disabilities can be viewed as a charitable response of "do-
ing special things."1 61 In a society that espouses the medical model,
the primary thrusts of social policy regarding disability are both to
eliminate as much disability as possible, by using medical technology
to cure existing disability or prevent future disability, 62 and to use
rehabilitative techniques to help disabled individuals approximate
dominant physical standards as closely as possible. 163 Only if curative
and rehabilitative efforts are unavailing should persons with disabili-
ties receive financial assistance benefits. Finally, the medical model of
disability justifies other, nondisabled members of society in labeling
and stigmatizing the disabled person as naturally inferior, 64 a process
that implicitly supports the development of social and legal structures
that exclude and devalue persons with disabilities. 165
This medical model of disability, while it has been increasingly
challenged by disability theorists and disability-rights activists, persists
in the popular understanding of disability, as well as in the legal com-
mentary on disability. As one disability studies scholar points out,
"Unlike other disadvantaged groups, citizens with disabilities have not
yet fully succeeded in refuting the presumption that their subordinate
status in society can be ascribed to an innate biological inferiority."' 66
Even commentators generally supportive of the ADA, which disability
theorists view as taking at least modest steps away from the medical
model, often reveal an understanding of disability largely consonant
161 See Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the ADA, in IMPLEMENT-
ING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr 36-37 (Jane West ed., 1996).
162 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 785. The use of medical technology to prevent
disability includes the use of prenatal genetic screening to allow the abortion of fe-
tuses likely to be disabled, a practice often decried by disability rights advocates. See
Mary A. Crossley, Choice, Conscience, and Context, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1223, 1231-32
(1996) (describing objections).
163 See Hahn, supra note 152, at 51.
164 Historically, persons with disabilities have been viewed as inferior not only in
physical terms, but also in moral terms. The belief that a bodily impairment is the
result of a moral flaw-of either the impaired person or an ancestor-is longstand-
ing, though less prevalent today. See Silvers, supra note 138, at 785 (calling this the
"moral model" of disability). So too, persons with disabilities have often been
grouped together with other individuals who are seen as departing significantly from
accepted norms of social behavior and thus are deemed deviant. See Drimmer, supra
note 30, at 1348-49 (describing the "social pathology model" of disability).
165 See Drimmer, supra note 30, at 1349-51.
166 Hahn, supra note 152, at 43; cf. Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference:
Caring (F)or Justice for People with Disabilities, HYPATIA, Winter 1995, at 30 (stating that




with the medical model. For example, one commentator argues that
a person with an impairment that is potentially mutable should be
entitled to employer-provided accommodations only if the person has
taken reasonable steps to improve her condition. 167 Echoing Con-
gress's sentiments when it created the SSDI program, 168 she asserts
that an employer should be obligated to pay for accommodations
"only if the individual with the disability has first made all reasonable
efforts to help himself. This will eliminate any potential for
abuse ... .,169 Another commentator portrays disability as an innate,
biological condition when he characterizes the ADA as posing the
"seemingly intractable problem of how to treat the physical or mental
disability of the person, which is neither social, artificial, nor irra-
tional, but simply a 'stubborn fact' of nature itself embedded in that
person's life experience.' 170 Thus, while the social and minority
group models of disability described below increasingly challenge it,
the medical model of disability still appears firmly ensconced in our
collective societal understanding of disability.
2. The Social Model of Disability
In contrast to the medical model of disability, which views disad-
vantages as flowing naturally from a defect located in an individual,
the social model of disability sees disadvantages as flowing from social
systems and structures. Because members of society historically have
not viewed persons with disabilities as part of the societal norm, no
attempts have been made to avoid the creation of physical and attitu-
dinal barriers built into the very framework of society-barriers that
167 See Lisa E. Key, Voluntary Disabilities and the ADA: A Reasonable Interpretation of
"Reasonable Accommodations' 48 HASTINGS LJ. 75 (1996). The idea that one ought to
do what one can to help oneself before seeking accommodations, while facially ap-
pealing, can be quite deceptive in the rehabilitation context. A physician's judgment
that a person can repair or surmount his impairment falls far short of a guarantee
that such result is possible. If the person with the impairment follows the prescribed
course and it fails, he will have paid in terms of pain, lost time, money, and possibly
even a reduction in functioning. To condition the availability of accommodations on
this effort casts the accommodation as compensation for the failure to be cured (i.e.,
the medical model), rather than as a reformation of the environment to make it more
accessible (i.e., the social model).
168 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
169 Key, supra note 167, at 103.
170 W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with
Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of SocialJustice, 22 N.M. L. Rxv. 295, 296 (1992); cf
Locke, supra note 16, at 139 (arguing that the definition of disability should be
amended to clarify that disabilities are physical and emotional conditions measured in
medical terms).
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prevent persons with disabilities from fully participating in society.17'
Thus, the disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is the prod-
uct of a hostile (or at least inhospitable) social environment, not sim-
ply the product of bodily defects.'
72
Accordingly, a major premise of the social model of disability is
the belief that disability is a creation of society (a "social construct"),
rather than a biological phenomenon. As Susan Wendell, drawing on
feminist work regarding the social construction of gender, writes: "So-
cieties that are physically constructed and socially organized with the
unacknowledged assumption that everyone is healthy, nondisabled,
young but adult, shaped according to cultural ideals, and, often, male,
create a great deal of disability through sheer neglect of what most
people need in order to participate fully in them."1 73 A straightfor-
ward (and probably the most often used) example of how the con-
struction of physical environments can create disability is the
construction of buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps.
The exclusive reliance on stairs for moving people from one level to
another reflects an implicit assumption that people using the building
will be able to climb stairs and an implicit judgment that the presence
of people who cannot climb stairs-for example, wheelchair users-is
neither expected nor desired. So understood, the wheelchair user is
disadvantaged not by her inability to walk, but by the way in which
buildings are designed and constructed.
174
More subtle examples of how disability is physically, socially, and
culturally constructed begin to reveal how pervasive are the barriers
that persons with impairments encounter. Susan Wendell provides an
example in an activity as mundane as grocery shopping: the simple
lack of a place to sit and rest for a few minutes in the typical supermar-
ket reflects an assumption that all shoppers should be strong and
171 See Feldblum, supra note 161, at 36; Jane West, The Evolution of Disability Rights,
in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr, supra note 161.
172 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 785-86; Hahn, supra note 152, at 45 (stating that
the "sociopolitical" approach defines disability as the product of interactions between
individuals and their environment, with the effects of disability primarily attributable
to a disabling environment, rather than to personal defects or deficiencies).
173 WENDELL, supra note 138, at 39. Wendell also asserts that disability may be
socially constructed by social conditions, such as violent crime, contaminated water,
and poverty, that straightforwardly create illnesses, injuries, and poor physical func-
tioning. See id. at 36-37. For a description of how public and collective actions in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries limited the functions of physically impaired per-
sons, see CLAIRE H. LIAcHowrrz, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCr (1988).
174 See Amundson, supra note 160, at 109 (noting that a wheelchair user has virtu-
ally no mobility impairment in a building with ramps, but is greatly handicapped
when his goals are located up or down a flight of stairs).
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healthy--not easily fatigued or otherwise likely to need to rest during
shopping-and effectively excludes those individuals who don't fit the
expected mold.'7 5 Wendell also suggests that something as intangible
as what she calls the "pace of life" can be disabling: as the pace of life
in our society increases, more people tend to become disabled be-
cause fewer people can meet societal expectations for performance at
the heightened pace.' 7 6
Finally, disability may also be culturally constructed. The lack of
realistic, cultural representations of the lives of persons with disabili-
ties may reinforce the sense that disabled persons are somehow
"other" and thus contribute to their exclusion. 177 Instead of depicting
individuals with disabilities as part of the mainstream and as human
beings with whom viewers can identify, the media, particularly the
movies, have typically portrayed individuals with disabilities as freaks
or dangerous monsters. These stereotyped depictions tend to perpet-
uate societal prejudice and to bolster nondisabled persons' fear of dis-
abled people.178 Thus, disability 7 9 is constructed not only by barriers
175 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 39; cf. S. Kay Toombs, Sufficient unto the Day: A
Life with Multiple Sclerosis, in CHRONIC ILLNESS: FROM EXPERIENCE TO POUCY 3, 9 (S. Kay
Toombs et al. eds., 1995) (describing how the fatigue that accompanies M.S. affects
her ability to go grocery shopping).
176 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 37-38.
177 See id. at 42-43.
178 See Robert Bogdan et al., The Disabled: Media's Monster, in PERsPECTIvEs ON DIsA-
BrLrY (Mark Nagler ed., 2d ed. 1993); see generally M~ARTn F. NORDEN, THE CINEMA OF
ISOLATION: A HISTORY OF PHYSICAL Dis ~iLrn IN THE MovIEs (1994).
179 Because this Article is concerned with the meaning given to the term "disabil-
ity" in federal disability discrimination legislation, it is worth highlighting that not all
disability theorists use that term to describe the disadvantages that flow from the phys-
ical, social, and cultural environments that persons with various impairments live in.
Instead, consistent with the WHO conceptual framework discussed above, see supra
text accompanying notes 134-35, some authors distinguish between the concepts of
disability and handicap. Under this taxonomy, disability describes the functional limi-
tation experienced by an impaired individual, but the social disadvantage exper-
ienced when that individual interacts with his environment is captured by the term
handicap. SeeAmundson, supra note 160; Andrew I. Batavia, RelatingDisability Policy to
Broader Public Policy: Understanding the Concept of 'Handicap," 21 POL'Y STUD. J. 735
(1993). Using this vocabulary, one may isolate a disability in an individual's body, but
handicap is necessarily a relational concept. Theorists adopting this vocabulary, how-
ever, are not simply espousing the medical model, for they recognize that the disad-
vantage experienced by the disabled individual is not inevitable, but instead flows
from the fact that "we humans regularly construct our environments with a certain
range of biologically typical humans in mind." Amundson, supra note 160, at 110.
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erected in the physical environment, but also by the barriers embed-
ded in social structures and societal attitudes.1
80
A corollary of the belief that disability is a social construct is the
view that normalcy itself is a social construct. It is commonly recog-
nized that-rather than being easily divisible into two distinct catego-
ries of ability and disability-the range of human functioning lies
spread across a wide spectrum. 181 That being so, creating the category
of disability requires drawing a line somewhere on this spectrum to
differentiate "normal" ability from disability. In this sense, as Lennard
Davis puts it, "[t] he construction of disability is based on a deconstruc-
tion of a continuum."'182 But drawing this line itself requires some
shared understanding of what constitutes normal ability.
Disability theorists argue that, far from being a natural and obvi-
ous classification, the very concept of a "normal human being" is so-
cially constructed and therefore socially and culturally relative. As its
history is related by Lennard Davis, the concept of "normal" entered
the English language only in the mid-nineteenth century in relation to
the developing science of statistics, which focused on identifying a
norm and deviations from that norm.183 But the concept of "normal"
grew from being simply descriptive of a statistical finding to carrying
with it a prescriptive force, implying that normality was to be desired
and deviance from the norm was to be avoided.184 Yet the perimeter
of human normality has been rearranged over time and among differ-
180 In discussing the social construction of disability, Michael Oliver makes a dis-
tinction between "social constructionists," who believe that the problem is located in
the minds of nondisabled people, and "social creationists," who believe the problem is
located in the institutionalized practices of society. See MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLrTIcs
OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 78-94 (1990).
181 See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDI-
VIDUAL ABILITIES 87-89 (1983).
182 DAVIS, supra note 27, at 11.
183 See id. at 24-29. Davis also makes an interesting comparison to the earlier
development of the concept of the ideal, which by definition was beyond the attain-
ment of any human. Accordingly, while all human bodies were nonideal, none was
seen as deviant.
184 See id. Davis links this prescriptive force to the eugenics movement, which he
views as an effort aimed at norming the population by getting rid of deviants. See id.
at 30-31; see also Gina Maranto, On the Fringes of the Bell Curve, the Evolving Quest for
Normality, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at F7 ("reference to the normal has great force
precisely because it so seamlesslyjoins description, which in the scientific view is value
neutral, and evaluation, which entails making judgments about worth or moral sta-
tus"); cf. Hiegel, supra note 91, at 1451 (arguing that disease and disability are norma-
tive concepts and that "the decision to categorize deviance as disability depends in
large part on social values").
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ent cultures, 8 5 and as the construction of normality has changed, so
has the construction of that form of deviance from the norm known as
disability.
Indeed, it is for its failure to recognize the social and cultural
relativity of disability that some disability theorists fault the WHO's
conceptual framework discussed above in Part Ill.A., for the WHO's
definitions of "impairment" and "disability" rely on the concepts of
abnormality and "the normal human being." These definitions, there-
fore, imply that an absolute, measurable standard or norm of human
structure, functioning, and physical ability exists, without recognizing
that the concepts of impairment and disability depend to some degree
on the society generating the standards of normality. 8 6 The philoso-
pher Anita Silvers illustrates this relativity by pointing to the various
modes that different cultures use to travel five miles and the corre-
sponding impact on who is deemed disabled: "Where autos are abun-
dant, the blind are dysfunctional travelers while the one-legged
function nearly normally; where the prevailing mode of travel is to
walk, the reverse is the case."' 8 7 Thus, under the social model, the
phenomenon of disability is both socially constructed and culturally
relative.
While the social model's belief in the social construction of disa-
bility draws on and finds company in critical analyses of gender and
race, some disability theorists recognize disability-specific limits to,
and criticisms of, the view that disability is a social construct. The fun-
damental shortcoming of the social model-one which at least some
of its proponents acknowledge-is that, by focusing on environmen-
tally caused disadvantages, it ignores limitations inherent in bodily im-
pairments. For some impairments, such as severe mental retardation,
severe brain injury, and rapidly deteriorating medical conditions, limi-
tations inextricable from the condition and independent of social fac-
tors may seem to overwhelm any social discrimination faced by
persons with those impairments. 8 8
185 See Maranto, supra note 184. For a fascinating discussion of how changing
social structures affect our understanding of "normal" variations in temperament, see
Lawrence H. Diller, The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Stimulant Treatment
in the 1990s, HASNrGs CENm- REP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 12.
186 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 14; see also Silvers, supra note 138, at 784 (criti-
cizing the WHO framework as reifying "a relative benchmark into an absolute
standard").
187 Silvers, supra note 138, at 784.
188 See Philip Ferguson, The Social Construction of Mental Retardation, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON Dis~AILy, supra note 178, at 203; Batavia, supra note 179, at 738. Ferguson,
however, views the social model's failure to account for the exclusion of the severely
mentally retarded not as evidence of the invalidity of that model's basic premise, but
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But even for disabled persons whose disadvantage can be traced
primarily to the social environment, the social model may give short
shrift to the lived experience of impairment itself. A compelling criti-
cism of the social model is that persons with disabilities do experience
real limitations, and often suffering, in the daily experience of living
in their bodies and that these limitations and sufferings exist indepen-
dently of any disabling social environment. The social model does not
speak to these experiences of the body and personal impairment.189
As a result, Susan Wendell distances herself from postmodern theo-
rists who fail to recognize the difficult physical realities faced by per-
sons with disabilities, 190 and she acknowledges that not all the
difficulties and limitations that accompany an impairment result from
a disabling environment. Yet even this acknowledged limitation does
not lessen the social model's force: the social model need not deny
that some limitations flow directly from impairment in order to argue
that externally imposed disadvantages should be remedied.' 91
Not only does the social model's theoretical understanding of dis-
ability diverge from that of the medical model, the social model also
has drastically different implications for public policy. While the main
thrust of disability policy under a medical model is to get rid of disa-
bility by attempting to cure or rehabilitate the individual, the main
thrust of policy under a social model is to get rid of disability by "reha-
bilitating" the social and physical structures and systems that serve to
impose disadvantages on persons with impairments. 192 This rehabili-
tation may be a straightforward matter of altering the physical envi-
ronment (for example, by building ramps and cutting curbs), or it
may involve modifying social systems or policies to enable persons
with disabilities to participate in, and benefit from, opportunities com-
monly enjoyed by nondisabled members of our society. This ap-
proach sees socially created barriers as generating an
"accommodation imperative," which requires affirmative efforts to
instead criticizes the social model as being too narrow and for failing to challenge the
denial of social participation for the severely mentally retarded.
189 See OLIVER, supra note 148, at 37-38.
190 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 45 ("The experiences of people with disabili-
ties are as invisible in the discourses of postmodernism, which has the virtue of being
critical of idealized, normalized, and universalized representations of bodies, as they
are in discourses which employ concepts of bodily 'normality' uncritically.").
191 See Batavia, supra note 179, at 739 (acknowledging that while a person with an
impairment may have a greater challenge in succeeding in any society than a person
who enjoys all physical capabilities, "such internal limitations are not nearly as insur-
mountable as the external limitations that can truly handicap the disabled").
192 See Hahn, supra note 30, at 104 n.36.
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make all aspects of social and economic life accessible. 193 Thus, the
social model's attribution of disability-related disadvantage to societal
causes indicates that disability may be amenable to societal remedy, an
understanding that underpins yet a third model of disability, the mi-
nority group model.
3. The Minority Group Model of Disability
The minority group model of disability builds on the understand-
ing of disability elaborated by the social model and transforms it into a
political call to action. The minority group model goes beyond simple
recognition that disability has social roots. It argues that the func-
tional limitations associated with impairment vary directly with the de-
gree to which society respects the differences of the minority group of
impaired individuals, 194 and it demands the eradication of exclusion-
ary social practices and structures as a matter of civil rights for persons
with disabilities. In this model, persons with disabilities face barriers
to participation in society because historically they have not been
viewed as part of the societal norm, but persons with disabilities have a
civil right to be considered part of the societal norm and to be allowed
to participate meaningfully. 195 Consequently, this model is also called
the civil rights approach to disability.
According to the minority group model, because society pro-
duced the historical exclusion experienced by persons with disabili-
ties, their claim to remediation of exclusionary structures and
practices is made as a claim of right, rather than as a request for spe-
cial benefits. 196 It is vital to recognize that the rights asserted are char-
acterized as simple equality rights: disability activists argue that
eliminating societal barriers-both physical and attitudinal-is indis-
pensable to allowing persons with disabilities a level playing field.
97
The presumption is that persons with disabilities are equally capable
of flourishing in competitive environments if societally erected barri-
193 See West, supra note 171; see also Burgdorf, supra note 77, at 460.
194 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 786; Hahn, supra note 152, at 53 (laying forth as
postulates of the minority group paradigm (1) that all aspects of the environment are
fundamentally shaped by public policies, (2) that policies tend to reflect pervasive
societal attitudes and values, and (3) that the primary source of problems for persons
with disabilities lies in the unfavorable attitudes of nondisabled persons).
195 See Feldblum, supra note 161, at 36-37.
196 See Amundson, supra note 160, at 113 ("Someone whose disadvantage occurs
as a result of a social decision has a more obvious claim for social remediation.").
197 See Drimmer, supra note 30, at 1358; cf. Burgdorf, supra note 21 (arguing that
reasonable accommodations should not be viewed as special benefits).
199]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[o
ers are removed. 198 By framing the question as one of civil rights,
proponents of the minority group model are also able to argue that
policy choices about the remedy to be provided should be guided by
"democratic principles" rather than "strict financial pragmatism."1 99
In promoting a minority group model of disability, advocates for
disability rights seek to mobilize persons with disabilities politically by
consciously drawing upon the civil rights movements of other disad-
vantaged minority groups.20 0 Advocates employ the language from
those movements, decrying patterns of hierarchy and subordination
based upon physical differences. 20 1 Again drawing on other groups'
experience, disability theorists argue that, in order to emerge from
roles of inferiority by exercising power, persons with disabilities
should define disability for themselves, control the usage of the term,
and choose when to identify themselves as having a disability.20 2 To
that end, the disability rights movement has significantly influenced
the usage of the term "disability" and the adoption of "people first"
phraseology. In exercising authority over the usage of language, how-
ever, persons with disabilities wield a double-edged sword. Although
self-identification as having a disability may entitle a person to finan-
cial benefits or protection under the ADA, labeling oneself as disabled
may also expose one to prejudice and prove distasteful for persons
198 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 789. Even Silvers, however, recognizes that "the
differences attendant upon serious impairment . . . resist being thus dismissed
through social agreement," id., and that it may be inappropriate to conceptualize
individuals with severe impairments as identical to nondisabled person§ in the ab-
sence of social barriers. See id.
199 See Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Poli-
cies, 22 Soc. Sci.J. 87 (1985). But cf Amundson, supranote 160, at 116 (noting that if
any handicapping aspects of the environment are fully natural and not socially con-
structed, then claims for remediation will not have a civil rights basis, but will be based
on distributive justice).
200 See Drimmer, supra note 30, at 1355 (linking disability rights movement to civil
rights movements of 1950s and 1960s); Hahn, supra note 30, at 98 (linking disability
studies to feminist thought). Commentators have also noted that a disproportionate
number of persons with disabilities are also members of other disadvantaged groups
and thus may be subject to dual discrimination.
201 See Drimmer, supra note 30, at 1357 (stating that the civil rights model rejects
the use of difference to create hierarchical structures of superiority and inferiority
upon which societal participation is premised); cf. Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orien-
tation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (linking group subordination of
persons with disabilities to subordination of other groups).
202 See DAvis, supra note 27, at xv, 4; OLIVER, supra note 148, at 9; WENDELL, supra
note 138, at 25.
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who have endeavored to avoid receiving a pejorative label from
others.20
3
While proponents of the minority group model generally agree
that political action is required to remedy a history of prejudice and
exclusion, they do not speak with one voice (or sign with one pair of
hands) in explaining why persons with disabilities historically have
been and continue to be disadvantaged and excluded. Two central
strands, however, have emerged in the writings of disability theorists.
One strand focuses on the impact of impaired functioning in leading
to disadvantage, and the other focuses on the impact of physical dif-
ference in the treatment of persons with disabilities.20 4
Assuming that at least some portion of the disadvantage exper-
ienced by persons with disabilities has social roots, one explanation
for that disadvantage is simply that the physical and social environ-
ment was not built with disabled people in mind. Why not? Precisely
because persons with disabilities always have been in the minority.
Anita Silvers employs the exercise of "historical counterfactualizing"
to demonstrate how our social landscape would look different if a
dominant group in a society used wheelchairs, for example. Given
that hypothetical state of affairs, it is indeed hard to imagine that
buildings would have been constructed with stairs and narrow door-
ways that would exclude a majority of users. Silvers concludes from
this exercise: "By hypothesizing what social arrangements would be in
place were persons with disabilities dominant rather than suppressed,
it becomes evident that systematic exclusion of the disabled is a conse-
quence not of their natural inferiority but of their minority social
status." 205
To the extent that it focuses on both environmental and social
inaccessibility resulting from the minority status of disabled people,
this approach responds to physical, social, and economic barriers as a
source of disadvantage, without directly accounting for the impact of
attitudinal barriers. Other theorists, however, have linked functional
203 See Burgdorf, supra note 77, at 443.
204 Along these lines, Lennard Davis notes that "[d]isability presents itself to 'nor-
mal' people through two main modaliies-function and appearance." DAvis, supra
note 27, at 11. He argues that nondisabled persons' understandings of disability,
whether based on an inability to do something or on a different appearance, are
socially constructed. See id. at 11-13.
205 Silvers, supra note 166, at 48. While the example given is of a physical barrier,
it should be noted that historical counterfactualizing responds to any barrier that is
the product of a social practice. For example, an instructor's continuing to speak as
she turns her back to students to write on the blackboard creates a barrier for deaf
students. If the majority of people were deaf, the practice would not be accepted as it
is today.
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limitations to the development of negative attitudes towards persons
with disabilities. Harlan Hahn, for example, uses the phrase "existen-
tial anxiety" to describe one response of nondisabled people to a per-
son with a disability. The phrase captures how nondisabled people
feel threatened by the fear that they might one day be "stricken" with
a disability that would interfere with their physical capacities. Existen-
tial anxiety thus stimulates an unpleasant, negative response to the
individual with a disability.20 6 So too, some persons equate impaired
physical or mental functioning with impaired personhood and view
persons with disabilities as somehow less than fully human, an attitude
that feeds the growth of prejudice.
A second explanation for negative attitudes towards persons with
disabilities is premised on their different physical appearance. Hahn
suggests that differences in appearance may contribute more signifi-
cantly to the stigma and disadvantage experienced by persons with
disabilities than do differences in ability.20 7 The impact of a physical
difference flows from its effect on nondisabled viewers; Hahn uses the
phrase "aesthetic anxiety" to describe this impact. He posits that per-
sons who are perceived as physically deviant or unappealing provoke a
deep sense of discomfort that may cause other persons to avoid or
shun them. 208 Similarly, individuals who do not present conventional
images of the human body are devalued and may be cast in
subordinate roles based on their "strange" appearance. 20 9 According
to disability theorists, this discomfort with, and aversion to, physical
difference is not a natural response, but is itself a socially conditioned
response.21
0
The role of physical appearance in creating disadvantage for per-
sons with disabilities is bolstered by evidence suggesting the power of
appearance in society. Perceptions of physical attractiveness are de-
scribed as having a pivotal effect on evaluations in contexts ranging
from academics, to employment, to personal relationships.211 Ap-
pearance contributes to social stereotyping, which in turn generates
206 See Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination,
in PERSPECrVES ON DISABILITY, supra note 178, at 37, 39-40.
207 See Hahn, supra note 30, at 106.
208 See Hahn, supra note 152, at 54.
209 See Hahn, supra note 206, at 37, 40.
210 See Davis, supra note 27, at 12-13; see also Harlan Hahn, Can Disability Be Beauti-
ful?, in PERPECTIVES ON DIsABILIT, supra note 178, at 217 (describing historical ac-
ceptance of a variety of body types prior to the influence of religion and advertising).
211 See Hahn, supra note 30, at 108; see alsoJonathan Sinclair Carey, The Quasimodo
Complex: Deformity Reconsidered, in THE TYRANNY OF THE NORMAL 43 (Carol Donley &
Sheryl Buckley eds., 1996) (describing the social impacts of deformity).
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expectations regarding ability. For example, researchers studied how
nondisabled adolescents perceived the effects of facial surgery on chil-
dren with Down's syndrome, and found that the subjects who noticed
an improvement in appearance following surgery also offered higher
intelligence ratings to those Down's syndrome children with improved
appearances.2 12 Accordingly, some plastic surgeons justify performing
radical facial surgery on children with Down's syndrome to correct
facial anomalies-even though such surgery has no effect on mental
functions-simply on the grounds that emotional and behavioral re-
sponses to the children will improve following the surgery.
213
Based on the power of physical appearance, some disability theo-
rists have linked negative attitudes and discrimination against persons
with disabilities to corresponding attitudes and discrimination against
other groups of people who deviate from cultural norms of physical
appearance. Based on this linkage, Lennard Davis suggests using the
phrase "physical minorities" to give more of a political sense to the
importance of physical difference than does the term "disabled,"
214
and Hahn adopts the term "physicalism" to describe the oppressive
aversion to disability and intolerance of other forms of physical differ-
ence.215 Thus, according to these theorists, prejudice against, and ex-
clusion of, persons with disabilities flows at least as much from their
visible physical differences as from their limited abilities.
Although the burgeoning literature in disability studies has been
elaborating the theoretical underpinnings of a minority group model
of disability, several difficulties with understanding disabled people as
a distinct minority group remain. First, unlike many members of
other racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups, individuals with disa-
bilities often have grown up in isolation from other persons with disa-
bilities and thus have had little opportunity to develop the type of
group consciousness or culture that has empowered other minority
212 See Ronald P. Strauss, Quasimodo and Medicine: What Role for the Clinician in
Treating Deformity?, in THE TYRANNY OF THE NoimAL, supra note 211, at 79-80 (citing
R.P. Strauss et al., Social Perceptions of the Effects of Down's Syndrome Facial Surgery: A
School-Based Study of Ratings by Normal Adolescents, 81 PLASTIC AND RECONSTrUCrlVE SUR-
GERY 841 (1988)).
213 See Carey, supra note 211, at 45. Of course, some may also view correcting
physical anomalies as a benefit to society: "Reconstructive surgery has the objective
not only of helping an abnormal individual achieve a kind of normalcy, but of rid-
ding, if possible, society of a visible, uncomfortable exception." Robert M. Goldwyn,
Deformity and the Humane Ideal of Medicine, in THE TYRANNw OF THE NoRMAL, supra note
211, at 86.
214 See DAvis, supra note 27, at 3.
215 See Hahn, supra note 30, at 99.
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groups. 216 Similarly detracting from the likelihood of developing a
minority group consciousness is the reality that disabled people are an
extremely heterogeneous bunch. As a result, the experiences of dis-
advantage or subordination that individuals have encountered may be
so diverse that group members may find themselves with little in com-
mon. Due to this heterogeneity, disability theorists are particularly
sensitive to their inability to speak to the experience of all disabled
people. Thus, essentialism in describing the lived experience of "the
disabled" is particularly to be avoided.
217
Aside from these obstacles to conceptualizing persons with disa-
bilities as a discrete and cohesive minority group, disability theorists
also have recognized that framing their political demands as purely a
claim to equal treatment on a level playing field may sometimes be
problematic. As discussed above in the description of the social
model, it is imperative to recognize that for some persons with severe
disabilities, the playing field can never truly be leveled, for not all of
the limitations associated with their impairments are socially created.
Moreover, as Anita Silvers points out, even if the playing field is lev-
eled to the extent possible by removing barriers and providing accom-
modations, only the highest functioning impaired people will
thrive. 218 Thus, the civil rights model may prove a mirage for persons
216 See Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction,
Discrimination, and Activism, 44J. Soc. IssuEs 3 (1988) (discussing obstacles to develop-
ing a minority-group consciousness); West, supra note 171.
217 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 30, 31 (recognizing that living with disability is
different for people with different disabilities, but finding common ground in exper-
iences of social oppression); Hahn, supra note 30, at 111 (recognizing that no single
"disabled viewpoint" exists but asserting that persons with disabilities do have in com-
mon that they do not experience the external environment in the same way as the
nondisabled). But cf Fine & Asch, supra note 216 (reporting results of survey show-
ing that 74% of people with disabilities do feel some common identity with one an-
other and 45% see themselves as members of a minority group); Longmore, supra
note 30 (discussing insider and outsider perspectives on medical treatment for per-
sons with disabilities).
218 An example of the type of situation she contemplates may be found in Mat-
thews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997). In this reduction-in-
force case, the employer used performance ratings from the previous year as the crite-
ria for selecting which employees to retain. These ratings were based partially on the
amount of work performed. Since the plaintiff missed a great deal of work because of
his heart attack, and was forced to work a limited number of hours during his recov-
ery period, his performance score was significantly lower and so he was let go. De-
spite this direct correlation between plaintiffs physical impairment and his low
performance rating, the court found that the plaintiff was not discharged because of
his disability. Rather, according to the court, the company made a legitimate, prag-




whose impairments make them incapable of competitive function-
ing.21 9 Despite these acknowledged limitations, however, the minority
group model of disability provides the undergirding for current ef-
forts to advance the rights of persons with disabilities.
220
4. Further Insights
In addition to refining the three models of disability described
above, numerous disability theorists have discussed two additional no-
tions that may be pertinent to this Article's consideration of how to
219 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 791.
220 The civil rights model also has its dissenters. A main argument against the civil
rights approach to disability is that it is disingenuous: critics see the ADA as not an
antidiscrimination law, but an imposition of a subsidy for individuals with disabilities,
paid for by public and private entities. See RICHARD A. EPSTIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Andrew Kull, The Dis-
crimination Shibboleth, 31 SAN DIEOO L. REV. 195 (1994). They argue that the "antidis-
crimination" measures in the ADA in reality represent a public policy choice to
promote the employment of those with disabilities, not to protect their civil rights.
See id. Such critics view the requirement of reasonable accommodations for individu-
als with disabilities not as the removal of arbitrary roadblocks to employment, but as
an "affirmative obligation" for employers to provide more compensation to individu-
als with disabilities than to those without disabilities. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 480; Mark
A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with Disabilities Act, Liberty,
and Markets, 10 ST. JoiN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495, 504-05 (1995). This amounts to
government imposing a "price floor" for entering into a contract with an individual
with a disability. See id. at 506-07. The labeling of this action as "antidiscrimination"
has been characterized as a "linguistic diversion" used both to shield the pride of
those benefited by the laws and to disguise a "back-door technique to subsidize peo-
ple's jobs." Kull, supra, at 200.
In addition, Kull asserts that the ADA's provisions differ from the prohibition of
race discrimination in Title VII mostly in their costs to business and society, which
both Kull and Epstein argue are higher than proponents of the ADA care to admit.
See EPsTEN, supra, at 488; Kull, supra, at 200. Kull also suggests that the equation of
so-called disability discrimination with race discrimination obscures the true issues
and impedes meaningful discourse about the meaning of and solutions to race
discrimination.
Finally, Epstein argues that discrimination against the disabled isn't really dis-
crimination, but the logical effect of the increased costs of doing business with indi-
viduals with disabilities. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 487. He advocates an analysis of the
costs to business and society of the ADA against the actual benefits enjoyed by all
disabled individuals (notjust those who are employable). See id. at 491. He suggests
that "antidiscrimination" laws be repealed, and, in their place, a system of budget-
restricted government subsidies be instituted, which would be targeted to resolve spe-
cific issues facing those with disabilities. See id. at 493. In other words, Epstein advo-
cates calling the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability by what he
sees as its right name: a subsidy for individuals with disabilities.
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define "disability": the symbolic facet of disability and the dynamic na-
ture of disability.
a. Disability's Symbolism
Many disability theorists concur that bodily impairment and visi-
ble physical differences carry with them a symbolic power that exceeds
their effects on actual ability. For persons gifted with strong, able bod-
ies, persons with disabilities may symbolize things dreaded: the vulner-
ability to aging, infirmity, and death and the inability to control one's
body. Indeed, the symbolic content of disability may overwhelm the
humanity and individuality of a disabled person in the eyes of a
nondisabled individual. In other words, one sees not the person, but
only the disability, and the disability identifies its bearer as "other,"
someone with whom nondisabled people cannot, and perhaps do not
wish to, identify.221 Moreover, Anita Silvers argues, even if an able-
bodied person attempts to identify with the experience of being im-
paired, it may be impossible to imagine what it is like to be disabled:
"[P]erforming major life functions such as moving one's body is so
intimate an element of the fabric of our experience that one cannot
accurately imagine how to live otherwise."222 This inability is conse-
quential, for it confounds the ability of nondisabled persons to reason
morally about how they would wish to be treated if they were
disabled. 223
Another aspect of disability's symbolism is the meaning attached
to an ability that is lost. For example, in our culture the act of walking
has a symbolic significance that far exceeds its functional value. With
the advent of the ADA and its accessibility requirements, the barriers
faced by wheelchair users have significantly decreased; nonetheless,
the goal of the rehabilitation system remains the encouragement of
walking or near-walking. 224 The symbolic importance attached to
walking was vividly illustrated by James Brady's appearance at the 1996
Democratic Convention. After he rose from his wheelchair and
walked the few steps to the podium to address the convention, thun-
derous applause erupted from the delegates. Clearly, James Brady
could have made his speech no less eloquently seated in his wheel-
chair, but it was the sight of him walking, rather than his words, that
221 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 60-61; Wendell, supra note 150, at 70, 74; see
also Hiegel, supra note 91, at 1451 ("[T]he human body is an important site of sym-
bolic meaning about personhood.").
222 Silvers, supra note 138, at 783.
223 See id.
224 See OLIVER, supra note 148, at 95-105.
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captivated viewers. 225 Thus, theorists recognize that the functional
worth of a lost ability may be overshadowed by its symbolic value.
b. Disability's Dynamism
Along with their understanding of disability as a construct reflect-
ing social demarcations of normality and deviance, many disability
theorists highlight disability's dynamic nature. Because disability re-
flects the interaction between the environment and the body-both
of which are constantly changing-it is mistaken to view an individ-
ual's disability as a fixed trait that, once determined to exist, remains
static.
This dynamic property of disability exacerbates the difficulty of
setting boundaries around the concept of disability. Drawing lines
somewhere on the continuum of human abilities is problematic, 226
and all the more so when individuals' abilities and impairments are
often fluid. Yet both the law and popular understanding take a bipo-
lar approach: an individual is either disabled or not. This all-or-noth-
ing approach offends some disability theorists who would prefer the
recognition of degrees of limited ability as being more closely in har-
mony with the reality of people's lives. 227 Yet even those who chal-
lenge the bipolarity of the common understanding of disability
recognize that not all impairments and inabilities limit individuals' ca-
pacity to participate meaningfully in society and that some impaired
persons have stronger claims than others to societal remediation and
protection from discriminatory behavior.228 Ultimately, the apparent
necessity of drawing lines does not render the question of where and
on what basis to draw those lines any less problematic. In the next
Part, I turn to considering, through the lens of disability theory, how
legal decisionmakers have attempted to draw lines around the con-
cept of impairment.
225 See Doyle McManus & Sara Fritz, Democrats' Emotional Night: Convention Opens
with Brady, Reeve Casting Clinton as a Leader who Reaches Across Party Lines, LA. TIMES,
August 27, 1996, at Al (observing that delegates and guests "fell reverently silent as
Brady, grievously wounded in a 1981 assassination attempt against then-President Rea-
gan, walked haltingly to the dais with the help of his wife, Sarah, and a cane").
226 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
227 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 20-21; cf. Colker, supra note 201.
228 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 50 (giving example of an inability to dance
gracefully as not particularly important to full participation in the life of a society); cf
Colker, supra note 201, at 4 (asserting necessity of ensuring that programs designed
primarily to assist individuals in overcoming a history of subordination are not used
by individuals who have been insulated from that subordination by their presence in a
"bi" category).
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IV. DEFINING "DISABILITY": THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL IMPAIRMENT
Having described the understandings of disability that have
grown up out of the field of disability studies, this Article now uses the
lens of these theoretical understandings to examine more closely how
the agencies and courts are interpreting the concept of impairment as
a constitutive element of the ADA's definition of disability. The pur-
pose of this examination is several-fold: first, to assess whether the
ADA's definition of "disability," as applied, truly embodies the civil
rights model of disability; second, to consider whether a greater ap-
preciation of nonlegal understandings of disability might assist courts
in giving content to the ADA's imprecise definition; and third, to de-
velop strands of reasoning to use in the task that Part V undertakes-
inquiring whether using a concept other than impairment as an ele-
ment in defining "disability" might better accord with the evolving so-
ciopolitical understanding of disability.
Numerous commentators have hailed the ADA as rejecting tradi-
tional understandings of disability that viewed the disabled individual
as having something wrong with her and instead embodying a more
enlightened civil rights approach that recognizes the social roots of
disability.229 This characterization of the ADA is based chiefly upon
the statute's express recognition that persons with disabilities have
been subjected to discrimination and excluded from society as a result
of stereotypes 230 and its mandate that employers, public entities, and
public accommodations provide reasonable accommodations to allow
disabled individuals to participate meaningfully in society.2 31 A closer
inspection of how agencies and courts approach the threshold con-
cept of impairment, however, reveals that, by and large, the applica-
tion of the widely acclaimed civil rights statute reflects a medical
model understanding of disability.
Before beginning this inquiry, however, I should acknowledge
the limitations of an approach that seeks to inform decisions about
applying a legal definition by reference to scholarly theories from
other disciplines about the nature of disability. Disability theorists de-
229 See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 77; Feldblum, supra note 161; Silvers, supra note
160.
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
231 See supra note 6 (citing statutory provisions requiring reasonable accommoda-
tions). But see Drimmer, supra note 30 (finding that standards such as "reasonable"
accommodations and "readily achievable" modifications are inconsistent with the civil
rights model's demand that "equal treatment and freedom from both attitudinal and
structural discrimination be guaranteed without compromise").
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scribe a phenomenon: why persons with disabilities suffer social, cul-
tural, and economic disadvantage. Courts applying the statutory
definition of disability make a threshold eligibility decision: whether
an individual plaintiff claiming to have a disability falls inside or
outside of the ADA's protective realm. These different pursuits re-
quire differing degrees of precision. In essence, describing requires
less precision than drawing lines.23 2 Even given these varying pur-
poses, however, scrutinizing agency and judicial decisions through the
lens of disability theory may turn the disability kaleidoscope and give
us a fresh view of whether the ADA, as enacted, is likely to be effective
in accomplishing Congress's purpose of ending a history of exclusion
and discrimination against disabled people.
As noted earlier, the ADA defines "disability" as having three ele-
ments: (1) a physical or mental impairment that (2) substantially lim-
its (3) a major life activity. This Part focuses on the regulations and
case law regarding the first element as a way of teasing out how the
ADA's definition, as applied, understands the phenomenon of disabil-
ity. Like the conceptual frameworks discussed above in Part III.A.,
Congress employed the concept of impairment as an essential step
towards finding disability. The ADA itself does not define the term,
but regulations issued by the EEOC define physical impairment as
"[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement,
or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body sys-
tems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine."233 This
definition, on its face, is extremely broad; it appears that "any condi-
dlon . . . affecting" one of the listed body systems qualifies as an
impairment.
232 This limitation is implicitly acknowledged by scholars of disability, too. Simi
Linton writes:
The question of who 'qualifies' as disabled is as answerable or as con-
founding as questions about any identity status. One simple response might
be that you are disabled if you say you are. Although that declaration won't
satisfy a worker's compensation board, it has a certain credibility with the
disabled community.
LINTON, supra note 27, at 12.
233 29 G.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1) (1998). A mental impairment is defined as "[a]ny
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syn-
drome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."
§ 1630.2(h) (2). The EEOC adopted these definitions from the regulations imple-
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act at 34 C.F.R. pt. 104. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h), app. (1998). The regulatory definitions provided by the DOJ and DOT
are in accord. See 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1997); 28 G.F.R. § 36.104 (1998).
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Having planted this expansive definition of "impairment," the
EEOC then attempts to prune some of its branches. In its Interpretive
Guidance on the ADA's employment provisions23 4 and its Compliance
Manual235 for agents investigating charges of disability discrimination,
the EEOC tries to establish a basis for drawing lines between impair-
ments and physical, psychological, environmental, cultural, and eco-
nomic characteristics that are not impairments, and thus cannot
support a disability finding. These documents exclude from "impair-
ment's" broad definition several specific conditions or types of charac-
teristics that the EEOC anticipated potential plaintiffs would try to
represent as disabilities, including pregnancy, weight, personality
traits, and advanced age.2 36 This Part first examines, through a disa-
bility theory lens, two of the specific conditions or characteristics that
the EEOC excludes and the case law that has grown up in these areas,
and then proceeds to analyze more generally how the courts and the
agencies have construed the concept of impairment.
A. Pregnancy
1. The Law
At first blush, a straightforward reading of the regulatory defini-
tion of "impairment" would appear to include pregnancy as a "...
condition ... affecting... [the] reproductive [system]. '237 Nonethe-
less, the EEOC-apparently ignoring the disjunctive between "disor-
234 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (1998).
235 2 Equal Employment Compliance Manual (CBC) § 902 (1995) [hereinafter
Compliance Manual].
236 The Interpretive Guidance states:
The definition of the term "impairment" does not include physical charac-
teristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or
muscle tone that are within "normal" range and are not the result of a physi-
ological disorder. The definition, likewise, does not include characteristic
predisposition to illness or disease. Other conditions, such as pregnancy,
that are not the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments.
Similarly, the definition does not include common personality traits such as
poorjudgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental
or psychological disorder. Environmental, cultural, or economic disadvan-
tages such as poverty, lack of education or a prison record are not impair-
ments. Advanced age, in and of itself, is also not an impairment. However,
various medical conditions commonly associated with age, such as hearing
loss, osteoporosis, or arthritis would constitute impairment within the mean-
ing of this part.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. (1998).
237 § 1630.2(h) (1). One federal district court applying the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, whose regulatory definition of "impairment" tracks the EEOC's defini-
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der" and "condition"-has concluded that pregnancy is not an
impairment because it is "not the result of a physiological disor-
der."238 Following on this line of reasoning, in 1995 the EEOC clari-
fied that, while pregnancy plain-and-simple is not an impairment,
complications resulting from pregnancy are impairments, presumably
because they do reflect some physiological disorder.
239
By and large, the courts have followed the EEOC's rejection of
pregnancy as an impairment. With the exception of a few cases seen
as aberrant,240 courts applying the federal disability discrimination
laws have been unwilling to find that pregnancy, in and of itself, is an
impairment.241 Moreover, a number of courts have lumped "preg-
nancy and related medical conditions" together, finding that all such
bodily changes aggregated do not constitute an impairment, at least
don, dealt with this argument by importing from the caselaw a requirement of nega-
tive effect.
While a pregnant woman certainly has a physiological condition, it cannot
be said that the condition affects any of the above body systems. The cases
indicate that the body system must be affected in a negative manner, such
that there are problems suffered as a result of the condition.... [T] here is
no negative effect when a woman becomes pregnant. She still is able to
reproduce, in fact she is reproducing when she is pregnant, thus it cannot be
said that her reproductive system is negatively affected....
Brennan v. Nat'l Tel. Directory Corp., 850 F. Supp. 331, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
238 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. (1998).
239 See Compliance Manual, supra note 235, at § 902.2 (c) (3). The example that the
Compliance Manual gives of a pregnancy-induced complication is hypertension, a
condition that is readily recognized as an impairment in nonpregnancy cases.
240 See Chapsky v. Baxter Mueller Div., No. 93-6524, 1995 WL 103299 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 9, 1995). In Chapsky, the court misconstrued Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F.
Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ill. 1994), as holding that pregnancy is a physical impairment affect-
ing the reproductive system, when in fact Pacourek did not discuss that issue. See
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications Inc., 922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Ran. 1996). Kin-
dlesparker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 94-C7542, 1995 WL 275576 (N.D. Ill May 8,
1995), was decided by the same court a few months later in reliance on Chapsky. Cf
Wenzlaff v. Nationsbank, 940 F. Supp. 889, 891 (D. Md. 1996) (describing Chapsky as
aberrant after reviewing existing caselaw).
241 See Martinez v. Labelmaster, No. 96-C4189, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8499 (N.D.
Ill. May 29, 1998); Leahrv. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., No. 96-C1388, 1997
WL 414104 (N.D. ll.July 17, 1997); Wenzlaff 940 F. Supp. 889;Jessie v. Carter Health
Center, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613 ( E.D. Ky. 1996); Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of
Sag Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Gudenkauf 922 F. Supp. 465;Johnson
v. A.P. Products, Ltd., 934 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Villareal v. J.E. Merit Con-
structors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Tsetseranos v. Tech Prototype, Inc.,
893 F. Supp. 109 (D.N.H. 1995); Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-7382, 1993
WL 101196 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1993).
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in the absence of "unusual circumstances. '242 For example, in
Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc.,2 43 the court found that the
plaintiff, who during her pregnancy complained of morning sickness,
stress, nausea, back pain, swelling, and headaches, did not have an
impairment because her pregnancy was not unusual or abnormal.
24 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the EEOC's interpre-
tive guidelines regarding pregnancy 245 and went on to reason as fol-
lows: "Pregnancy is a physiological condition, but it is not a disorder.
Being the natural consequence of a properly functioning reproduc-
tive system, pregnancy cannot be called an impairment.... All of the
physiological conditions and changes related to a pregnancy also are
not impairments unless they exceed normal ranges or are attributable
to some disorder."246 Several courts adopting this approach to ex-
clude pregnant women from the ADA's coverage have reassured the
plaintiff by reminding her that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) and Title VII prohibit adverse employment actions based on
pregnancy, by treating pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex dis-
crimination rather than disability discrimination.
2 47
242 See, e.g., Leahr, 1997 WL 414104, at *4; Jessie, 926 F. Supp. at 616; Lehmuller, 944
F. Supp. at 1094 ("coverage of the ADA does not extend to normal pregnancies");
Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 627 (noting that neither an employee's pregnancy nor its
complications were a disability under the ADA); Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. 109 (finding
that pregnancy complicated by ovarian cysts, which caused plaintiff to miss work, was
not an impairment); Villlarea 895 F. Supp. at 152 (concluding that pregnancy and
related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute an
impairment).
243 922 F. Supp. 465 (D. Kan. 1996).
244 Although Gudenkauf believed she was disabled during the last trimester of her
pregnancy, the court relied on the testimony of Gudenkauf's obstetrician that she had
not experienced any complications or conditions not normally expected with preg-
nancy and that her complaints did not indicate unusual symptoms or unusually severe
symptoms. See id. at 469.
245 Several of the courts rejecting pregnancy and related conditions as disabilities
also rely on a statement in the EEOC's guidance manual that "temporary, nonchronic
impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are
usually not disabilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1998). This statement is directed
at explaining the phrase "substantially limits," not "impairment." See, e.g., Martinez,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8499; Leahr, 1997 WL 414104, at *4; Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at
119; Villarea 895 F. Supp. at 152.
246 Gudenkauf 922 F. Supp. at 473.
247 See, e.g., Johnson, 934 F. Supp. at 627; Jessie, 926 F. Supp. at 616; Villarea4 895 F.
Supp. at 152; Tsetseranos, 893 F. Supp. at 119; Byerly v. Herr Foods, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-
7382, 1993 WL 101196, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 1993). The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act was enacted in 1978 as an amendment to Title VII. It specifically prohibits, as a
form of sex discrimination, discrimination on the bases of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.
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A few women experiencing pregnancy-related conditions, how-
ever, have managed to circumvent this line of cases by characterizing
their disability not as their pregnancy, or even as pregnancy plus its
manifestations, but instead as a separate condition, which just hap-
pened to accompany their pregnancy. For example, the plaintiff in
Patterson v. Xerox Corp.248 alleged that severe back pain-which she
suffered as a result of her pregnancy and the aggravation of a prior
back injury-was her impairment and that it substantially limited her
ability to sit at work for extended periods of time. While noting the
line of case law holding that the ADA does not recognize pregnancy as
a disability, the court held that Patterson had survived a motion to
dismiss by alleging her disability to be severe back pain.249 Thus, by
cleaving the disabling result of a pregnancy from the pregnancy itself,
a plaintiff may be able to convince a court that her case really isn't
about pregnancy.
More recently, a number of courts have built on this judicial will-
ingness to focus the impairment inquiry away from the simple state of
pregnancy and onto its side effects, but have done so by distinguishing
between "normal, uncomplicated pregnanc[ies]" and the complica-
tions that can arise out of a pregnancy.2 50 In Cerrato v. Durham,251 the
plaintiff alleged that her experience of spotting, leaking, cramping,
dizziness, and nausea during pregnancy qualified as disabilities. In
denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court embraced the
distinction between an uncomplicated pregnancy and. pregnancy com-
plications as supported by medical science-specifically, a statement
by the AMA that most women with uncomplicated pregnancies would
be able to work until labor commenced, but that enumerated "sub-
stantial complications" might disable the pregnant woman from fur-
ther work.2 52 Emphasizing that the case did not involve "an entirely
248 901 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
249 See id. at 278; see also Walker v. American NTN Bearing Mfg., No. 95-C1227,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2919 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1997) (citing Patterson in accepting
plaintiff's contention that her impairment was not her pregnancy itself, but her head-
aches, nausea, and sleeping and eating problems attributable to her pregnancy); Gar-
rett v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, No. 95-C7341, 1996 WL 411319 (N.D. Ill.
July 19, 1996) (finding allegation of severe morning sickness as disability was suffi-
cient to survive motion to dismiss).
250 Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Darian v.
University of Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1997); Hernandez v. City of
Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1997); Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Centers,
Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.1997).
251 941 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
252 Id. at 393 (citing Council on Scientific Affairs, Effects of Pregnancy on Work Per-
formance, 251 JAMA 1995 (1984)).
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normal, healthy pregnancy," the court concluded that Cerrato had
sufficiently alleged a disabling impairment to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.
253
Under this approach, courts consider whether a pregnancy-re-
lated complication can be seen as a disorder or abnormal (so that it
might be deemed an impairment) notwithstanding that the complica-
tion is inextricably part of the pregnant woman's experience of preg-
nancy (which is deemed not an impairment). In assessing a plaintiff's
argument that her premature labor was a disabling impairment, one
court explained its reasoning:
Pregnancy is not considered a physiological disorder under [the
EEOC regulations].... However, the regulation does not explicitly
exclude pregnancy-related impairments, provided they are the re-
sult of a physiological disorder. "Physiologic" is defined as "charac-
teristic of or conforming to the normal functioning or state of the
body or a tissue or organ." Thus, a physiological disorder is an ab-
normal functioning of the body or a tissue or organ. Clearly, plain-
tiff's condition was not a function of a normal pregnancy. It was a
physiological disorder.
254
Similarly, in considering the claims of a woman who experienced
severe back, uterine, and pelvic bone pain and painful uterine con-
tractions, another court emphasized that these "conditions were not a
function of a normal pregnancy, but rather a physiological disorder
with disabling consequences. "255 Thus, these most recent cases en-
deavor to draw the line between "impairment" and "not impairment"
by distinguishing between pregnancies that are normal and those
marred by abnormal complications.
2. Theoretical Response
So how does the law regarding a pregnant woman's ability to
claim the ADA's protection look from the perspective of disability the-
ory? It looks as if the EEOC and the courts are attempting to draw
lines between the majority of pregnant women, who cannot complain
under the ADA if they are discriminated against based on the bodily
and emotional changes that accompany pregnancy, and those few wo-
men who experience conditions that deviate so far from what is con-
sidered normal for a pregnancy that the women are found to have an
impairment under the ADA. This effort at categorizing is seen
253 Id.
254 Hernandez, 959 F. Supp. at 130 (citing DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICrIONARY (27th
ed. 1988)).
255 Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 87.
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throughout the case law, whether it takes the form of an "unusual
circumstances" or "abnormal complications" standard, and it essen-
tially demands a finding that something is wrong with, or abnormal
about, a pregnant woman's body before acknowledging an impair-
ment. This reluctance to find impairment in pregnancy is premised
on the understanding that a pregnancy itself represents the proper
functioning of a healthy reproductive system; it also probably rests on
a common perception that pregnant women are not typically viewed
as having a disability. Nonetheless, a disability theorist might ask, if an
employer (or other actor covered by the ADA) discriminates against a
woman based on her pregnancy and related conditions, isn't that dis-
crimination likely to be based on the deviation of the pregnant wo-
man's body from cultural ideals of what the body should look like and
how it should perform? And, if that is the case, how much does dis-
crimination based on pregnancy really differ from discrimination
based on disability?
As noted above, the earlier cases took a strongly exclusionary
stance, reasoning that pregnancy and related medical conditions sim-
ply were not impairments absent "unusual circumstances"-a phrase
that none of the courts explained or even illustrated. As many of
these courts noted, pregnancy discrimination is discrimination based
on sex, not disability, and it should stay in its proper box. But can
these two possible reasons for discriminating really be so easily untan-
gled? Does the employer who terminates a woman "based on her
pregnancy" really do so because she is female (after all, only females
become pregnant)? Or might the employer terminate the woman be-
cause she's been late to work (because of morning sickness), missed
several days (when she experienced spotting and her doctor put her
on bed rest), and is often eating at her desk (in order to keep up her
blood sugar and prevent nausea)? Or might all these elements come
into play in a single decision?
Disability theorists might remark that the courts' desire to com-
partmentalize these cases into sex, but not disability, discrimination
categories reflects an inability or unwillingness to recognize the fre-
quency of dual discrimination encountered by women with disabili-
ties. Nor is it always a real answer to say, as the courts often have, that
pregnancy discrimination is indeed prohibited, but under the PDA,
rather than the ADA. For the PDA, unlike the ADA, simply prohibits
differential treatment based on pregnancy, but does not impose any
obligation to provide accommodations for employees whose preg-
nancy-related conditions affect their ability to perform their job in the
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manner required by their employer. 256 Given this difference, the
question bears addressing: if one of the ADA's purposes is to enable
persons with functional limitations to obtain and retain employment
by requiring employers to accommodate those limitations, doesn't the
reasonable accommodations requirement make equal sense as ap-
plied to pregnant women?257 It is also worth noting, as one court has,
that the PDA provides an alternative avenue of protection only in the
employment context; it does not protect pregnant women discrimi-
nated against by public accommodations or public entities.258 Thus, a
greater judicial willingness to find that pregnancy and its accompany-
ing physical and mental changes qualify as impairments under the
ADA would not simply duplicate protection already existing for preg-
nant women.
But the steps that some courts have taken to allow some pregnant
women to claim protection under the ADA-whether by isolating an
impairment such as back pain or morning sickness from its cause or
256 See Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Disabilities,
Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213,
221 (1998) (arguing that gender discrimination laws take an "antidifferentiation" ap-
proach while disability discrimination laws take an "antisubordination" approach that
seeks to improve employability of persons with disabilities); Pamela S. Karlan &
George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE
L.J. 1 (1996) (arguing that the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodations be
incorporated into other employment discrimination laws). For commentary on ac-
commodating pregnant employees, see Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Preg-
nancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1995) (advocating that accommodation
of pregnancy in the workplace be characterized as a legal obligation to promote the
health of developing children); Jennifer Gottschalk, Comment, Accommodating Preg-
nancy on the Job, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (1996) (arguing for the need for on-the-job
accommodation for pregnant workers and advocating an interpretation of existing
employment legislation which would support this result); Colette G. Matzzie, Note,
Substantive Equality & Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193 (1993) (arguing for coverage of pregnancy and
pregnancy-related disabilities under the ADA by defining "disability" as relative to a
particular social context); Laura Schlichtmann, Comment, Accommodation of Preg-
nancy-Related Disabilities on the Job, 15 BEREL.EYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 335 (1994) (consider-
ing currently available legal protections for workers who need accommodations to
continue working while pregnant).
257 For examples of the range of accommodations requested by pregnant women,
see Darian, 980 F. Supp. 77 (requesting that nursing student be required to see only
one patient per day, be allowed to review patient records at home, and have a re-
duced course load); Jessie v. Carter Health Center, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Ky. 1996)
(requesting that certified nursing assistant be placed on light duty work); Patterson v.
Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (requesting that receivables representa-
tive be allowed to take 5-10 minute walk every hour to relieve back pain).
258 See Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 86.
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by viewing the complications of pregnancy as impairments-clearly re-
flect a medicalized view of disability. Demanding the artificial cleav-
age of an impairing condition from its source (the woman's
pregnancy), and considering it in isolation from the bundle of other
physical changes experienced by a pregnant woman, reflects a medi-
calized understanding of human experience as describable in terms of
symptomatology and disorder in discrete bodily systems or organs,
rather than as a complexly integrated experience of the whole body in
context. This approach is reminiscent of the method used in Social
Security disability determinations that employs schedules or lists show-
ing the percentage of impairment resulting from different
conditions.
2 59
The "more refined" analysis used in Cerrato and Hemnandez is even
more explicitly medicalized, for these courts rely on the "current state
of medical knowledge" to draw a line between pregnancies that are
normal and those that are not because of complications. 260 Disability
theorists likely would reject the medical profession as the arbiter re-
sponsible for drawing lines between normal and abnormal (or "com-
plicated" ) pregnancies. Instead, in assessing when pregnancy should
be considered a disability, the proper questions are how women expe-
rience their pregnancies and all the accompanying changes-without
attaching labels like "complicated" or "abnormal" or "unusual"-and
how those changes affect women's lives and ability to participate in
the workplace and society more broadly. This approach would accord
with the efforts of the women's health movement over the past several
decades to demedicalize pregnancy and childbirth and wrest control
of those experiences from the predominantly male medical profes-
sion.261 It would be bitterly ironic, however, if the struggle to have
pregnancy and childbirth understood as normal, healthy experiences
rather than as medical problems were to contribute indirectly to de-
259 See STONE, supra note 33, at 110 ("Human performance is divided into percen-
tiles, so that disability is conceived in terms of missing parts. Impairments become
entities to be subtracted from the presumed wholeness of the individual.").
260 See Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
Council on Scientific Affairs, supra, note 252). It is worth noting, moreover, that
these courts are not being analytically consistent They are using the medical litera-
ture to get them over the initial threshold of whether a pregnant woman can be con-
sidered to have an impairment. The statement relied on, however, talks about the
fact that some complications may disable a woman from further work during the preg-
nancy-an analysis which appears to focus on the limiting effect of the complication
rather than its nature as a disorder or abnormal condition.
261 See generally BARBARA KArz ROTHMAN, IN LABOR: WOMEN AND POWER IN THE
BIRTHPLACE (1991).
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priving of legal redress pregnant women who are discriminated
against because of their physical condition.
I make these points to illustrate how claims of disability by preg-
nant women have encountered a medical model analysis by the EEOC
and the courts on the question of impairment. While disability theo-
rists would be likely to discredit the legal analysis of pregnancy as a
disability for these reasons, it is less clear that disability theorists would
themselves view pregnant women who are discriminated against as dis-
abled. The questions that those theorists ask, however, would not re-
semble the questions posed under the medical model. Rather than
asking whether a woman's pregnancy is characterized by some physio-
logical dysfunctioning or abnormality, some disability theorists would
ask whether pregnant women, like people with disabilities, have been
subjected to social oppression because of their bodies' deviations from
cultural norms. 262 Other theorists might focus on whether pregnancy
significantly affects a woman's daily life and whether pregnant women
present themselves to the world as disabled people.263 Ultimately, the
question becomes how much alike, and how different from, disabled
people are women whose pregnancies cause them to be subjected to
discrimination. 264 Thus, approaching the question from a disability
theory perspective does not avoid the need to draw lines; it simply
demands that the lines be drawn based on the social reality that peo-
ple experience rather than based on medical classifications.
265
B. Obesity and Overweight
1. The Law
Cases in which plaintiffs assert violations of disability discrimina-
tion laws by alleging discrimination based on their weight 266 provide
262 Cf Hahn, supra note 30, at 108 (discussing aesthetic anxiety stimulated by
physical differences as the basis for prejudice and exclusion).
263 Cf LINTON, supra note 27, at 13 (discussing Carol J. Gill, Questioning Contin-
uum, in THE RAGGED EDGE: THE DisABILrny EXPERIENCE FROM THE PAGES OF THE FIRST
FIFrEEN YEARS OF "THE DisABiTy RAG" 46 (B. Shaw ed., 1994)).
264 I think that few persons from any camp would argue that all pregnant women
should be considered to have a disability throughout their pregnancies. It seems that
women whose pregnancy causes their bodies not to look or perform the way that
society expects bodies to look and perform-a failure that prompts discrimination-
have the strongest claim to disability.
265 Cf MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 3-4 (1990) (discussing importance of basis on which classifications are
made).
266 For commentary on these cases, see Sharlene A. McEvoy, Tipping the Scales of
Justice: Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, 21 HUM. RTs. Q. 24 (1994)
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another example of how the medical model of disability influences
legal application of the ADA's definition of "disability." Two types of
cases have arisen claiming weight discrimination as disability discrimi-
nation. In the first, a morbidly obese267 plaintiff alleges that discrimi-
nation occurred and either that her obesity was an actual disability or
that her employer (or other actor covered by the ADA) perceived her
(analyzing Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993)); Charles T. Passaglia, Appearance Discrimination: TheEvidence of
the Weight, 23 COLO. LAw. 841 (1994) (evaluating the possible impact of Cassista and
Cook on obesity becoming recognized as a perceived disability); Steven Ziolkowski,
The Status of Weight-Based Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After
Cook v. Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74
B.U. L. REv. 667 (1994) (advocating amending EEOC regulations to address over-
weight conditions exceeding 20-30% over ideal weight); Andrea M. Brucoli, Com-
ment, Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and
Hospitals: Morbid Obesity as a Protected Disability or an Unprotected Voluntay Condition, 28
GA. L. REv. 771 (1994) (emphasizing the need for case-by-case evaluation of each
claim rather than a blanket recognition of all obese persons as disabled); Carolyn May
McDermott, Note, Should Employers Be Allowed to Weigh Obesity in Their Employment Deci-
sions? Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation & Hospitals,
44 U. KAN. L. Rrv. 199 (1995) (recommending that protection of federal disability law
be extended to those whose obesity results from systemic or metabolic factors, or
whose obesity is of sufficient duration and impact); Milena D. O'Hara, Note and Com-
ment, "Please Weight to be Seated": Recognizing Obesity as a Disability to Prevent Discrimina-
tion in Public Accommodations, 17 WHrrrIER L. REv. 895 (1996) (arguing that prevalence
of discrimination against the obese mandates that obesity be protected as a disability,
and proposing a "sliding-scale" approach to categorizing individuals as disabled);
Scott Peterson, Comment, Discrimination Against Overweight People: Can Society Still Get
Away with It?, 30 GONZ. L. REv. 105 (1994) (advocating protection for the obese from
widespread societal discrimination, yet acknowledging the logistical problems of ex-
tending disability legislation to cover the large number of overweight Americans);
Shari Ronkin, Comment, Private Rights in Public Places: A Weighty Issue, 48 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 649 (1994) (arguing that obese plaintiffs should be offered redress under the
ADA's "regarded as" prong when they can demonstrate that they have been treated
differently due to societal stereotypes about obesity); Paula B. Stolker, Note, Weigh My
Job Performance, Not My Body: Extending Title VUI to Weight-Based Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. Hum. RTS. 223 (1992) (arguing for Title VII protection for the overweight
based on appearance discrimination); William C. Taussig, Note, Weighing in Against
Obesity Discrimination: Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retarda-
tion & Hospitals and the Recognition of Obesity as a Disability Under the Rehabilitation Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 B.C. L. REv. 927 (1994) (favoring federal
protection of all obese individuals because of "societal perception that being over-
weight is a disabling condition").
267 The medical definition of obesity is weight of 20% or more over the ideal body
weight. Morbid obesity is defined as 100% over ideal weight. SeeJeanine C. Cogan &
Esther D. Rothblum, Outcomes of Weight-Loss Programs, 118 GENETiC, Soc., & GEN.
PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 385, 388 (1992); Barbara Lukert, Biology of Obesity, in PsYcHo-
LOGICAL ASPECTS OF OBEsriY 1 (Benjamin Wolman ed., 1982).
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obesity as a disability. In the second type of case, the plaintiff is not
morbidly obese and may not even be obese; nonetheless, the plaintiff
has suffered some adverse outcome as a result of a failure to meet
weight guidelines or standards adopted by an ADA-covered entity.
These plaintiffs allege that they have been discriminated against based
on a perception that their failure to meet the standards makes them
disabled.
The EEOC's interpretive guidelines take the position that the
term "impairment" does not include "physical characteristics such as
eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle
tone that are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physio-
logical disorder."268 In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC goes on to
explain that "[b] eing overweight, in and of itself, generally is not an
impairment.... On the other hand, severe obesity.., is clearly an
impairment. In addition, a person with obesity may have an underly-
ing or resultant physiological disorder, such as hypertension or a thy-
roid disorder. A physiological disorder is an impairment."269 Thus,
the EEOC asserts that while a person's weight generally will not be
deemed an impairment, it may be in two circumstances: (1) when the
weight is attributable to or results in some physiological disorder or
(2) when the weight falls outside the "normal" range, as in cases of
morbid obesity.270
Cases applying the ADA's definition of "disability" to claims of
weight discrimination have generally followed the EEOC's approach
to assessing when weight can be an impairment.271 Cook v. State of
Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and HospitaS272
provides an example of the cases in which a morbidly obese plaintiff
268 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. (1998).
269 Compliance Manual, supra note 235, at § 902.2 (c) (5) (ii) (citations omitted).
270 In the interpretive guidelines explaining the phrase "substantially limits" as it is
used in defining "disability," the EEOC also states, without explanation,
"[T] emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term
or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities.... Similarly, except in rare circum-
stances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app.
(1998). This reference to obesity, however, does not go to whether it should be con-
sidered an impairment.
271 In several cases, however, courts have either assumed that morbid obesity is a
physical impairment, see, e.g., Nedder v. Rivier College, 908 F. Supp. 66 (D.N.H. 1995)
(assuming arguendo that morbid obesity constitutes an impairment); Morrow v. City
of Jacksonville, Ark., 941 F. Supp. 816 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (assuming implicitly that a
combination of obesity and hypertension were impairments), or declined to decide
the question, see Smaw v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862 F.
Supp. 1469 (E.D. Va. 1994).
272 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
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challenges an adverse employment action. Bonnie Cook was denied a
position working as an attendant at an institution for persons with
mental retardation. At the time she applied, Cook weighed over 320
pounds and stood 5'2" tall, which classified her as morbidly obese. In
turning down her application, the defendant institution asserted that
Cook's weight could affect her ability to evacuate residents in the
event of an emergency and that her weight also created risks for her
own health, which might lead to repeated absences and workers' com-
pensation claims. Cook sued, alleging violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and arguing that, although she was capable of do-
ing the job in question, the defendant perceived her as having a disa-
bility.2 73 The jury found for Cook and awarded her $100,000 in
damages.
On appeal, the court affinned, finding that the evidence sup-
ported the jury's verdict. In the course of assessing the evidence, the
court concluded that the jury could reasonably have found that Cook
had a physical impairment: "[A]fter all, she admittedly suffered from
morbid obesity, and she presented expert testimony that morbid obes-
ity is a physiological disorder involving a dysfunction of both the meta-
bolic system and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal system,
capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal, respira-
tory, and cardiovascular systems." 274 In affirming, the court also re-
jected arguments by the defendant that the mutability and
voluntariness of Cook's obesity prevented a finding that it was a legally
cognizable impairment. Although the appeals court questioned the
basic proposition that immutability is a prerequisite to finding an im-
pairment, it found that the jury nonetheless had sufficient evidence
from which it could find that the metabolic dysfunction that caused
Cook's obesity was permanent, even if Cook could lose weight by fast-
273 In order to succeed on a perceived disability claim, the plaintiff may show the
definition of "being regarded as having a disability" to be met in one of three ways:
(1) The individual may have an impairment which is not substantially limit-
ing but is perceived by the employer or other covered entity as constituting a
substantially limiting impairment;
(2) The individual may have an impairment which is substantially limiting
only because of the attitude of others toward the impairment; or
(3) The individual may have no impairment at all, but is regarded by the
employer or other covered entity as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1), app. (1998).
274 Cook, 10 F.3d at 23. The court also found that the jury could have found from
the evidence that although Cook was not handicapped, the defendant treated her as
if she had a physical impairment because it treated her obesity as if it actually affected
her musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems.
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ing. Likewise, the court found that the voluntariness of Cook's obesity
was not relevant to its status as an impairment, 275 and that, even if it
were, the jury could have found that the metabolic dysfunction was
beyond Cook's control.
In a case decided just a few months before Cook, the California
Supreme Court more narrowly circumscribed when obesity could be
deemed a "physical disability" under California's Fair Employment
and Housing Act, a phrase whose definition tracks the EEOC's regula-
tory definition of "impairment. ' 276 Cassista alleged that the defend-
ant had denied her employment because it perceived her to be
disabled by her morbid obesity; after the defendant health food store
declined to offer her a job, several employees expressed concern
about whether Cassista's weight would affect her ability to do the job.
The California Supreme Court, however, rejected the proposition that
simply showing that the defendant's failure to hire Cassista was based
on its perception that her weight disqualified her was sufficient to
make out a showing of perceived disability. Instead, the court rea-
soned, because the "regarded as" prong of the disability definition re-
fers back to the type of impairment that can give rise to a finding of
actual disability, only a condition qualifying as an actual impairment
can support a perceived disability claim.2 77 Moreover, the court inter-
preted regulations and case law under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act as standing for the proposition that weight unrelated to a "physio-
logical, systemic disorder" cannot be a disability. As a result, the court
concluded that, in order to succeed on a perceived disability claim
based on weight, a plaintiff has to show that the defendant perceived
her weight to be in the nature of a physiological disorder. 278 Because
Cassista had not presented evidence that her obesity was the result of
a physiological condition or disorder affecting a body system, she
could not succeed in her claim. Thus, under the California court's
approach in Cassista, even morbid obesity-a condition that falls
275 The court did suggest, however, that the mutability and voluntariness of an
impairment could be relevant to determining whether it had a substantially limiting
effect on major life activities. See id. at 23 n.7.
276 See Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). The court
pointed out that the statutory definition of "physical handicap" was modeled on the
Rehabilitation Act's and ADA's definition of "disability" and looked to federal admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations of those statutes. See id. at 1150, 1153.
277 Accord Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082 (S.D.
Iowa 1997) (stating, regarding perceived disability claim, that "evidence which con-
sists only of a belief that a physical characteristic presents an undesirable image or
appearance does not support an inference that [defendant] regarded [plaintiff's]
weight problems as connected to a physiological disorder").
278 See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153.
[VOL- 74:3
1999) THE DISABILITY KALEIDOSCOPE 683
outside the range of "normal" weights-is not an impairment unless it
results from some physiological disorder.
2 79
This linkage between evidence of some sort of physiological dis-
order and a plaintiff's ability to demonstrate disabled status also shows
up in the handful of cases in which plaintiffs who are not morbidly
obese challenge weight standards used by employers.280 In these
cases, the plaintiffs-a firefighter, a state trooper, and a flight attend-
ant-claimed that they were fully able to perform their desired jobs,
but that their employers' use of weight tables or guidelines as a basis
for disciplining them showed that the employers perceived the plain-
tiffs to be disabled by their excess weight. In each of these cases the
plaintiffs failed, with each court following a basic line of reasoning.
For example, in Francis v. City of Meyiden,28 1 the plaintiff
firefighter was suspended for repeatedly failing to keep his weight
under a maximum acceptable weight established by a height/weight
chart. The First Circuit acknowledged that, to succeed on a perceived
disability claim, the plaintiff did not need to show that he had an ac-
tual disability. The court, however, went on to require an allegation
that the employer believed (albeit erroneously) that the plaintiff suf-
fered from a condition that, if it in fact existed, would qualify as an
impairment under the actual disability prong. It is not enough, the
court reasoned, that the plaintiff allege that the employer believes
that some physical characteristic like weight makes the plaintiff unable
279 Karen Kramer and Arlene Mayerson criticize the California court's reading of
the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability as being too narrow. They
suggest that, in order to show that an employer regarded an individual as having an
impairment, it should be sufficient to show that the employer perceived her as having
a physical condition "affecting" one of the "bodily systems." Thus, a plaintiff who
could show that an employer refused to hire her because it believed her obesity (a
physical condition) would cause her to have back problems (an effect on the muscu-
loskeletal system) could proceed on a perceived disability claim. SeeKaren M. Kramer
& Arlene B. Mayerson, Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a Disa-
bility Claim Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CAL. W.
L. REv. 41, 62-63 (1994).
One district court has taken a similar approach in finding that a morbidly obese
plaintiff had presented evidence of an actual impairment. See Hazeldine v. Beverage
Media, Ltd., 954 F. Supp. 697, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Hazeldine has shown that her
obesity constitutes a physiological condition which affects at least her musculoskeletal,
respiratory, and cardiovascular systems."); accord Bryant v. Troy Auto Parts Ware-
house, No. IP95-1654-C-D/F, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22111, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 25,
1997).
280 See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997); Andrews v. State of
Ohio, 104 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 1997); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
281 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997).
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to do the job or renders him somehow otherwise disabled.2 82 So, be-
cause weight is not an impairment unless it relates to a physiological
disorder,283 the court found that no claim lay against an employer
who took disciplinary action because an employee failed to meet
weight guidelines.
28 4
Courts reaching this conclusion justify the outcome not only in
terms of adherence to the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA, but also
in terms of furthering that statute's broad purposes. The courts seem
to fear that permitting suits that allege discrimination based on simple
(albeit socially undesirable) characteristics such as excess weight will
fling wide open the floodgates of specious ADA claims. Interpreting
the ADA to cover such claims, as the First Circuit opined, "would
make the central purpose of the statute [ ], to protect the disabled,
incidental to the operation of the 'regarded as' prong, which would
become a catch-all cause of action for discrimination based on appear-
ance, size, and any number of other things far removed from the rea-
sons the statute [was] passed.
'28 5
In sum, reading together the cases challenging employer-im-
posed weight limits with those alleging discrimination based on actual
or perceived morbid obesity, the courts-in accord with the EEOC-
generally have agreed that a person's weight will be considered an
impairment only if it reaches the level of morbid obesity28 6 (or is
otherwise outside the normal range) or is related to a physiological
282 See id. at 285-86.
283 The court distinguished Cook as a case involving discrimination based on mor-
bid obesity and suggested that a plaintiff could proceed on a perceived disability claim
if the employer perceived the plaintiff as being morbidly obese. See id. at 286.
284 See id.; accord Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 ("Because a mere physical characteristic
does not, without more, equal a physiological disorder, where an employee's failure
to meet the employer's job criteria is based solely on the possession of such a physical
characteristic, the employee does not sufficiently allege a cause of action under these
statutes."); Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 (concluding as a matter of law that a
bodybuilder flight attendant who exceeded weight limits was not a handicapped indi-
vidual because his excess weight was not the result of physiological disorders, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss).
285 Francis, 129 F.3d at 287. See also Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (stating that allowing
coverage of discrimination based on physical characteristics unrelated to a physiologi-
cal disorder would "debase the high purpose of the statutory protections available to
those truly handicapped"); Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746 ("This court refuses to make
the term handicapped a meaningless phrase.").
286 See Fredregill v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1090
(S.D. Iowa 1997) (stating, with respect to a morbidly obese plaintiff, "[plaintiffs]
weight departs from the norm to such an extent it would not be beyond the realm of




disorder of some sort.287 What would a scholar from the disability
studies field have to say about this method of drawing lines?
2. The Theoretical Perspective
A critic from the field of disability studies would likely point out
that the two bases on which the EEOC and courts have chosen to seg-
regate those people who can claim weight as an impairment are, re-
spectively, arbitrary and medicalized. First, as noted above, a person
may successfully assert weight as an impairment if that person is mor-
bidly obese or her weight is otherwise beyond the "normal" range.
This boundary raises questions of its own. How is "normal" weight to
be determined? Should it be defined as less than a specified deviation
from the ideal weights established by a particular height and weight
chart?28 8 But it becomes difficult to argue that assessments of nor-
malcy should be based on ideal benchmarks when about twenty-five to
thirty percent of Americans weigh twenty percent or more over their
ideal weights.
28 9
Even if lawmakers were to decree that only weight rising to the
level of morbid obesity deviates from the normal range enough to be
deemed an impairment, a logical problem remains. Why should
someone whose weight is one hundred percent more than her ideal
weight be found to have an impairment when someone whose weight
287 One case to which the EEOC was a party, however, confounds this generaliza-
tion somewhat. In EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996), the
defendant refused to hire a morbidly obese woman as a shuttle van driver after a
physician refused to issue a Medical Examiner's Certificate required by Department
of Transportation regulations. The EEOC took the position that the morbidly obese
woman had no physical or mental impairment, but that Texas Bus Lines regarded her
as substantially impaired. See id. at 968. The court found that the physician refused to
provide medical clearance not based on any medical findings, but based on "myth,
fear or stereotype" about the abilities of obese persons. The court concluded: "Texas
Bus Lines regarded [the plaintiff] as disabled and, therefore, unable to work as a
driver based on her alleged impaired mobility without the benefit of objective medi-
cal testing or findings." Id. at 979. This conclusion appears to be inconsistent with
the holding in Francis, described in the text accompanying notes 281-84. Nonethe-
less, the two cases are distinguishable because the plaintiff in Texas Bus Lines was mor-
bidly obese.
288 For example, weights beyond the normal range-or abnormal weight to put it
more bluntly-could be established as a deviation of more than x% from the weights
set forth in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company height and weight tables. See
Jane Byeff Kom, Fat, 77 B.U. L. REv. 25, 28 n.18 (1997) (reproducing table). The
term "obese" is medically defined in a similar fashion, as meaning 20% or more over
ideal body weight. See id. at 25 n.1.
289 See id. at 28-29; accord Fredregll, 992 F. Supp. at 1089 ("A large segment of the
population is obese to some degree, and obesity is a matter of degree.").
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is a mere ninety-nine percent over her ideal weight does not have an
impairment?290 Under this approach, we cannot escape the fact that
morbid obesity (an impairment) is distinguished from lesser levels of
obesity (not impairments) simply by additional weight.291 What logic
justifies attaching legal relevance to the surpassing of an arbitrary
threshold such as the criterion for morbid obesity?
292
The second grounds for drawing lines that the EEOC and the
courts have used is more logical, but shows how firmly entrenched
those lawmakers are in the medical model-of disability. Here, the
EEOC asserts that "physical characteristics such as . . . weight
... that ... are not the result of a physiological disorder" do not fall
within the definition of "impairment," implicitly suggesting that
weight that is the result of a physiological disorder is an impair-
ment.293 As with the earlier discussion of pregnancy and related con-
ditions, recognition of impairment depends on finding something
medically and diagnosably wrong with the obese individual's body.
Only if the fat294 person submits herself to medical care and produces
expert testimony regarding the cause of her obesity can she claim pro-
tection against weight-based discrimination.
From the perspective of disability studies, this basis for line-draw-
ing too is arbitrary and likely to produce unfair results. If disability is
understood as a social, rather than medical phenomenon, then why
290 Unless, of course, her weight results from some physiological disorder, as will
be discussed infra text accompanying notes 293-99. The present discussion centers
on finding impairment in a deviation from the norm. See Korn, supra note 288, at 42
(objecting to blanket rule that protects someone who is 100% over her ideal weight,
but not someone who is 80% over her ideal weight).
291 I am indebted to Professor Michael Masinter for making this point during a
discussion of Francis v. City of Meriden in Counsel Connect's ADA discussion group.
292 In light of the alternative way that weight can be deemed an impairment-if it
is the result of a physiological impairment-one might speculate that the EEOC's
identification of morbid obesity as "clearly an impairment" reflects a res ipsa loquitur
("the thing speaks for itself") approach. In other words, how could someone weigh
100% more than his ideal body weight if there's not something wrong with him?
Even if this theory accurately reveals an implicit rationale for the EEOC's treatment of
morbid obesity, it does not resolve the arbitrariness of the threshold chosen.
293 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. (1998). In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC ex-
plains further: "[A] person with obesity may have an underlying or resultant physio-
logical disorder, such as hypertension or a thyroid disorder. A physiological
impairment is an impairment." Compliance Manual supra note 235, at
§ 902.2(c) (5) (ii).
294 Many individuals favor the use of the word 'fat" over "obese," which has medi-
cal connotations, or "overweight," which imposes societal notions of weight norms.
See Christian S. Crandall, Preudice Against Fat People: Ideology and Self-Interest, 66 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 882, 882 n.1 (1994); Kom, supra, note 288, at 25 n.1.
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should Bonnie Cook (who produced a diagnosis of what causes her
morbid obesity) receive protection from employment discrimination
when Toni Linda Cassista (who produced no evidence of a diagnosis)
does not? Regardless of what caused these women's morbid obesity,
the social effects that they experienced were nearly identical: they
were denied employment opportunities because employers believed
that fat people couldn't do the job.
295
Moreover, simply delegating- to medical professionals the respon-
sibility for determining who has obesity attributable to a physiological
disorder and thus may296 be qualified for ADA protection is particu-
larly problematic given the high level of medical uncertainty regard-
ing the, causes of obesity. Medical science knows little about the
etiology of obesity297 and thus is often incapable of stating with cer-
tainty whether a given person's obesity is or is not the result of some
physiological disorder. The courts' insistence on identifying an un-
derlying physiological disorder is also inconsistent with regulations is-
sued under the Rehabilitation Act. According to guidelines clarifying
these regulations, the term "impairment" includes "any condition
which is mental or physical but whose precise nature is
not ... known."298 Of course, this uncertainty regarding the causes of
obesity may not persist forever. Recent research suggests that some
cases of obesity may be caused by hormonal disorders and that genetic
factors may play a contributing role.2 99 But if these causes of obesity
are someday confirmed and become diagnosable, will they be consid-
ered physiological disorders and thus valid grounds for finding im-
pairment? What if it is discovered that a genetic marker is shared by
295 For a discussion of Cook v. Rhode Island from a disability perspective, see Anita
Silvers, Reprising Women's Disability: Feminist Identity Strategy and Disability Rights, 13
BERKLm WoMEN's L.J. 81, 109-11 (1998) (emphasizing that Cook received protec-
tion from discrimination because the employer "falsely equated her physical condi-
tion with incompetence").
296 Again, the reminder: even if a person satisfies the requirement of proving an
impairment, that person will be an individual with a disability only if that impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities.
297 See Korn, supra note 288, at 45.
298 34 C.F.L pt. 104, app. A (1997) (clarifying 34 C.F.1. § 104.30)); 45 C.F.R. pt.
84, app. A. (1997) (clarifying 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)). Given the weight placed on Reha-
bilitation Act regulations by the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998), it would seem that lower courts should pay closer attention to this interpretive
guidance, even though it is not repeated in the ADA regulations or interpretive
guidance.
299 See Crandall, supra note 294, at 883 (reporting that most research suggests that
weight is primarily a function of genetic and metabolic factors); Gina Kolata, Research-
ers Find Hormone Causes a Loss of Weight, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1995, at Al.
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many obese people-will that marker be deemed a physiological dis-
order and thus an impairment?
What a disability theorist is likely to come back to after pursuing
this line of questions is a question of her own: why should all this
matter? Both social science research and everyday experience demon-
strate that fat people are commonly stigmatized and discriminated
against based on their weight.300 Some portion of this discrimination
likely flows from myths and stereotypes about how obesity affects a
person's physical capabilities. Some of the discrimination, however, is
undoubtedly based on what Harlan Hahn calls "aesthetic anxiety" -
the anxiety and discomfort provoked by the presence of a person who
deviates from cultural norms of physical attractiveness. 30 1 Each of
these reasons for weight-based discrimination is closely akin to the rea-
sons that disability theorists identify as explaining disability discrimi-
nation, and thus a disability studies scholar might conclude that fat
people should be considered to be persons with disabilities.
This conclusion, however, begs a question of its own: how fat
must a person be before her weight will be considered a disability?
And how can the line drawn by disability theorists be any less arbitrary
than the line drawn by the EEOC? Ultimately, a disability theorist
would likely concede that all line-drawing ventures separating persons
into categories based on physical characteristics or functioning are in-
evitably arbitrary to some degree. Nonetheless, that theorist might ar-
gue, forming categories based on how greatly persons have
experienced social exclusion and disadvantage as a result of physical
characteristics is a preferable basis for creating categories-however
arbitrary their boundaries might be-than the medicalized approach
employed by the EEOC.
3 0 2
300 See Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 279, at 64-72 (discussing stigmatization of
and work-related stereotypes about obese individuals); cf Ronkin, supra note 266 (dis-
cussing obese people's denial of access to public accommodations).
301 See Kramer & Mayerson, supra note 279, at 65-66 (discussing studies showing
stronger negative reactions by children and adults to pictures of obese persons than
to pictures of persons with visible disabilities).
302 The points made in this section regarding the disability studies critique of the
legal treatment of when obesity may be deemed an impairment (and thus the first
step towards a finding of disability) would also apply to the EEOC's exclusion of other
physical characteristics from the definition of impairment unless they exceed the nor-
mal range or are attributable to a physiological disorder. For example, in discussing
the potential that short stature may be a disability, the EEOC gives the following
example:
[A] four foot, ten inch tall woman who was denied employment as an auto-
motive production worker because the employer thought she was too small
to do the work does not have an impairment. The woman's height was be-
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C. Deference to Medical Authority in Judging Impairment
Examples of how agencies and courts adopt a medical model of
disability in assessing impairment are not limited to cases involving
pregnancy and obesity. Instead, a medical model understanding of
disability appears in a broad gamut of cases when courts look to physi-
cians to validate the existence of a plaintiff's impairment. This defer-
ence to medical authority may be objectionable from a disability
studies perspective for multiple reasons, as discussed in this section.
1. Subjectivity of Assessment
One common thread running through the regulatory approach
to, and case law on, defining "disability" is the need for medical valida-
tion of the existence of an impairment.303 The EEOC's Compliance
Manual points out to agents investigating charges of disability discrim-
ination that when it is not obvious that the charging party has an im-
pairment, the investigator should ask the charging party for medical
documentation that describes the party's condition or contains a diag-
nosis of the condition.304 Likewise, courts considering whether a
low the norm, but her small stature was not so extreme as to constitute an
impairment and was not the result of a defect, disorder, or other physical
abnormality. On the other hand, a four feet, five inches tall man with
achondroplastic dwarfism does have an impairment. The man's stature was
the result of an underlying disorder, achondroplastic dwarfism, which is an
impairment.
Compliance Manua supra note 235, at § 902.2(c) (5) (i) (citations omitted). As with
obesity, the question posed by disability theory would be why does the cause of short
stature matter if the social experience of oppression is the same regardless of the
cause? As a practical matter, in the example given by the EEOC, there might in fact
be a difference in social experience if the person with achondroplastic dwarfism ex-
perienced greater prejudice and exclusion as a result of disproportion between trunk
and limbs or other physical anomalies accompanying the dwarfism. The EEOC, how-
ever, does not identify this as the basis for treating one person differently from the
other in assessing impairment. See generally Paul Steven Miller, Coming up Short: Em-
ployment Discrimination Against Little People, 22 HARv. G.R.-C.L. L. REv. 231 (1987).
303 I speak of "need" here not in the sense of medical validation being an absolute
prerequisite for a finding of impairment and disability. I imagine that if a plaintiff
who was a double amputee were to come to court in a wheelchair, the court would
not require expert medical testimony before finding the plaintiff to have an impair-
ment. For those plaintiffi whose impairments are not as subject to lay assessment,
however, the need for medical validation is much greater.
304 See Compliance Manual supra note 235, at § 902.2(b). The Manual also states
that "[o] ther information, such as the charging party's description of his/her condi-
tion or statements from the charging party's friends, family, or co-workers, also may
be relevant to determining whether the charging party has an impairment." Id.
Thus, the EEOC does not exclude from consideration nonmedical evidence of im-
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plaintiff has an impairment typically cite to expert medical testimony
(or the absence thereof) regarding the existence and nature of the
plaintiff's condition.
30 5
The reliance on medicine to validate impairment, as a precondi-
tion for a finding of disability, is objectionable to disability theorists
on a number of levels. As a political matter, disability studies scholars
view the identifying or labeling of who is disabled as an exercise of
unequal power,30 6 and have argued that the power to define who is
disabled has historically been used to advance the interests of groups
providing services to disabled people rather than to advance the inter-
ests or well-being of disabled people themselves. 30 7 On an individual
level, the requirement of medical validation of impairment may create
problems for individuals whose experience of disabling bodily condi-
tions is not accepted as real by medical professionals. Susan Wendell
gives as an example women with pelvic inflammatory disease (PID),
which can cause severe, prolonged disability in some cases. Instead of
physicians recognizing the physiological basis of their intense abdomi-
pairment; in stating that such evidence "may be relevant," however, the EEOC ap-
pears to place it on a lower level than medical evidence in assessing impairment.
Medical documentation is also identified by the EEOC as a "good starting point"
for investigation of whether an impairment substantially limits a charging party's ma-
jor life activities, and the discussion that follows applies equally to medical judgments
regarding the substantially limiting impact of a patient's condition. See id. at
§ 902.4(c) (1). The Manual, however, cautions agents evaluating whether an impair-
ment substantially limits a major life activity not to rely solely on information con-
tained in medical documentation. See id. Of course, in the "real world," medical
practice may not always make clean distinctions between decisions regarding the exist-
ence of an impairment and the manifestations of that impairment. For example, di-
agnosing chronic fatigue syndrome calls for the physician to report severe fatigue that
is not the result of exertion, but is unexplained, of recent onset, unimproved by rest,
and significantly disabling. See Keiji Fukuda et al., The Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: A
Comprehensive Approach to its Definition and Study, 121 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 953
(1994).
305 See Boren v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 457, 462 (N.D. Miss. 1997);
Kalekiristos v. CTS Hotel Mgmt. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1997); Buchanan v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., No. C95-1658 FMS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18325, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 5, 1996); Farley v. Gibson Container, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 322, 326 (N.D. Miss.
1995); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 736, 744 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1992).
306 See supra text accompanying note 197.
307 See Silvers, supra note 166, at 44 (describing how disabled people came to be
seen as part of the "deserving poor" and became a means of production for profes-
sional caregivers); OLIVER, supra note 148, at 127 (arguing that the category of disabil-
ity is a product of capitalistic society and that the workforce of professional caregivers
has a "vested interest in producing its own product in particular ways and in exerting
as much control over the process of production as possible").
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nal pain, however, women with PD often receive psychiatric diagno-
ses and are treated as if the problem is all in their heads. s08 Even
aside from the possibility that a physician might discount a patient's
description of her experience, diagnostic judgments of impairment
may be far less precise and far more uncertain and unreliable than
most lawmakers might recognize.30 9
The effective delegation to medical professionals of the authority
for determining whether a plaintiff in an ADA lawsuit has an impair-
ment is particularly problematic when a significant aspect of the im-
pairment alleged is not amenable to objective measurement and thus
may not be readily validated. This problem may arise whenever a per-
son experiences fatigue, shortness of breath, or anxiety associated
with an impairment, but the difficulty is probably best recognized with
respect to conditions that cause potentially disabling, but largely un-
measurable, pain.310 Pain is a highly subjective experience. Individu-
als experience the same pain-producing stimulus in different ways,
and pain has differing impacts on individuals' abilities to function
during pain.31 Moreover, recognized clinical methods of assessing
pain in an individual are often of limited efficacy.3 12 These factors
combine to produce a disturbing result: medical science has little abil-
ity to determine with certainty when a bodily condition will produce
pain and what impact that pain has on the person's ability to function.
This predicament regarding medicine's limited ability to assess
and characterize pain has been well-recognized in other contexts,
most notably with regard to the disability determination process for
308 See WENDELL, supra note 138, at 25. In making this point, Wendell is not con-
cerned specifically with the inability of women with PID to access the protections of
the ADA, but with their inability to receive support in their struggles with their bodies
from families, friends, and society at large.
309 See STONE, supra note 33, at 129-31 (discussing medical error and the unrelia-
bility of clinical judgment). For a discussion of similar concerns in the context of
mental health treatment decisions, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Ex-
perts": From Deference to Abdication Under the ProfessionalJudgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J.
639 (1992).
310 See STONE, supra note 33, at 134 ("Pain, fatigue, shortness of breath-and, one
might add, anxiety-are all real and very powerful subjective phenomena, but they
defy measurement.").
311 See COMvISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF PAIN, 54 (1986); see also
Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1964) ("What one human being may be
able to tolerate as an uncomfortable but bearable burden may constitute for another
human being a degree of pain so unbearable as to subject him to unrelenting misery
of the worst sort.").
312 See Thomas E. Rudy et al., Dfferential Utility of Medical Procedures in the Assessment
of Chronic Pain Patients, 34 PAIN 53 (1988).
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SSDI eligibility. There, Congress and the courts have engaged in an
ongoing effort to establish clear and accurate standards for evaluating
when pain is sufficiently severe to qualify an applicant for disability
benefits. 31 3 Of particular concern are cases in which the applicant
cannot establish by objective medical evidence a condition that would
be expected to cause the amount of pain alleged.3 14 The problem in
the SSDI context is ultimately how to assess pain and determine a
threshold of pain severity beyond which a person should not be ex-
pected to work;3 1 5 for purposes of defining "disability" under the
ADA, the problem is how to determine when pain manifests an im-
pairment and is so severe that it substantially limits a major life
activity.
Weaknesses in medicine's pain assessment practices have also
been noted as part of the increasing attention being paid to issues of
adequate pain control and relief.3 16 While these discussions focus pri-
marily on how physicians respond to pain, a necessary precondition to
adequate pain relief is effective pain assessment. 31 7 Research suggests,
however, that physicians often do a poor job of evaluating a patient's
level of pain. For example, one study found that health care providers
313 See Margaret C. Rodgers, Subjective Pain Testimony in Disability Determination Pro-
ceedings: Can Pain Alone be Disabling?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 173 (1991).
314 In the SSDI context, "excess pain" is the term of art used to describe pain
above and beyond the level that a diagnosed medical impairment would normally be
expected to produce. See Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). The
courts have differed on whether or not excess pain can be the basis for a disability
finding. See Rodgers, supra note 313, at 178-82 (describing vacillation of Ninth Cir-
cuit on the question).
315 See Rodgers, supra note 313, at 173-74; cf. STONE, supra note 33, at 134-38
(addressing the "special problem of pain" in disability determination).
316 See Patricia C. Crowley, No Pain, No Gain? The Agency for Health Care Policy and
Research's Attempt to Change Inefficient Health Care Practice of Withholding Medication from
Patients in Pain, 10 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 383 (1994); see also Brian
Goldman, Chronic-Pain Patients Must Cope with Chronic Lack of Physician Understanding,
144 CAN. MED. Ass'NJ. 1492 (1991).
317 This statement is true when medicine takes an "as needed" approach to pain
control, that is, wait until the patient feels pain and then provide palliative medication
as needed to relieve the pain. The "as needed" approach to pain control has
predominated in American medicine, but a shift towards a preventative approach to
control pain seems to be underway. Adoption of a preventative approach to pain
relief seeks to prevent and relieve pain by improving physician-patient communica-
tions about pain and providing medication before the patient suffers pain. In 1992,
the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, a federal agency charged with
promulgating advisory guidelines for medical practice, issued guidelines for pain re-
lief that focused on improving the effectiveness of pain control techniques. See gener-
ally Crowley, supra note 316.
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tend to disbelieve patients who claim high levels of pain.318 While
several barriers exist to effective pain assessment, the barrier of great-
est interest to disability theorists is the role that subjective biases may
play in physicians' assessment of pain. Health care providers assess
patients' pain levels differently depending on whether the provider
views the patient positively or negatively,3 19 and because the inade-
quacy of diagnostic techniques renders pain assessment largely subjec-
tive, the potential for physician bias to play a role is enormous.
Research suggests that several types of provider bias may influence
pain assessments,3 20 including attractiveness,3 2' gender,322 age,3 23 and
ethnicity.3 24 Taken together, this research indicates that a physician's
assessment of the pain experienced by a person claiming disability has
a substantial probability of being innocently inaccurate at best and
biased at worst. Given this possibility of inaccuracy and bias, disability
theorists would be particularly troubled by the delegation of authority
318 Stuart A. Grossman et al., Correlation of Patient and Caregiver Ratings of Cancer
Pain, 6J. PAIN & SmiPTOM Mcm-r. 53, 56 (1991) (finding that health care provider and
patient agreement regarding level of pain was 79% when patients reported low levels
of pain, 37% when patients reported moderate levels of pain, and 13% when patients
reported high levels of pain).
319 See Raymond C. Tait &John T. Chibnall, ObserverPerceptions of Chronic Low Back
Pain, 24J. APPLIED Soc. PsyCHOL. 415 (1994); David E. Weissman &J. David Haddox,
Opioid Pseudo-addiction: An latrogenic Syndrome, 36 PAIN 363 (1989).
320 See Raymond C. Tait & John T. Chibnall, Physician Judgments of Chronic Pain
Patients, 45 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1199 (1997) (identifying attractiveness, gender, litigation
status, patient age, ethnicity, and social desirability sensitivity as potential bases for
bias).
321 See Heather D. Hadjistavropoulis et al., Are Physicians' Ratings of Pain Affected by
Patients'PhysicalAttractiveness?, 31 Soc. Sci. & MED. 69 (1990) (concluding that attrac-
tive patients are viewed as generally more healthy than unattractive patients and thus
receive lower pain assessments). This finding might be interpreted to mean that dis-
abled patients, because they are commonly perceived as physically unattractive, are
more likely to receive higher pain assessments than their nondisabled counterparts.
That interpretation might hold true for persons with visible disabilities, but may be
less true for persons with chronic medical conditions that do not perceptibly affect
their physical appearance.
322 See Deborah Dillon McDonald & R. Gary Bridge, Gender Stereotyping and Nursing
Care, 14 REs. NuRsrNG & HF.LTH 373, 376 (1991) (finding that nurses planned signifi-
cantly more ambulation, analgesic administration, and emotional support time for
male patients).
323 See Michael J. Ross et al., Age Differences in Body Consciousness, 44 J. GERONTOL-
Ocv PSYCHOL. Sci. 23 (1989).
324 See Maryann S. Bates et al., The Effects of the Cultural Context of Health Care of
Treatment of and Response to Chronic Pain and Illness, 45 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1433 (1997)
(interpreting studies as showing that cultural beliefs affect both the provider's assess-
ment of pain and the patient's perception and communication of pain).
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to medical professionals to opine on whether a person's pain reflects
an impairment and renders her disabled.
2. The Evolution of Medical Science
Disability theorists may also disapprove of the authority granted
to medical professionals to determine the existence of impairment for
a separate, but related reason. Congress rejected a laundry list ap-
proach to defining "disability" in part to ensure that, as new disabling
conditions developed or were discovered, persons with those condi-
tions would be able to claim protection under the ADA.3 2 5 Medical
science, however, may at times be slow in accepting evidence of a new
condition that, in time, comes to be well-established. Persons strug-
gling with the disabling effects of a novel condition before the condi-
tion is validated by medical science may not be able to establish that
they have an impairment.
An example of the process of increasing, but not yet universal,
acceptance of a condition3 26 can be found in the growing recognition
325 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 51 (1990).
326 Other examples of conditions whose nature is uncertain and whose legitimacy
is currently in dispute include multiple chemical sensitivity and Gulf War Syndrome.
Multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) was first identified by allergist Theron Randolph
in 1962 as a "general allergic syndrome" provoked in especially susceptible individuals
by continuous exposure to chemicals in daily life. Thomas L. Kurt, Multiple Chemical
Sensitivities-A Syndrome of Pseudotoxicity Manifest as Exposure Perceived Symptoms, 33
CLINICAL ToxIcoLoGY 101, 101 (1995). Individuals suffering from MCS complain of
headaches, fatigue, nasal congestion, cognitive problems, irritability, and mood sw-
ings. See E.E. Sikorski et al., The Question of Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, 24 FUNDAmEN-
TAL & APPLIED ToxiCOLOGY 22, 23 (1995). Overall, the syndrome is characterized
almost exclusively by subjective symptoms, which the patient claims were triggered by
chemical exposure. See id. at 22. Because of the dearth of objective, reproducible
signs of the disorder, and a lack of universal definitions or diagnostic criteria ac-
cepted by physicians treating sufferers, the medical establishment tends to believe
that the symptoms derive from a psychological problem. See Claudia S. Miller, White
Paper: Chemical Sensitivity: History and Phenomenology, 10 TOXICOLOGY & INDus. HEALTH
253, 258 (1994).
To date, no MCS claim under the ADA has survived a defendant's summaryjudg-
ment motion. See Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Treadwell v.
Dow-United Techs., 970 F. Supp. 974, 975 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Patrick v. Southern Co.
Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 567 (N.D. Ala. 1996), affd, 103 F.3d 149 (11th Cir. 1996);
Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (N.D. Ga. 1995), affd, 86
F.3d 1171 (1lth Cir. 1996). The court in Frank, for example, refused to allow expert
testimony on MCS, and, citing the general lack of acceptance of MCS in the medical
community and the lack of an objective, reliable, clinical test for the disorder, found
that expert evidence regarding the disorder lacked scientific reliability. SeeFrank, 972
F. Supp. at 134.
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in the 1990s of chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) 327 CFS is an unex-
plained disorder that causes severe, disabling fatigue for a period of
over six months, along with a constellation of other symptoms, includ-
ing, among others, impaired concentration, sleep disturbances, and
musculoskeletal pain.3 28 After the reporting in the mid-to-late 1980s
of increasing numbers of persons experiencing such symptoms with
no explainable causes, 329 the Center for Disease Control began pro-
viding a definition for CFS in 1988, which it has continued to revise
since then. The Social Security Administration (SSA) recognizes CFS
as a real and potentially disabling (for Social Security purposes) con-
dition, with the actual existence of disability in persons claiming CFS
to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
330
Gulf War Syndrome (GWS), though yet to be conclusively diagnosed, has been
recognized as at least six separate groupings of symptoms by medical researchers. See
Robert W. Haley et al., Is There a Gulf War Syndrome? Searching for Syndromes by Factor
Analysis of Symptoms, 277 JAMA 215 (1997). In fact, a General Accounting Office Re-
port released in 1997, along with three 1997Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion articles, linked service in the Gulf theater to a variety of mysterious ailments. See
New Study Finds Fertilizer May be Linked to Gulf lllnesses, MED. INDuSTRY TODAY, June 25,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File; Ingrid Wickelgren & Marcia
Barinaga, The Big Easy Serves Up a Feast to Visiting Neuroscientists, 278 SCIENCE 1404
(1997). Commonly reported symptoms of the syndromes include fatigue, joint pain,
sleep disorders, memory loss, headaches, and rashes. See The Iowa Persian Gulf Study
Group, Self-Reported Rllness and Health Status Among Gulf War Veterans, 277 JAMA 238
(1997). Despite medical research demonstrating that veterans reporting GWS symp-
toms generally shared a psychological profile consistent with chronic medical illness
and not post-traumatic stress or malingering, government entities, including the Pen-
tagon, officially attribute GWS to psychological sources. See Haley et al., supra; MED.
INDUSTRY TODAY, supra. Litigation on Gulf War Syndrome has yet to produce any
rulings on the admissibility of medical testimony on the disorder. See, e.g., Coleman v.
Acolac, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D. Tex. 1995); United States v. James, No. ACM
31012, 1995 WL 755296 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 1995).
327 Other names for chronic fatigue syndrome include chronic fatigue immune
dysfunction syndrome (CFIDS) and myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME). See JEsSE A.
STOFF & CHARLES R. PELLEGRINO, CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME: THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC
(1988).
328 See Fukuda et al., supra note 304.
329 See generally HILLARY JOHNSON, OSLER'S WEB: INSIDE THE LABYRINTH OF THE
CHRONIC FATIGUE SYNDROME EPIDEMIC (1996) (tracing cases of CFS during its "pan-
demic" period, early research efforts into its possible causes, and the struggles of phy-
sicians first diagnosing the syndrome to have it recognized by the mainstream medical
establishment and the U.S. government).
330 See SOCIAL SECURnIY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM,
§ DI 24515.075 (May 1997); cf Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 443 (3d
Cir. 1997) (stating that, in an employer-provided disability insurance case, CFS is "uni-
versally recognized as a severe disability"); Woodson v. Cook County Sheriff, No. 96-
C3864, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15475 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 17, 1996) (holding, in an ADA
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Despite the official acceptance of CFS as a legitimate medical
condition-which presumably would qualify it as an impairment for
purposes of the ADA-its existence as a discrete syndrome remains a
matter of dispute among medical professionals. Some doctors attri-
bute CFS symptoms to depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, or
other psychological ailments. This skepticism regarding CFS is com-
pounded by the dearth of objective, measurable tests for CFS. A diag-
nosis of CFS requires the treating physician both to find that
symptoms of CFS are present and to exclude other medical or psychi-
atric causes for the symptoms. No simple blood test for CFS exists;
instead it is a diagnosis that follows when everything else has been
ruled out.3 31 The relative newness of CFS, combined with the high
level of uncertainty among medical professionals surrounding CFS di-
agnoses and a public perception that persons claiming CFS are merely
malingerers and whiners,3 32 suggests that some persons who suffer
from CFS's debilitating symptoms 33 3 may experience difficulty in find-
ing the medical validation necessary to be able to prove impairment
for purposes of asserting rights under the ADA. Only time will tell
whether CFS can be explained and objectively identified, but the pos-
sibility exists that persons who truly experience symptoms that sub-
stantially limit their major life activities have been and are deprived of
legal protections because the law delegates to the medical profession
the authority to validate the existence of impairment.
D. Judicial Confusion About Impairment's Not So Plain Meaning
This Part's discussion of theoretical perspectives on legal impair-
ment has thus far focused on the numerous, specific ways in which
legal assessment of impairment tends to embody a medicalized under-
case, that CFS can be an impairment which substantially limits the major life activity
of working).
331 See Fukuda et al., supra note 304. There do exist a few objective measures that
are consistent with a diagnosis of CFS, but that do not establish a diagnosis. See Issam
Bou-Holaigah et al., The Relationship Between Neurally Mediated Hypotension and the
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, 274 JAMA 961 (1995) (abnormally reduced heart rate and
blood pressure after the patient has been sitting upright for forty minutes); SToFF &
PELLEGRINO, supra note 327, at 74-84 (laboratory tests for low-functioning immune
system, yeast infections, and chronic viral infections).
332 See, e.g., The Actively Sick, WALL ST.J., Aug. 26, 1997, at A16 (dismissing Chronic
Fatigue Syndrome as a "psychologically grounded ailment[s]" or variety of depression
which sufferers fraudulently tie to "exotic virus[es]" and "little brain lesions[s]," and
supporting characterization of the illness as one of many "coping mechanisms and
methods of escape" in "stressful times").
333 For a description of the progression and impact of CFS on one person, see
Susan Wendell's description of her experience. WENDELL, supra note 138, at 1-5.
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standing of disability. Yet even a limited review of the case law on
defining "disability" reveals that courts' more general, and at times
subjective, understandings of the concepts of impairment and disabil-
ity are often inconsistent with a social or civil rights model of disabil-
ity. This section illustrates how those subjective, nonlegal
understandings appear in the cases and analyzes them from a disabil-
ity theory perspective.
As any first-year associate in a law firm well knows, lack of clarity
in directions can lead to confusion. That principle is equally true
when Congress directs the body politic not to discriminate against
people with disabilities. When Congress imported the ADA's defini-
tion of "disability" from the Rehabilitation Act, "impairment" was one
of the murky terms that came along. Congress made clear when it
enacted the ADA that it intended the statute to be interpreted in ac-
cordance with the Rehabilitation Act and the regulations issued there-
under (which included a regulatory definition of "impairment") and,
since the ADA's passage, administrative agencies have issued regula-
tions providing nearly identical definitions of "impairment." None-
theless, some courts do not appear to understand the term as it is used
in the ADA. If the courts themselves are not confused, then they at
times use the term and its verb form "to impair" carelessly and in a
fashion that is inconsistent with a sociopolitical understanding of
disability.
1. Conflating Impairment and Limitations
One culprit for the courts' confusion lies in the subtle distinc-
tions between the legal definition given to "impairment" for purposes
of the ADA and the common usage of that term, particularly in its
verb form, "to impair." To reiterate, for purposes of defining disabil-
ity, "impairment" is legally defined as "[a] ny physiological disorder, or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting one
or more listed body systems.33 4 By contrast, the dictionary defines
"impairment" as meaning "the action of impairing, the fact of being
impaired; deterioration; injurious lessening or weakening" and de-
fines "impair" as meaning "to make worse, less valuable, or weaker; to
lessen injuriously; to damage, injure."33 5 In essence, the legal defini-
tion understands "impairment" as a disorder or condition that has an
effect on the body, while the nonlegal definition understands "impair-
ment" as a process of becoming worse, or weaker, or less valuable, or
the status of having become worse, or weaker, or less valuable.
334 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
335 7 THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICmONARY 696 (2d ed. 1989).
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One example of a court's conscious adoption of the common,
nonlegal meaning of impairment is the Fourth Circuit's en banc deci-
sion in Runnebaum v. Nationsbank of Maryland.336 In considering
whether asymptomatic HIV infection was a physical impairment, the
court found that impairment had a plain meaning-which the court
found by looking in the dictionary-and concluded that in order to
ascertain Congress's intent, it did not need to consider the ADA's leg-
islative history, which listed HIV infection as an impairment.337 The
majority's opinion did not even address the regulatory definition of
"impairment," presumably because it believed that term was so clear
that agency interpretations too were irrelevant. Based on the diction-
ary meaning, the court reasoned that an impairment, by definition,
had to have "diminishing effects" on an individual. Because a person
with asymptomatic HIV infection has not yet developed symptoms of
HIV disease, the court concluded that asymptomatic HIV infection
could never qualify as an impairment.338
The precedential value of Runnebaum's reliance on a dictionary
definition of "impairment" is, of course, today extremely limited in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott. There, the
Court used the regulatory definition of "impairment" to reach its con-
clusion that HIV infection, from the moment of infection, is in fact a
disorder that affects the body's hemic and lymphatic systems.
33 9
Nonetheless, the analysis and language courts use in determining
whether an individual has a disability under the ADA at times reveal a
more subtle lack of conceptual clarity regarding the concept of im-
pairment. To state the ambiguity: is the impairment that the ADA
refers to the disorder3 40 itself, or is the impairment found in the "di-
minishing effects" of the disorder on the individual's body? To ex-
press the question in concrete terms, going back to the earlier
discussion of obesity as an impairment, was Bonnie Cook's impair-
ment her metabolic disorder or was it her obesity? In addressing the
mutability issue, the First Circuit in Cook cast its vote with the view that
the impairment lies in the disorder itself.3 4 1 Other courts, however,
appear to understand the ADA's usage of impairment to refer to the
336 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
337 See id. at 168.
338 See id. at 169.
339 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202-04 (1998).
340 Or condition, or cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h) (1) (1998).
341 See Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health Retardation, &
Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[T]hough people afflicted with morbid obes-
ity can treat the manifestations of metabolic dysfunction by fasting or perennial un-
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manifestations of a disorder. For example, one district court, after
taking judicial notice of the fact that the plaintiff's lupus was a physio-
logical disorder affecting certain body systems, went on to state: "An
illness cannot in and of itself be considered an impairment. Only
symptoms and/or ramifications actually limit the inflicted person's
ability to perform major life activities. '3
42
On the one hand, this imprecision in the usage of impairment is
easily understandable and perhaps harmless, for in many cases of disa-
bility-particularly in the most stereotypical cases of disability-the ef-
fects or manifestations of a physiological disorder or anatomical loss
are spoken of as the impairment itself, because the two are so inextri-
cably intertwined. For example, when courts speak of blindness as an
impairment, they are describing the effect of some ophthalmological
disorder or trauma-induced loss which, properly understood, is the
true "impairment" as that term is legally defined.343 Similarly, if the
courts speak of quadriplegia as an impairment, they are describing the
manifestation of a spinal cord injury or neurological disorder. It is
when a physiological disorder affects a body system in a way that is
more remote or less easily observable that courts may reach the con-
clusion that the lack of visible "diminishing effects" means that no
impairment is present, and therefore the plaintiff cannot claim the
ADA's protection.
This miscomprehension of the term "impairment" might be alle-
viated were courts familiar with (or at least aware of the existence of)
the conceptual frameworks of disability discussed above in Part III.A.
Both the WHO and Nagi frameworks are built on the term "impair-
ment," which each framework defines similarly to the EEOC's regula-
tory definition.344 With an awareness of these frameworks, courts
dereating, the physical impairment itself-a dysfunctional metabolism-is
permanent.").
342 Rodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D.P.R. 1997).
When this portion of the court's opinion is read in context, it appears that what the
court is attempting to express is that the plaintiff could not successfully argue that her
Lupus was a disability unless she could show that its manifestations substantially lim-
ited a major life activity. So understood, the analysis is correct. Nonetheless, the lan-
guage used displays confusion over the usage of the term impairment.
343 But for an example of a court that understands the distinctiori, see Doane v.
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that plaintiff had a disa-
bility because "[h ] is glaucoma caused permanent blindness in one eye which substan-
tially limits [his] major life activity of seeing").
344 The WHO framework describes impairment as any loss or abnormality of psy-
chological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function, and Nagi uses the term
to indicate some loss or abnormality of mental, physiological, or biochemical func-
tion, which relates to the specific functioning of an organ or organ system, but not to
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might be more likely to view "impairment" essentially as a term of art
and thus be able to resist the temptation to use either the dictionary
definition or their own personal understandings of the term. 45
It might be anticipated, however, that disability theorists would
object to greater judicial reliance on these definitions of "impair-
ment," for they reflect a medicalized approach to the concept by look-
ing for something deviant or pathological in an individual's body.3 4 6
After all, as Michael Oliver puts it succinctly: "Impairment
is . . . nothing less than a description of the physical body,"34 7 sug-
gesting implicitly that it need not be diagnosis of the body. Nonethe-
less, scholars from the disability studies field might be willing to
accept a more explicit medicalization of impairment in order to pre-
vent a potentially more disturbing problem: the conflation of the con-
cepts of impairment and disability. Indeed, some disability studies
scholars take impairment to refer to explicit kinds of biological anom-
alies in order to maintain the distinction between impairment and
disablement.34
8
It is easy to find in the case law instances when courts use the
terms "impairment" and "impaired" to describe not the bodily condi-
tion of the plaintiff, but the disadvantage or deficit in ability that is
associated with a bodily condition.349 For example, in Soileau v.
the functioning of an individual as an entire organism. See supra text accompanying
notes 134, 141.
345 An example of a court using its own understanding of impairment, without
relying either on the regulatory definition or the assistance of a dictionary, can be
found in Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986), where the court states:
"[T] he very concept of impairment implies a characteristic that is not commonplace
and that poses for the particular individual a more general disadvantage. .. ." For
discussion of courts' understanding that a common condition cannot be an impair-
ment, see infra Part IV.D.2.
346 See Silvers, supra note 138, at 784 (noting that the disability community has
criticized the WHO's conceptual framework as blaming the victim by locating the
problem in the deficits of impaired individuals rather than in the failure of society to
treat persons equitably).
347 OLIVER, supra note 148, at 35 (emphasis added).
348 E-mail from Anita Silvers, Professor, San Francisco State University (Oct. 5,
1998) (on file with author).
349 See, e.g., Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The
statute's inclusion of the limiting adjectives 'substantial' and 'major' emphasizes that
the impairment must be a significant one."); Sweet v. Electronic Data Sys., Inc., No. 95
CIV.3987, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5544, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1996) ("Plaintiff's
ability to engage in these activities shows that his ability to engage in the major life
activity of seeing has not been 'substantially impaired.'"); Trembczsynski v. City of
Calumet City, No. 87-C0961, 1987 WL 16604, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1987) ("Plain-
tiffs admit they have worked successfully.., for a number of years. Therefore, Plain-
tiffs were not impaired."); cf. Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1438
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Guilford of Maine, °50 the First Circuit considered whether a plaintiff
with a depressive disorder was disabled because, as the plaintiff al-
leged, his condition substantially limited his major life activity of get-
ting along with others. The court first found that the plaintiff's
disorder, dysthymia, was a mental impairment within the meaning of
the ADA.351 Even assuming that getting along with others is a major
life activity, however, the court found no evidence that the plaintiff
was substantially limited with respect to that activity. The court rea-
soned: "The evidence does not establish that Soileau had particular
difficulty in interacting with others, except for his supervisor. Impair-
ment is to be measured in relation to normalcy, or, in any event, to what the
average person does. . . . [The evidence] does not establish that the
nature and severity of his impairment were substantial." 352 Thus, the
court uses impairment as synonymous with limitation. This equation
of impairment with limitation is also apparent in cases demanding
that a plaintiffs impairment be significant or severe because the ADA
requires a substantial limitation of a major life activity.353 These courts
fail to recognize that an impairment (i.e., bodily condition) that is
quite severe, in the sense of threatening the health or well-being of an
individual, may have (at least for some period of time) a relatively
minor impact on an individual's functional capacities, 354 while an im-
pairment that is less severe may have a greater functional impact.
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (failing to recognize that mitigating measures might be disregarded
in determining impairment, but taken into account in determining substantial limita-
tion). There are also instances when it is unclear in which sense a court is using the
term impairment. For example, in Roth v. Lutheran General Hospita; 57 F.3d 1446,
1454 (7th Cir. 1995), Judge Coffey states: "The key is the extent to which the impair-
ment restricts a major life activity; the impairment must be significant one." Here,
impairment may be referring either to the limitation on a major life activity or to a
bodily condition. The sense of the sentence favors the former interpretation.
350 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997).
351 See id. at 15.
352 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
353 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1997)
("[T] he statute does require that the impairment 'substantially limit' a major life ac-
tivity. Thus, the impairment must be significant, and not merely trivial.") (citation
omitted); Sweet, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5544, at *11 ("[T]he ADA protects only a lim-
ited class of persons-individuals who suffer from impairments significantly more se-
vere than those encountered by the average person in every-day life.").
354 See, e.g., Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding that subdural hematoma, which necessitated brain surgery, did not substan-
tially limit a major life activity); Nave v. Wooldridge Constr. of Pa., Inc., No. 96-2891,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9203 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1997) (finding that Hodgkin's disease
did not substantially limit a major life activity).
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The conflation of impairment and the broader concept of disabil-
ity likely results from the above-described confusion regarding impair-
ment and limitation, but is it any cause for concern? Disability
theorists would likely say yes. Once we begin to understand impair-
ment as describing the ways in which a person's activities are affected
by a bodily condition or deficit, it is but a short step to viewing all the
disadvantages suffered by disabled people as being simply part and
parcel of their impairments. This collapsing of the entire definition
of "disability" into the concept of impairment is dangerous from the
perspective of disability theory. To the extent that we conflate a de-
scription of the body with the social, political, and cultural disadvan-
tages that accompany it, the latter start to appear to be caused by, and
inextricably linked to, the former. But the belief that bodily inferi-
ority naturally causes the disadvantages of disability reflects precisely
the medical model of disability that disability theorists reject. Thus,
when a court speaks of a plaintiffs impairment being a medical condi-
tion and then goes on to describe the person as being impaired in
relation to her employment opportunities, the message sent by the
choice of language is that the social disadvantage of decreased em-
ployment opportunities is but one side effect of a medical condition,
and not the result of exclusionary social forces.
2. The Commonness of Impairment: Of Aging and Asymptomatic
Genetic Conditions
While some courts have used the term "impairment" synony-
mously with limitation, other courts have understood the term "im-
pairment" as including only conditions or disorders that are
uncommon or not widely shared. One case widely cited for this prop-
osition is Daley v. Koch,3 55 in which the Second Circuit reasoned that
the allegedly disabling personality traits at issue "could be described as
commonplace; they in no way rise to the level of an impairment."3 56
So too some courts have found that myopia (nearsightedness) cannot
355 892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1989). Another widely cited case suggesting that the
commonness of a condition may determine whether it should be deemed an impair-
ment is Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986). In an oft-quoted passage, the
Fourth Circuit opined: "It would debase this high purpose [of the Rehabilitation Act]
if the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by
anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was
widely shared. Indeed, the very concept of an impairment implies a characteristic
that is not commonplace. . . ." Id. at 934.
356 Daley, 792 F.2d at 215. See also Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437
(D. Kan. 1996) (finding that common personality traits such as a violent temper are
not mental impairments); Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
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be an impairment because it is so widely shared.357 Courts that im-
pose this kind of "uncommonness" criterion appear to do so based on
their ordinary, nonlegal understanding of the term "impairment," for
the regulatory definition of the term provides no such limitation.
To date, this view of impairment as something out of the ordinary
has been expressed most often in cases involving personality traits and
myopia. It has, however, notable implications for other conditions
that could be characterized as disabilities, but that have not yet gener-
ated much ADA litigation. Specifically, age-related infirmities and the
possession of genetic mutations spring to mind.
In the legislative findings included in the ADA's text, Congress
recognized that aging and disability often go hand in hand. In its
Interpretive Guidance regarding the definition of "impairment," how-
ever, the EEOC takes the position that advanced age, in and of itself,
is not an impairment, but that "various medical conditions commonly
associated with age, such as hearing loss, osteoporosis, or arthritis
would constitute impairments."35 8 Thus, the EEOC approaches ad-
vanced age much as it does pregnancy or obesity: by themselves, these
conditions are generally viewed as normal and thus not impairments.
If a plaintiff can identify a medically determinable disorder associated
with one of these conditions, however, then an impairment may be
Va. 1994) (rejecting former law student's depression as a disability when evidence
showed that 40% of law students experience some depression).
357 SeeJoyce v. Suffolk County, 911 F. Supp. 92, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("The need for
corrective eyewear could reasonably be characterized as 'commonplace.'"); Trembcz-
synski v. City of Calumet City, No. 87-C0961, 1987 WL 16604 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1987)
(reasoning that being slightly myopic is a widely shared physical characteristic, not an
impairment as contemplated by the Rehabilitation Act); cf Venclauskas v. Connecti-
cut, 921 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1995) (finding "plaintiff's visual 'impairment' [not] to
be unusually severe or rare"). Another court has reasoned that the commonness of
the need to wear corrective lenses means that a moderate vision impairment does not
substantially limit a person's major life activities. See Sweet, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at
*15-*16 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The other issue that is typically discussed when visually im-
paired plaintiffs sue under the ADA is whether the measure of the limitations im-
posed by the impairment should take into account the availability of mitigating
measures. In other words, does the court assess the impact of myopia on the plaintiff
with his glasses off or on? Compare Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F.
Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (availability of mitigating measures should not be consid-
ered) with Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (availability of
mitigating measures should be considered).
358 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), app. (1998); accord RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE 338-39 (1995) (suggesting that characteristic age-related ailments and deficits
may be deemed disabilities).
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present.359 Thus, an elderly woman whose arthritis prevents her from
performing manual tasks and caring for herself would likely be seen as
having a substantially limiting impairment under this approach. Like-
wise, an elderly man whose hearing loss substantially limits his ability
to hear may have a disability.
But what would a court make of the fact that over half the people
over the age of eighty-four years have impaired hearing?3 60 Would
that mean that loss of hearing is too common, at least among elderly
persons, to rise to the level of an impairment? At issue is whether we
should have an age-relative understanding of impairment and disabil-
ity for purposes of disability discrimination law. Ron Amundson, a
disability studies scholar, suggests that in some cases we should. He
sees medical normality as relative to age and argues that the narrowed
range of opportunity associated with frailty is species-typical for elderly
humans. As a consequence, Amundson sees this reduced opportunity
as a natural part of aging and therefore different from the socially
constructed narrowing of opportunity experienced by younger per-
sons with disabilities.3
61
Nonetheless, Amundson's exclusion from the category of disabil-
ity of some elderly persons with conditions that limit their social par-
ticipation is premised less on the commonness of the condition than
on the natural, rather than constructed, character of the limitations
experienced.362 According to this reasoning, the eighty-five year old
359 See supra Parts IV.A and IV.B for a discussion of the EEOC's approach to preg-
nancy and obesity. Some of the concerns about medicalization discussed in these
parts may also apply to the ability of an old person to obtain a medical diagnosis
identifying a particular disorder that causes the increasing, and disabling, frailty that
may accompany advanced age. "[F)railty is very common at an advanced age. It is
difficult to know the extent to which that frailty is the result of disease, of the aging
process itself, and of disuse, often compounded by neglect and depression." Edward
W. Campion, The Oldest Od 330 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1819, 1819 (1994). Cf SHERWIN B.
NuLAND, How WE DIE 43-44 (1993) (decrying the insistence of medical examiners
that all death certificates state a "cause of death" when a person may simply have died
of old age).
360 See Campion, supra note 359, at 1819 ("Half the people over the age of 84 years
have impaired hearing; vision impairment, falls, hip fractures, stroke, cancer, and car-
diovascular disease are also common. Nearly a third of the very elderly have some
degree of dementia.").
361 See Amundson, supra note 160, at 115. Amundson, however, recognizes that
elderly persons with other impairments may face some of the same problems of disa-
bility as younger persons with the same impairments.
362 But see WENDELL, supra note 138, at 18 ("It is not obvious to me that the reduc-
tion of opportunities experienced by the elderly are any more attributable to nature




who is hard of hearing might qualify as an individual with a disability
for purposes of suing a fast food restaurant for failing to make elec-
tronic assistive technology available at its drive-through window. 63 By
contrast, the eighty-five year old who is extremely frail might not be
deemed an individual with a disability for purposes of suing a retire-
ment home for failing to provide a personal attendant to help her
walk so that she can enjoy walking through the gardens like other, less
frail residents. The distinction that Amundson might draw here is
that the former person's inability to place a fast food order results
from social structures that fail to account for the abilities of all people,
while the latter's inability to stroll the gardens results from the natural
processes of aging. Thus, from this perspective, the decision as to
whether a person has a disability depends at least in part on the na-
ture and source of the disadvantage encountered as a result of a bod-
ily condition.
Another situation in which commonness might come into play in
the assessment of potential impairment is when a person claims to
have been discriminated against because that person has a genetic
mutation or genetic marker associated with an increased risk that a
disease or disabling condition will develop in the future. That situa-
tion raises the question whether the person is currently an individual
with a disability protected from discriminatory treatment by the ADA.
In its Compliance Manual, the EEOC takes the position that a person
subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic information relat-
ing to illness, disease, or other disorders falls within the "regarded as"
prong of the definition of "disability."36 In adopting this stance, the
EEOC appears to assume, without any analysis of the question, that a
genetic sequence predisposing an individual to a disease or disorder
can be considered an impairment for ADA purposes. The EEOC's
position has prompted much commentary on the question of whether
the mere possession of such a predisposing genetic sequence or muta-
363 Cf James Bovard, The Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J.,June 22,
1995, at A16 (describing settlement of deaf woman's lawsuit against Burger King).
364 See Compliance Manua4 supra note 235, at § 902.8(a). The Compliance Manual
gives the following example: CP's genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to
colon cancer. CP is currently asymptomatic and many never in fact develop colon
cancer. After making CP a conditional offer of employment, R learns about CP's
increased susceptibility to colon cancer. R then withdraws the job offer because of
concerns about matters such as CP's productivity, insurance costs, and attendance. R
is treating CP as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
See id. For the EEOC's regulatory description of how a person can succeed on a per-
ceived disability claim, see supra note 273.
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tion can be considered a disability.3 65 Much of this commentary, how-
ever, has focused on the social and economic impacts of finding that
persons genetically predisposed to serious conditions are protected by
the ADA.
36 6
If we are to continue using the ADA's existing definition of "disa-
bility," however, it seems imperative to address directly the question of
whether the presence within a person's genotype 367 of gene(s) indi-
cating an increased risk of future disease or disorder should be
deemed an impairment. 3 68 Thus, the question becomes whether a
predisposing genetic sequence or genetic mutation can be under-
stood as a "physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of [several] body
systems. '3 69 When one considers the nature of genetic mutations,
they do not appear to fit easily within that definition.
A genetic mutation can be simply defined as a structural change
in a gene. In other words, when we speak of a genetic mutation, we're
talking about a variation from the typical sequence for a particular
gene. Mutations can be either inherited from parents or created
365 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and Insurance, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 187 (Jane West ed. 1996);Joseph
S. Alper, Does the ADA Provide Protection Against Discrimination on the Basis of Genotype?,
23J.L. MED. & ETHICS 167 (1995); Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic
Age: Do Our Genes Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?,
42 ViLL. L. REV. 613 (1997); Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntington's Disease
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1406 (1997); Kirke D. Weaver,
Genetic Screening and the Right Not to Know, 13 ISSUES L. & MED. 243 (1997).
366 Compare Gostin, supra note 365 (arguing, inter alia, that failure to protect per-
sons from genetic discrimination will create physical and economic dependence and
will discourage individuals from being tested) with Dichter & Sutor, supra note 365
(arguing, inter alia, that protecting individuals with asymptomatic genetic disorders
will increase litigation costs).
367 A gene is a single functional unit of hereditary material located upon a chro-
mosome, which is the package in which a single strand of DNA is stored and transmit-
ted. See ROBERT C. KING & WILLIAM D. STANSFIELD, A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 136
(5th ed. 1997). An individual's genotype is the sum total of all the genes an individ-
ual receives from his parents. See id. at 141. No individual expresses every gene
within his genotype, however; nor does he express the same genes throughout his life.
An individual's phenotype, in contrast to his genotype, is the combination of physical
traits displayed by an individual. See id. at 258. These include visible traits, such as eye
color, height, and build, and invisible traits, such as the ability to make a particular
enzyme.
368 With the exception of Alper, supra note 365, this question has been largely
ignored in the commentary.
369 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
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within an individual's genotype.37 0 Each human being, on average,
creates two new mutations, inherits eight mutated genes, and is at risk
for at least one genetic disorder. Thus, if we view genetic mutations
per se as impairments, then we all have these impairments. No one
has a "normal" genotype in the sense of having a genotype without
mutation.
37 '
One might argue, though, that the commonness, indeed univer-
sality, of mutations generally should not preclude categorizing as im-
pairments those genetic sequences or mutations associated with
diseases or conditions that, if expressed, would qualify as impair-
ments. At least two difficulties with this argument spring to mind.
First, the simple fact that a "physiological disorder... affecting a body
system" may develop at some point in the future does not mean that
the mere presence of a mutation is such a disorder. Unless the muta-
tion is currently causing some impact on bodily systems, it does not
seem to fit within the definition of "impairment."3 7 2 In this sense,
some genetic mutations will be distinguishable from asymptomatic
HIV infection-a condition to which asymptomatic genetic conditions
370 Mutations can occur in an individual's genotype in one of two general ways.
They can be inherited from one's parents, thus producing a uniform mutation car-
ried in every cell of the offspring. Alternatively, mutations can occur through the
process of gene duplication, through chromosonal aberrations, or through the effect
of mutagens (physical or chemical agents that raise the frequency of mutation above
the spontaneous rate) on individual cells. See KING & STANSFIELD, supra note 367, at
224. For duplication, chromosomal, and mutagen mutations, the degree to which a
mutation will be uniform throughout an individual's cells depends on how early in
cell division the mutation occurs. For example, a mutation that occurs in a gamete
will be uniformly present in all the individual's cells, and cancer is often the result of
the mutation of a single cell that causes the cell to divide out of control.
371 See Wolf, supra note 29, at 348 (characterizing as a "fiction" the idea that there
is such a thing as a " 'normal' genotype").
372 How genetic mutations contribute to particular diseases or disorders has in
many cases not yet been discovered by science and is currently the focus of intense
scientific investigation. Of necessity, then, the points that follow are simplifications
and generalizations regarding extremely complex and diverse matters; these points
are raised simply to provoke thought on how genetic mutations logically fit (or do not
fit) within the legal definition of impairment.
It is unclear whether a mutated gene functions atypically throughout an individ-
ual's life or whether atypical functioning is triggered by environmental factors. Even
if a gene functions atypically throughout an individual's life, its atypical functioning
may not have an adverse impact on any bodily system for many years, if ever. For
example, in the case of the "breast cancer genes," BRGA1 and BRCA2, the function of
the genes that are mutated is the production of tumor suppressing enzymes. Accord-
ingly, the failure of these genes to function typically would appear to have an impact
on the woman's body only once a tumor starts growing. Cf Patricia Kahn, Coming to
Grips with Genes and Risk, 274 SCIENCE 496 (1996).
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are often analogized 373-for the Supreme Court found that HLV in-
fection has an adverse impact on the body's lymphatic and hemic sys-
tems from the moment of infection.
3 74
The second problem with characterizing genetic mutations asso-
ciated with diseases as impairments in and of themselves is the incredi-
ble uncertainty whether those mutations will ever express themselves
phenotypically in a particular individual. It is only in relatively few
cases of single gene disorders, for example cystic fibrosis or Hunting-
ton's disease, that the presence of a single gene (or pair of genes)
predicts with certainty the eventual onset of a disease. Most diseases
with genetic components, by contrast, are multigenic (they involve the
presence of multiple genes) and multifactorial (they depend on the
interaction of genetic factors with other biological or environmental
factors). Moreover, even if a gene is expressed, most genes are char-
acterized by variable expression; that is, the impact the gene may have
on a person's body may range from quite mild to severe.375
As a result of all this uncertainty about the predictive value of
genetic information, trying to find current impairment in the pres-
ence of a mutation that may someday have some effect on an individ-
ual raises difficult line-drawing questions.3 76 How likely must it be
that a mutation will express itself before the mutation can be deemed
an impairment? How great must the likely severity of an expressed
condition be? How likely must it be that any expression will be severe,
rather than mild? Ultimately, because the predictive value of genetics
today remains quite limited,3 77 predictions of future disease do not
373 See Gin, supra note 365, at 1423 (recognizing the similarities between HIV-
positive status and Huntington's disease); see also Weaver, supra note 365 (arguing
that asymptomatic genetic disorders are likely to fall within the third prong of the
ADA's definition of "disability" because HIV has been found to do so).
374 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998).
375 See Peter D. Blanck & Mollie W. Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VIL. L. REV. 345, 386-87 (1997).
376 Cf Gin, supra note 365, at 1414-15 (acknowledging line-drawing problem).
377 See Ruth Hubbard & R. C. Lewontin, Pitfalls of Genetic Testing, 334 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1192, 1192 (1996) (arguing that current genetic testing technology cannot ade-
quately take into account the complexity of genetic diseases); Pamela S. Karnes, Order-
ing and Interpreting DNA Tests, 71 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 1192, 1192-94 (1996) (stating
that, for a majority of genetic disorders, accurate genetic testing currently cannot be
performed due to the vast number of different mutations causing a particular disor-
der); Stephen G. Post et al., The Clinical Introduction of Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's
Disease, 277JAMA 832, 833-34 (1997) (stating that the inaccuracy of genetic tests for
Alzheimer's has led numerous governmental and scientific committees to recom-
mend against its use as a predictive assessment of asymptomatic individuals).
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provide a firm foundation for findings of current impairment for ADA
purposes.
To summarize, it becomes quite difficult to argue that genetic
mutations or sequences that are not yet phenotypically expressed
should be deemed impairments for purposes of the ADA's definition
of "disability.1378 If we argue that the simple fact of possessing a muta-
tion equates to impairment, then impairment of this sort is ubiqui-
tous. But if we try to characterize a mutation as an impairment by
linking the mutation to its potential impact, the absence of any pres-
ent impact on body systems and the unpredictability of any future im-
pact weigh against a finding of current impairment. Under this
analysis, the ADA appears to offer little shelter for persons discrimi-
nated against on the basis of genetic information.
Yet how might this analysis be viewed by a disability studies
scholar? To begin, the scholar might relish the challenge that the
foregoing discussion issues to the utility of the concept of impair-
ment-as defined by the ADA regulations-as a precondition for a
finding of disability. Delving into the depths of human genetics dem-
onstrates that none of us is one hundred percent "normal." We all
deviate in some way from what is typical, and the use of a medicalized
concept of impairment as a means of cordoning off those whose devi-
ance can potentially be viewed as a disability is likely to be unsatisfac-
tory to a disability studies scholar.
That said, it bears noting that a disability studies understanding
of the nature of disability-that disability is found in the disadvantages
imposed by social and cultural systems and structures on persons with
bodily or mental differences-suggests that some persons with genetic
mutations might properly be considered persons with disabilities. The
evidence is plentiful that discrimination based on genetic information
has occurred. Thus, persons have been subjected to adverse differen-
tial treatment based on fears, prejudices, and stereotypes regarding a
bodily characteristic. In that sense, the disadvantages experienced by
persons whose genotype suggests an increased risk for a particular
condition are similar to the disadvantages faced by persons with more
"traditional" disabilities. One might argue, therefore, that we should
rethink our understanding of impirment as a threshold requirement
for showing disability protected under the ADA. The final Part of this
Article offers some preliminary thoughts in that regard.
378 For a valiant, though to my mind ultimately unconvincing, argument to the
contrary, see Alper, supra note 365, at 168-69 (arguing that "an altered genotype that
is associated with a disease is both an anatomical loss and a physiological disorder").
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V. WHAT TO MAKE OF ALL THIS: CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES
TO IMPAIRMENT
The discussion in the foregoing Part touches on several seem-
ingly disparate features of how agencies and courts have treated the
concept of impairment, as it is used in the ADA's definition of "disa-
bility." What ties these different observations together is that each is of
interest, and potentially of concern, to disability theorists, for each has
significant implications for our understanding of disability as a phe-
nomenon and, by extension, our view of which persons should receive
protection under disability discrimination legislation. Before going
on to reflect on those implications, it may be worth summarizing
three tendencies, illuminated in Part IV, on the part of courts address-
ing the existence of impairment.
First, courts that rely on the regulatory definition of "impair-
ment" in assessing a plaintiff whose disability is disputed tend to em-
ploy a medicalized understanding of impairment. These courts are
likely to require medical evidence of the plaintiffs condition and are
likely to find impairment only when some physical disorder is diag-
nosed. For these courts, the mere fact that some bodily characteristic
of the plaintiff prompted adverse treatment is insufficient; only if that
bodily characteristic can be described in pathological terms can the
plaintiff be protected as disabled.
Second, other courts, rather than focusing on how the regulatory
definition of "impairment" applies to the plaintiff's situation, may use
their own subjective, nonlegal understanding of impairment. These
courts may tend to view impairment as something that is necessarily
out of the ordinary or uncommon and thus disqualify as an impair-
ment any bodily characteristic that is widely shared. As a result, any-
one whose major life activities are substantially limited by such a
common characteristic could not be an individual with a disability.
Third, some courts tend to extend the term "impairment" to de-
scribe not only the physical characteristic affecting a bodily system,
but also the limitation experienced by the plaintiff with that character-
istic. These courts speak of the disadvantage faced by the plaintiff as
an impairment and thus seem to confuse the concept of impairment
with the concept of substantial limitation. As noted, the danger (from
a disability theory perspective) that this confusion creates is that the
courts will conflate impairment, which describes the body, with disa-
bility, which describes socially caused disadvantage.
Of these three tendencies, the first two implicate what standard
should be used in determining the existence of impairment for legal
purposes. The third tendency, by contrast, is more significant as a
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reflection of judges' mindset as they decide, disputes about the exist-
ence of disability. Ajudge's confusion of the concepts of impairment
and limitation seems to evidence an understanding of disability consis-
tent with the medical model described in Part III.B.1, for it suggests
that the judge understands the social or vocational limitation exper-
ienced by the plaintiff as part and parcel of her physical condition.
What can we learn about defining "disability" for purposes of dis-
ability discrimination law from looking at how courts have addressed
the question of impairment? The most important lesson that flows
from the discussion in Part IV is that defining "impairment," like de-
fining the larger concept of "disability" for which impairment is a
building block, unavoidably presents questions about where lines
should be drawn. At what point and on what basis does a physical
characteristic rise to the level of an impairment? The legal assess-
ments of impairment discussed above suggest two possible responses.
A certain level of deviance from normal bodily characteristics is one
possible basis for drawing lines, one that the EEOC guidelines employ
in determining when a simple physical characteristic like height or
weight can be an impairment. The courts that refuse to find common
conditions to be impairments also implicitly employ a deviance ap-
proach to impairment. As discussed above, however, trying to draw a
dividing line between normal and deviant-or common and uncom-
mon-anywhere along the spectrum of bodily characteristics and
their frequencies is artificial and ultimately arbitrary.
Another possible basis for drawing lines between characteristics
that are impairments and those that are not is to draw the lines based
on medical diagnoses of disorder and dysfunction. An examination of
the regulatory definition of "impairment" suggests, at first blush, that
determining the existence of impairment simply involves an objective
assessment of the physical body, which then produces a dear-cut re-
sponse. Indeed, this is part of the appeal of a medicalized approach
to impairment: simply let the doctor take a look at the plaintiff and
perform objective tests, and the doctor can validate the existence, or
confirm the nonexistence, of impairment. Thus, under an approach
to impairment consistent with the medical model, the line-drawing
dilemma is obscured, for the sheen of straightforward objectivity at-
taches to medical decisions.
Yet as we have seen, a medicalized approach to determining im-
pairment has its own problems, both practical and political. Medical
judgments are often far more imprecise, more subjective, and less cer-
tain than is popularly perceived. While physicians undoubtedly are
able to make definite diagnoses in some cases, medical "science" is
often quite tentative in its assessments. Thus, even a medical ap-
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proach to identifying impairment raises line-drawing questions: how
certain must it be that a plaintiff has a particular disorder? How well
must scientists understand the nature and cause of a set of symptoms
before those symptoms become the basis for diagnosing a disorder?
To what extent must a diagnosis be based on objective, measurable
evidence, and to what extent may it be influenced by the patient's
subjective description of her experience? The answer to each of these
questions influences where and how lines are drawn when doctors are
given the authority to assess impairment. Moreover, even if a medical-
ized approach to impairment solved the line-drawing quandary, it has
a political drawback in that persons identifying themselves as disabled
may object to a requirement that they submit to medical authority for
professional validation of their self-description.
Since both the medicalized approach and the deviance approach
to identifying impairment present difficult problems of line-drawing,
we might well ask whether we should even retain the concept of im-
pairment as the foundation for a determination of disability. But what
else is there? Can we imagine other approaches, which do not de-
pend on a finding of impairment, to identify who is disabled for pur-
poses of disability discrimination law? Admittedly, thorough
consideration of the wisdom of discarding our existing definition
would require an in-depth understanding not only of the issues that
have arisen with respect to impairment, but also of unresolved issues
regarding the meaning of "substantially limit" and "major life activ-
ity"-issues that this Article has not addressed. Nonetheless, the expe-
rience with giving legal meaning to impairment is sufficient to
support preliminary reflections on alternative approaches to defining
"disability," especially if we focus on what kinds of bodily characteris-
tics are prerequisites to falling within the definition.
One alternative approach would be to open up the protection of
disability discrimination law to anyone subjected to adversely discrimi-
natory treatment on the basis of any physical characteristic. This ap-
proach would clearly broaden the group of persons protected, for the
plaintiff could allege discrimination based on any condition that now
falls within the definition of "impairment" or on traits such as short
stature, baldness, or other aspects of nonpathological physical appear-
ance. This approach would have the advantage of eliminating litiga-
tion over the existence of the plaintiffs impairment; instead everyone
could be a potential plaintiff. In addition, discarding the medicalized
concept of impairment in favor of an approach that provides a rem-
edy for body-based discrimination more broadly responds to the lack
of logical justification for treating persons differently depending on
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whether they can attach a medical label to their discrimination-
prompting attribute.
While the fact that everyone could be a potential plaintiff is
presented above as an advantage of this approach, it might equally
well be characterized as a weakness. This is the floodgates argument:
if anyone can bring a lawsuit alleging discrimination based on a physi-
cal characteristic, then virtually every employment dispute (or disa-
greement between a public agency or public accommodation and
customer regarding the services provided) can turn into a vehicle for
a discrimination suit. Courts that have drawn the line on their willing-
ness to treat a physical characteristic as an impairment have drawn
back from this very possibility. As the First Circuit warned in rejecting
as an impairment overweight not rising to the level of morbid obesity,
allowing claims of discrimination based on simple physical characteris-
tics to proceed would permit the development of a "catch-all cause of
action for discrimination based on appearance, size, and any number
of other things far removed from the reasons the [ADA was]
passed."3
7 9
Perhaps, however, we could imagine some device that would
stanch the expected flow of litigants into court. Perhaps, in an at-
tempt to make disability discrimination law harmonize more with disa-
bility theory, a qualifier might be attached to "physical characteristic."
For example, prohibited discrimination might include only actions
taken based on a physical characteristic generally associated with so-
cial, cultural, or economic disadvantage. Under such an approach,
discrimination based on obesity would be prohibited, but discrimina-
tion based on a person's blue eyes would not be. This limit on prohib-
ited bases of discrimination accords with the social model of disability
in that it focuses on the social, cultural, or economic disadvantage
that flows from bodily difference rather than on the functional limita-
tions that flow from an impairment. To the extent that only those
characteristics shared by a minority of persons are likely to result in
disadvantage (according to Anita Silvers' "historical counterfactualiz-
ing"38 0 ), this approach may also harmonize with the minority group
model of disability.
But would such an approach represent an improvement in terms
of clarity with respect to who is protected? Probably not. Courts will
still have to draw lines if asked to apply a standard like "physical char-
acteristic associated with social, cultural, or economic disadvantage."
They will still have to answer questions like "How serious must the
379 Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 287 (1st Cir. 1997).
380 See supra text accompanying note 205.
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disadvantage be?" and "How close must the association be between
physical characteristic and the disadvantage?" These kinds of ques-
tions echo the questions that courts are struggling with today regard-
ing, for example, how limited a person's employment options must be
in order to be substantially limited. Thus, any attempt to particularize
the types of physical characteristics protected will create its own bor-
der disputes. Of course, if we are stuck having to draw lines, we
should at least attempt to identify standards for drawing lines that
comport with our understanding of whom we wish to protect. In
other words, it might be perfectly rational to trade one set of line-
drawing issues for another if we believe that the second set of issues is
more closely directed to accomplishing our policy goals.
One possible way to avoid line-drawing questions about what kind
of physical characteristics a person must possess in order to claim the
protection of disability discrimination law is simply to list specifically
those physical characteristics covered as per se disabilities. Congress
rejected this approach in enacting the ADA, largely out of fear that
any list would be underinclusive. What Congress apparently did not
anticipate, however, was the fashion in which its broad and flexible
approach to defining "disability" could be narrowly construed by the
courts. Thus, while substituting a list of covered disabilities might be
characterized as narrowing the coverage of disability discrimination
law, a generously drawn list including not only "traditional" disabili-
ties, but also serious medical conditions, genetic predispositions for
serious conditions, and obesity (for example) could actually expand
the scope of coverage currently available. Adopting a list approach
would substantially decrease the amount of litigation on the question
of who is an individual with a covered disability, but it would
hypermedicalize the inquiry, for in many cases, medical records or
expert testimony would be necessary to establish that the plaintiff in-
deed has a covered disability.
As Congress feared, a list approach to defining "disability" would
be less flexible than the existing constitutive approach. Each individ-
ual plaintiff would be assessed to determine whether she possessed a
condition listed as a disability, but if such a condition were found, the
need for individualized assessment of the impact on a major life activ-
ity would vanish. This approach would ease the litigation path for
plaintiffs with a listed condition; by contrast, it could pose an insur-
mountable barrier for persons who allege a condition that is unlisted,
but that might nonetheless fall within the existing definition of "im-
pairment." If this approach were taken, it would seem imperative to
devise a mechanism for expanding and updating the list to include
conditions as they are newly discovered or as their disabling effect is
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recognized. Authority for list expansion might be delegated to an ad-
ministrative agency, or an agency might be responsible for recom-
mending expansions for congressional approval.
Although Congress rejected a list approach partly to ensure that
more persons would be protected by casting the "individual with a
disablity" net broadly, some disability theorists supportive of the mi-
nority group model might actually prefer a list approach to the ex-
isting "disability" definition, for some theorists reject a continuum
understanding of disability that seeks to push the boundaries of disa-
bility outward beyond that group of persons with "traditional," soci-
etally recognized disabilities. These theorists might argue that a list
approach can best be tailored to protect maximally the truly dis-
abled-those persons who have historically been subjected to social
disadvantage and who present themselves to society as having a
disability.38 '
In terms of what goes on the list, some theorists might suggest the
practice of historical counterfactualizing as a way of identifying what
conditions subject their bearers to disadvantage as a result of society's
failure to take the needs of all persons into account. Likewise, evi-
dence of social, cultural, and economic disadvantage gleaned by social
scientists 38 2 or demonstrated through testimony at congressional hear-
ings could provide fodder for the list. From a disability studies per-
spective, however, drafting the list of covered conditions carries with it
dangers of divisiveness, for disability studies scholars differ among
themselves, for example, on whether chronic illnesses and age frailty
should be understood as disabilities.38
3
In any event, a list approach to defining "disability" might,38 4 on
balance, prove more inclusive than the existing definition of "disabil-
ity," as it has been applied by the courts. It would, however, also likely
exclude individuals with nontraditional or marginal disabilities who
might be able to succeed in proving disability under the current defi-
nition. Which brings us back full circle to the questions this Part
started with: whom does our society truly want to protect from dis-
381 See supra text accompanying notes 262-63.
382 See Hahn, supra note 152 (arguing for more social science research into the
creation of disability).
383 Compare Amundson, supra note 160 (distinguishing chronic illness and age
frailty from disability) with WENDELL, supra note 138 (including chronic illness and
age frailty in her discussion of disabilities).
384 The breadth of any actual list, of course, would depend on numerous factors
that could affect the political dynamic involved in composing the list.
1999]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[
crimination based on bodily difference? And how can we draw lines
around the concept of disability in order to protect those persons?38 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of whom our society truly wants to protect from
adverse discrimination based on bodily difference is ultimately a ques-
tion for the body politic. The aim of this Article, by contrast, has been
to use the analytical tools provided by scholars in the field of disability
studies to scrutinize how lawmakers to date have understood the con-
cept of impairment as one form of bodily difference. By viewing ad-
ministrative and judicial treatments of impairment through a
disability studies lens, I have sought to give the disability kaleidoscope
a turn and thus to provide the reader with an altered view of impair-
ment and, by extension, disability. The purpose of presenting this
changed view is primarily to educate, rather than to persuade. In
other words, it is less my aim to convince the reader that the social
model or minority group model of disability is "right," than to dispel
the reader's conviction that the medical model understanding is the
only shape that the disability picture can take.
Ultimately, the Article's goal is modest: to begin an examination,
and hopefully a discourse, on how the legal community understands
disability-specifically disability as an illegitimate basis for discrimina-
tory treatment. Fleshing out this understanding is essential to resolv-
ing some of the uncertainty and division in the courts about who is an
individual with a disability entitled to the ADA's protection. But criti-
cally assessing the law's understanding of impairment and disability
has broader implications as well, for the legal decision to identify per-
sons as protected by the ADA can broadcast a powerful message to
society at large. One goal of the ADA is to change societal attitudes
toward individuals with disabilities,3 86 and prodding lawmakers to
think more critically about the very concept of disability may prove a
first step towards encouraging members of society to scrutinize their
own assumptions about disability.
385 I recognize that focusing on whom disability discrimination ought to protect is
not the only way to respond to the current confusion in the courts. An alternative
approach would be to focus on the type of action prohibited rather than on the type
of person protected. Anita Silvers suggests false theorizing about the impact of an
actual or putative impairment on a plaintiff's abilities as one type of prohibited ac-
tion. See Silvers, supra note 295.
386 See Dick Thornburgh, The Americans with Disabilities Act: What It Means to All
Americans, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 375, 384 (1991) ("The ADA is social legislation to end
barriers.... [W] e do need some consciousness-raising about Americans with disabili-
ties, especially since our mistaken attitudes are often so well-meaning and so
ingrained.").
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